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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN FRANCISCO**

**FILED**  
**FEB 28 2022**  
 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
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*ISS.*

**Harry J. Williby,**

**Plaintiff,**

**vs.**

**Sergey Brin,**  
**Larry Page,**  
**Pichai Sundararajan, a.k.a.,**  
**Sundar Pichai, his predecessor,**  
**Eric Schmidt, dba, Alphabet,**  
**Inc.,**  
**Google, LLC., and YouTube,**  
**LLC., dba, Blogger, dba,**  
**Google AdSense**  
**(Pay-Per-Click)**  
**Mark Zuckerberg, dba,**  
**Facebook, Inc.,**  
**Jeff Bezos, dba,**  
**Amazon.com, Inc., and**  
**Doe(s)/Roe(s) 1-10,**  
**Defendant(s).**

Case No.

**C22-01271**

**VC**

**COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES**  
**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

**ORIGINAL**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The Plaintiff, Harry J. Williby ("Williby" or "Plaintiff"), by and through its attorneys, (In Pro Se), as and for its complaint against Defendants Sergey Brin, Larry

1 Page, Sundar Pichai, his predecessor, Eric Schmidt, dba, Alphabet, Inc., Google, LLC.,  
2 and YouTube, LLC., dba, Blogger, dba, Google AdSense (Pay-Per-Click), Mark  
3 Zuckerberg, dba, Facebook, Inc., Jeff Bezos, dba, Amazon.com, Inc., and Doe(s)/Roe(s)  
4 1-10, allege as follows:  
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## 6 **II. NATURE OF THE ACTION**

7  
8 1. This is an action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to restrain  
9 anticompetitive conduct by the defendants, the world's largest providers of the Android  
10 OS, Google Apps, Google Search browser, Internet advertising, online sales, and online  
11 news feed, and to remedy the effects of their past unlawful conduct. Defendants' actions,  
12 conduct and agreements are restraints of trade that are per se unlawful under Section 1 of  
13 the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. and § 2. This is also an action for damages and other relief  
14 arising out of the Defendants' unlawful and unfair decision to deprive Plaintiff of earned  
15 Internet Advertising Revenue. Defendants' actions, conduct and agreements are restraints  
16 of trade that are per se unlawful and constitute false advertising under the Lanham Act,  
17 15 U.S. Code § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B). The Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting such  
18 actions, conduct and agreements.  
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22 2. Since 2003, Defendants have tightly limited the supply and territorial  
23 markets of online advertisement in the United States and around the world, through its  
24 Google "AdSense (PPC)" program. Defendants have also collectively controlled and  
25 dictated under what terms and conditions, the website owners, or content creators, such as  
26 the Plaintiff, can have an online, digital advertising presence. This is achieved through a  
27 process commonly referred to by Defendants as "Demonetization," or "Shadow  
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1 Banning.” This is not a fair process in a competitive marketplace. It is a horizontal  
2 price-fixing scheme-rigged process that, contrary to the law, promotes a monopoly in  
3 order to further line the pockets of the Alphabet Defendants (owners) jointly and  
4 severally, with billions of dollars paid by their billionaire competitors (Defendants  
5 Facebook and Amazon) to the sole detriment of the Plaintiff, website owners, content  
6 creators and consumers. The Google “AdSense (PPC)” program is, essentially, a  
7 leveraging of the Defendants Android operating system and Internet browser monopoly  
8 power, used to extract value from Plaintiff, website owners, content creators and  
9 consumers, through a scheme-rigged process.  
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13 3. The costs of Defendants’ collective scheme is enormous, particularly to the  
14 public who bear the brunt of Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct. Due to the great  
15 demand for online advertisement, on the one hand, and Defendants’ collective market  
16 power over the online, digital advertising industry, on the other, Defendants can demand  
17 supra-competitive terms to the detriment of Plaintiff and consumers. This is a case of  
18 leveraging monopoly power, resulting in an anticompetitive wealth transfer from  
19 consumers to private business, in violation of the antitrust laws.  
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22 4. Not only does the Google “AdSense (PPC)” program violate the antitrust  
23 laws, the federal courts have previously determined the terms & conditions of the  
24 program to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable. *In Free Range Content*  
25 *Inc. v. Google Inc.*, No. 5:14-cv-02329 (BLF) Plaintiffs challenged the “Terms and  
26 Conditions” of the Google AdSense Program as unconscionable. The court held: “Thus,  
27 the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged at least a degree of procedural  
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1 unconscionability. See *Bridge Fund*, 622 F.3d at 1004. (At page 12) [¶] [...] the Court  
2 finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged substantive unconscionability.” (At Page  
3 14.) Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., dba, Google  
4 “AdSense (PPC)” alone, determines the terms & conditions of the Google “AdSense  
5 (PPC).”  
6

7  
8 5. Specifically, the Defendants, jointly and severally, controls all browsers,  
9 operating systems, online sales and online digital advertising; collectively, they control  
10 the terms & conditions, which Plaintiff, as the host of multiple websites, is an intended  
11 beneficiary; Defendants control who can place online ads; the number of advertisements  
12 that can be placed online (or on a particular page); where the ads are located online; and  
13 the cost of these online ads, which gives them complete market control and power.  
14 Through this decidedly skewed process, Defendants concertedly refused to deal with  
15 Plaintiff. As a result of Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct, jointly and severally, the  
16 Defendants (during the operative times of this complaint) have shared, or will share, in  
17 more than \$1.4 Trillion in online, digital advertising revenue. Maximizing their cartel  
18 revenue – ultimately at the expense of the consuming public and Plaintiff – is what really  
19 matters to Defendants.  
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23 6. The Defendants’ unlawful conduct has caused Plaintiff significant injury and  
24 loss. Among other things, Plaintiff has lost the value of his significant ten year  
25 investment in the websites/pages set forth below in ¶ 52. Plaintiff is burdened with a  
26 brand (Wilabee, (derivative brand of Williby)) of significantly diminished value, and has  
27 lost the revenues generated by the ten year investment in the websites/pages set forth  
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1 below in ¶ 52. Defendants disregarded every objective factor in the destruction, shadow  
2 banning and demonetization of Plaintiff's websites/pages set forth below in ¶ 52. Thus,  
3 concerted demonetizing, shadow banning and refusing to deal with Plaintiff on  
4 objective terms in an effort to maximize their ad revenue, as well as leveraging their  
5 multi-market monopoly power, was not grounded on, or based upon any objective  
6 criteria. Because Defendants' collective action was not grounded in objective criteria and  
7 violates the law, their collective action lacks any procompetitive justifications.  
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10 7. The Defendants, jointly and severally, possesses (and for several years has  
11 possessed) monopoly power in the market for browsers, online sale of goods, payment  
12 systems, Internet advertising, online news feeds, PC/tablets/smartphones and mobile  
13 based operating systems. Defendants' "Android" operating systems are used on over 98%  
14 of cell phones, the dominant type of cell phones in the United States. More than 90% of  
15 new cell phones are shipped with a version of Android apps pre-installed. Cell Phone  
16 manufacturers (often referred to as Original Equipment Manufacturers, or "OEMs") have  
17 no commercially reasonable alternative to Android operating systems for the cell phones,  
18 tablets, or wearables that they distribute.  
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20  
21 8. There are high barriers to entry in the market for browsers, the online sale of  
22 goods, payment systems, Internet advertising, online news feeds, PC/tablets/smartphones  
23 and mobile based operating systems. One of the most important barriers to entry is the  
24 barrier created by the number of software applications that must run on an operating  
25 system in order to make the operating system attractive to end users. Because end users  
26 want a large number of applications available, because most applications today are  
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1 written to run on Android, and because it would be prohibitively difficult,  
2 time-consuming, and expensive to create an alternative operating system that would run  
3 the programs that run on Android, a potential new operating system entrant faces a high  
4 barrier to successful entry and thus cannot develop browsers, platforms for the online sale  
5 of goods, payment systems, Internet advertising, online news feeds,  
6 PC/tablets/smartphones, or mobile based operating systems.  
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8  
9 9. Accordingly, the most significant potential threat to the Defendants'  
10 operating system monopoly is not from a direct, frontal assault by existing or new  
11 operating systems, but from new software products that may support, or themselves  
12 become, alternative "platforms" to which applications can be written, and which can be  
13 used in conjunction with multiple operating systems, including but not limited to  
14 Android.  
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16  
17 10. To protect its valuable Android monopoly against such potential competitive  
18 threats, and to extend its operating system monopoly into other software markets, The  
19 Defendants, jointly and severally, have engaged in a series of anticompetitive activities.  
20 The Defendants' conduct includes agreements tying other software products to the  
21 Android operating system; exclusionary agreements precluding companies from  
22 distributing, promoting, buying, or using products of Android's software competitors or  
23 potential competitors; and exclusionary agreements restricting the right of companies to  
24 provide services or resources to Android's software competitors or potential competitors.  
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27 11. One important current source of potential competition for Android's  
28 operating system monopoly comes from the Internet. The development of competing

1 Internet browsers -- specialized software programs that allow PC users to locate, access,  
2 display, and manipulate content and applications located on the Internet's World Wide  
3 Web ("the web") -- posed a serious potential threat to Android's operating system  
4 monopoly.  
5

6 12. Internet browsers pose a competitive threat to Android's operating system  
7 monopoly in two basic ways. First, as discussed above, one of the most important  
8 barriers to the entry and expansion of potential competitors to the Defendants in  
9 supplying platforms for the online sale of goods, payment systems, Internet advertising,  
10 online news feeds, PC/tablets/smartphones, or mobile based operating systems, is the  
11 large number of software applications that will run on the Android operating system, but  
12 not on other operating systems. If application programs could be written to run on  
13 multiple operating systems, competition in the market for platforms for the online sale of  
14 goods, payment systems, Internet advertising, online news feeds,  
15 PC/tablets/smartphones, or mobile based operating systems could be revitalized. For  
16 example, a programming language can be designed in part to permit applications written  
17 in it to be run on different operating systems, other than Android. As such, it threatens to  
18 reduce or eliminate one of the key barriers to entry protecting Android's operating  
19 system monopoly.  
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24 13. Internet browsers are perhaps the most significant vehicle for distribution of  
25 platforms for the online sale of goods, payment systems, Internet advertising, online news  
26 feeds, to end users. The Defendants have recognized that the widespread use of browsers,  
27 other than their own, threatens to increase the distribution of platforms for the online sale  
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1 of goods, payment systems, Internet advertising, online news feeds, and in so doing  
2 threatens Defendants' Android operating system monopoly. Second, the Defendants  
3 recognized that a browser was itself a "platform" to which many applications were being  
4 written -- and to which (if it thrived) more and more applications would be written. For  
5 example, since a java supported browser could be run on any PC operating system, the  
6 success of this alternative platform threatened to reduce or eliminate a key barrier  
7 protecting Defendants' Android operating system monopoly. Therefore, for example,  
8 when we load a website or a web service in which Java technology is used, it shows a  
9 message saying: "The [Google] Chrome browser does not support Java." The reason is  
10 that the [Google] Chrome browser no longer supports the NPAPI. NPAPI is a technology  
11 that supports Java applets.  
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15 14. To respond to the competitive threat posed by browsers not owned, or  
16 controlled by the Defendants, Defendant Google embarked on an extensive campaign to  
17 acquire, market and distribute Defendants' own mobile based Internet browser, which is  
18 named "Android."  
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20 15. Due to Defendants' vast resources and programming technology, Defendant  
21 Google was well positioned to develop and market a mobile based browser in  
22 competition with Internet OS platforms. Indeed, continued competition on the merits  
23 between Internet OS platforms and Defendant's Android OS would have resulted in  
24 greater innovation and the development of better products at lower prices. Moreover, in  
25 the absence of the Defendants anticompetitive conduct, the offsetting advantages of  
26 Facebook, Amazon and Google's size and dominant positions in OS software and the  
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1 Internet OS platform's position as the browser innovator and the leading distribution  
2 browser supplier, and the benefit to consumers of product differentiation, could have  
3 been expected to sustain competition on the merits between these companies, and perhaps  
4 others that have entered and might enter the OS market.  
5

6 16. However, the Defendants Facebook, Amazon and Google have not been  
7 willing simply to compete on the merits. The Defendants have concluded that it would be  
8 very hard to increase browser share on the merits of Android alone. It will be more  
9 important to leverage the OS asset to make people use Android instead of the Internet  
10 based platforms. Thus, the Defendants Facebook, Amazon and Google began, and  
11 continues today, a pattern of anticompetitive practices designed to thwart OS and browser  
12 competition on the merits, to deprive customers of a choice between alternative browsers,  
13 or operating systems, and to exclude the Defendants' Internet browser and/or OS  
14 competitors.  
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18 17. The Defendants' conduct with respect to Internet browsers and operating  
19 systems is a prominent and immediate example of the pattern of anticompetitive practices  
20 undertaken by the Defendants, jointly and severally, with the purpose and effect of  
21 maintaining its Android operating system monopoly and extending that monopoly to  
22 other related markets.  
23

24 18. The Defendants have clearly adapted the anticompetitive mantra of the  
25 former monopolistic giant Microsoft. In a warning to competitive rivals in June 1996, the  
26 Microsoft CEO stated: "*We are going to cut off their air supply. Everything they're*  
27 *selling, we're going to give away for free. Our business model works even if all Internet*  
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1 software is free. . . . We are still selling operating systems." First, Google has invested  
2  
3 eighty (\$80) billion dollars to develop, test, and promote the Android OS, a product  
4 which it distributes without separate charge. Second, the Defendants have set about to  
5 exclude non-Android and other Internet browser rivals from access to the distribution,  
6 promotion, and resources they need to offer their browser products to OEMs and  
7 PC/tablets/smartphones users. This prevents rival browsers from becoming an attractive  
8 programming platform in their own right. Third, the Defendants Facebook, Amazon and  
9 Google did not stop at free distribution. Rather, the Defendants purposefully set out to do  
10 whatever it took to make sure significant market participants distributed and used the  
11 Android OS instead of the Internet browser -- including paying some customers to take  
12 the Android OS and using its unique control over Facebook, Amazon and Google Apps  
13 (supported only by Android OS) to induce others to do so. For example, virtually every  
14 cell phone manufacturer (globally) has installed the Android OS on their phones, while  
15 every U.S. (Android) wireless phone retailer has agreed to pre-install Facebook, Amazon  
16 and Google (Android based) Apps on their phones.

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20 19. The Defendants unlawfully required PC/tablets/smartphones manufacturers, as a  
21 condition of obtaining licenses for the Android operating system, to agree to license,  
22 preinstall, and distribute Android on every phone and the Google browser on every  
23 PC/tablets/smartphones such manufacturers shipped. By virtue of the monopoly position  
24 Android enjoys, it was a commercial necessity for OEMs to preinstall the Android OS --  
25 and, as a result of Google's illegal tie-in, the Google search browser -- on virtually all of  
26 the PC/tablets/smartphones they sold. Google thereby unlawfully tied its Internet  
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1 Browser software to the Android version of its monopoly operating system and  
2 unlawfully leveraged its operating system monopoly to require PC/tablet/smartphone  
3 manufacturers to license and distribute the Google search browser on every  
4 PC/tablet/smartphone those OEMs shipped with Google (Android based) applications.  
5 The Defendants, Facebook, Amazon and Google have made it clear, that unless  
6 restrained, they will continue to misuse their operating system monopoly to artificially  
7 exclude browser/OS competition and deprive customers of a free choice between  
8 browsers/OS.  
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10  
11 20. Internet browsers are separate products competing in a separate product  
12 market from PC/tablets/smartphones and operating systems, and it is efficient to supply  
13 the products separately. Indeed, Defendant Google itself has consistently offered,  
14 promoted, and distributed its Internet browser as a stand-alone product separate from, and  
15 not as a component of, Android, and intends to continue to do so. Defendant Google's  
16 tying of its Internet browser to its monopoly operating system reduces the ability of  
17 customers to choose among competing browser products because it forces OEMs and  
18 other purchasers to license or acquire the tied combination whether they want Google's  
19 Internet browser or not. Defendant Google's tying -- which it can accomplish because of  
20 its monopoly power in Android OS -- impairs the ability of its browser rivals to compete  
21 to have their browsers preinstalled by OEMs on new PC/tablets/smartphones and thus  
22 substantially forecloses those rivals from an important channel of browser, or  
23 PC/tablet/smartphone operating system distribution.  
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28 21. Defendant Google's executives have repeatedly recognized the significant

1 advantage that Google (and the other Defendants) receives by tying its Internet browser  
2 to its operating system, rather than having to compete on the merits. Google has misused,  
3 and continues to misuse, its Android operating system monopoly by requiring  
4 PC/tablet/smartphone OEMs to agree, as a condition of acquiring a license to the Android  
5 operating system, to adopt the uniform "boot-up" sequence and "desktop" screen  
6 specified by Google. This sequence determines the screens that every user sees upon  
7 turning on a PC/tablet/smartphone. Google's exclusionary restrictions forbid, among  
8 other things, any changes by an OEM that would remove from the PC/tablet/smartphone  
9 any part of Google's Internet browser software (or any other Google-dictated software) or  
10 that would add to the PC/tablet/smartphone becoming a competing browser (or other  
11 competing software) in any more prominent or visible way (including by highlighting as  
12 part of the startup sequence or by more prominent placement on the desktop screen) than  
13 the way Google requires its Internet browser to be presented.  
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18 22. Virtually every new PC/tablet/smartphone that comes with Android, no  
19 matter which OEM has built it, presents users with the same screens and software  
20 specified by Google. As a result of Google's restrictive boot-up and desktop screen  
21 agreements, OEMs are deprived of the freedom to make competitive choices about which  
22 browser or other software product should be offered to their customers, the ability to  
23 determine for themselves the design and configuration of the initial screens displayed on  
24 the phones, or computers they sell, and the ability to differentiate their products to serve  
25 their perceptions of consumers' needs.  
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28 23. These restrictive agreements also maintain, and enhance the importance of,

1 Google's ability to provide preferential placement on the desktop (or in the boot-up  
2 sequence) to various Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and Internet Content Providers  
3 ("ICPs"), in return for those firms' commitments to give preferential distribution and  
4 promotion to the Google Internet browser and to restrict their distribution and promotion  
5 of competing browsers. As a result, these restrictions further exclude competing Internet  
6 browsers from the most important channels of distribution, substantially reduce OEMs'  
7 incentives and abilities to innovate and differentiate their products in ways that could  
8 facilitate competition between Google products and competing software products, and  
9 enhance Google's ability to use the near-ubiquity of its Android operating system  
10 monopoly to gain dominance in both the Internet browser/OS, the online sale of goods,  
11 payment systems, Internet advertising, PC/tablet/smartphone and the online news feeds  
12 market as well as other software markets.

16 24. The Defendants have entered into anticompetitive agreements with virtually  
17 all of the nation's largest and most popular ISPs, including particularly Online Service  
18 Providers ("OLSS"), firms which provide the communications link between a subscriber's  
19 PC, Cell Phone and the Internet and sometimes related services and content as well.  
20 Defendants Facebook, Amazon and Google provide PC/tablet/smartphone users with  
21 "folders" or lists including the names of certain of these ISPs that have entered into  
22 agreements with the Defendants and enable users readily to subscribe to their services.  
23 Because Google is preinstalled on nearly all PC/tablets/smartphones in the United States,  
24 inclusion in these folders and lists is of substantial value to ISPs. As a result, almost all of  
25 the largest and most significant ISPs in the United States have sought placement on the  
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1 Google desktop.

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3 25. Defendant Google's agreements with ISPs allow Google to leverage its  
4 Android operating system monopoly by conditioning these ISPs' inclusion in Googles'  
5 lists on such ISPs' agreement to offer Google's browser primarily or exclusively as the  
6 browser they distribute; not to promote or even mention to any of their subscribers the  
7 existence, availability, or compatibility of a competing Internet browser; and to use on  
8 their own Internet sites Google-specific programming extensions and tools that make  
9 those sites look better when viewed through Android, or the Google browser than when  
10 viewed through competing mobile operating systems, or Internet browsers. Defendant  
11 Google's anticompetitive agreements with ISPs have substantially foreclosed competing  
12 OS/browsers from this major channel of OS/browser distribution. Over ninety percent of  
13 Internet browser/OS users have obtained their browsers/OS from ISPs.

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16 26. Google has entered into anti competitive agreements with Internet Content  
17 Providers ("ICPs"). Prominent "channel buttons," advertising and providing direct  
18 Internet access to select ICPs appear on the "Active Desktop" feature that is shipped with  
19 the Android operating system. Defendant Google's agreements condition an ICP's  
20 placement on one of these buttons on the ICP's agreement to not pay or otherwise  
21 compensate Defendant Google's primary Internet browser/OS competitors (including by  
22 distributing their browsers/OS) for the distribution, marketing, or promotion of the ICP's  
23 content; to not promote any browser produced by any of Defendant Google's primary  
24 browser/OS competitors; to not allow any of Defendant Google's primary browser/OS  
25 competitors to promote and highlight the ICP's "channel" content on, or for their  
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1 OS/browsers; and to design its web sites using Google-specific, proprietary programming  
2 extensions so that those sites look better when viewed with Google's Internet browser/OS  
3 than when viewed through a competing browser/OS. These illegal agreements further  
4 inhibit competition on the merits between Google's Internet browser/OS and other  
5 OS/Internet browsers.  
6

7  
8 27. Neither the antitrust laws nor this action seeks to inhibit Defendants  
9 Facebook, Amazon and Google from competing on the merits by innovation or  
10 otherwise. Rather, the Complaint challenges only Defendants Facebook, Amazon and  
11 Google concerted attempts to maintain its monopoly in operating systems, Internet search  
12 browsers and digital advertising to achieve dominance in other markets, not by  
13 innovation and other competition on the merits, but by tie-ins, exclusive dealing  
14 contracts, and other anti competitive agreements that deter innovation, exclude  
15 competition, and rob customers of their right to choose among competing alternatives.  
16  
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18 28. Facebook, Amazon and Google's conduct adversely affects innovation,  
19 including by:

- 20 a. impairing the incentive of Facebook, Amazon and Google's competitors and  
21 potential competitors to undertake research and development, because they  
22 know that one, or all of the Defendants will be able to limit the rewards from  
23 any resulting innovation;  
24  
25 b. impairing the ability of Facebook, Amazon and Google's competitors and  
26 potential competitors to obtain financing for research and development;  
27  
28 c. inhibiting Facebook, Amazon and Google's competitors that nevertheless

1           succeed in developing promising innovations from effectively marketing  
2           their improved products to customers;

3  
4           d. reducing the incentive and ability of OEMs to innovate and differentiate  
5           their products in ways that would appeal to customers; and

6           e. reducing competition and the spur to innovation by Facebook, Amazon,  
7           Google and others that only competition can provide.  
8

9           29. The purpose and effect of Facebook, Amazon, Google's conduct with  
10          respect to Internet browsers, the Android OS, have been and, if not restrained, will be:

11           a. to preclude competition on the merits between Google's browser and other  
12           browsers;

13  
14           b. to preclude potential competition with Google's Android operating system  
15           from competing browsers and from other companies and software whose use  
16           is facilitated by these browsers;

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18           c. to extend Google's Android operating system monopoly to the Internet  
19           browser market; and

20           d. to maintain Google's Android operating system monopoly.  
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22           30. Accordingly, Plaintiff now brings this action explicitly for preliminary and  
23          permanent injunctive relief, and demonstrates that Defendants' conduct constitutes clear  
24          violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (breach of contract, breach of covenant  
25          & good faith and unfair competition, among other claims) and will cause irreparable  
26          injury in the absence of preliminary relief. As demonstrated in more detail below,  
27          because of this unlawful conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to, among other remedies, treble  
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1 damages from Defendants under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 15; a disgorgement of the enormous  
2 supra-competitive profits that Defendants have received, and will receive, from their  
3 unlawful conduct; and damages for Defendants' breach of their own contract, to which  
4 Plaintiff, as the online web host of tens of thousands of Google "AdSense (PPC)"  
5 advertisements, was an intended beneficiary.  
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### 7 8 **III. PARTIES**

9 31. Plaintiff, during the operative times of this complaint, was a resident of the  
10 City of Oakland and operated as a sole proprietorship, located in California. Oakland, as  
11 an content creator, website designer, independent advertiser, ad server and owner of the  
12 websites/pages set forth below in ¶ 52, at which the Defendants, jointly and severally,  
13 currently serve and host Google "AdSense (PPC)" online advertisements.  
14

15 32. Defendant Alphabet Holding Corporation (hereafter "Alphabet") was  
16 created by Law as a private legal entity, for profit, and with "general corporate powers,"  
17 under the Delaware General Corporation Law (where Alphabet is incorporated).  
18 Alphabet is an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Mountain View,  
19 California 94043, at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway (County of Santa Clara). Alphabet, Inc.  
20 was created through a corporate restructuring of Google on October 2, 2015. Alphabet,  
21 Inc. became the parent company of Google and several former Google subsidiaries.  
22 Alphabet Inc., is thus a legal entity doing business as (hereafter, "dba") Google, Inc., dba,  
23 Blogger, dba, Google AdSense (PPC) and dba, YouTube, LLC." Shares of Google's stock  
24 have been converted into Alphabet stock, which trades under Google's former ticker  
25 symbols of "GOOG" and "GOOGL". Google's core businesses are its search engine and  
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1 advertising sales through its global AdSense (PPC) program. Alphabet is essentially a  
2 holding company for Google, as well as all the projects, ideas, capital investments, and  
3 subsidiaries that Google has acquired over the years. The company consists of Google as  
4 well as other businesses including X Development, Calico, Nest, Verily, Fiber, Makani,  
5 CapitalG, and GV. As per its 2017 annual report, 86% of Alphabet's revenues came from  
6 performance advertising (through user clicks using AdSense and Google Ads) and brand  
7 advertising. Of these, 53% came from its international operations. This translated to a  
8 total revenue of US\$110,855 million in 2017 and a net income of US\$12,662 million. On  
9 January 16, 2020, Alphabet became the fourth US company to reach a US\$1 trillion  
10 dollar market value, entering the trillion dollar companies club for the first time.

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14 33. Defendant Larry Page co-founded Google. Defendant Page was the CEO of  
15 Alphabet, Inc., for the period covering October 2, 2015 to 2018. From September 4, 1998  
16 to October 2, 2015, Page served as CEO of Google. Defendant Page remains at Alphabet  
17 as co-founder, controlling shareholder, board member, and employee. As of November  
18 2020, Defendant Page was the 13th-richest person in the world, with a net worth of  
19 US\$77.6 billion dollars.

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22 34. Defendant Sergey Mikhaylovich Brin co-founded Google. Defendant Brin  
23 was the president of Google's parent company, Alphabet Inc., until stepping down from  
24 the role on December 3, 2019. Defendant Brin remains at Alphabet as co-founder,  
25 controlling shareholder, board member, and employee. As of September 2020, Defendant  
26 Brin is the 7th-richest person in the world, with an estimated net worth of US\$63.9  
27 billion dollars.

1           35. Defendant Eric Emerson Schmidt was the Executive Chairman of Google  
2  
3 from 2001 to 2015 and Alphabet Inc. from 2015 to 2017. From 2001 to 2011, Schmidt  
4 served as the CEO of Google. Defendant Schmidt served as a Technical Advisor for  
5 Alphabet, until February 2020. As of November 13, 2020, Defendant Schmidt had an  
6 estimated net worth of **US\$16.9 billion dollars**. Defendant Schmidt recently obtained  
7 citizenship in the European island, Cyprus, which could allow him to legally avoid  
8 paying U.S. taxes on his \$17 billion fortune  
9

10           36. Defendant Sundar Pichai (his full name is Pichai Sundararajan) was the  
11 chief product officer of Google, Inc., for the period covering October 2, 2015 to 2018.  
12 Defendant Pichai, Product Chief, became the new CEO of Google, replacing Defendant  
13 Page, who transitioned to the role of running Alphabet, along with Google co-founder,  
14 Defendant Brin. Defendant Pichai's net worth in 2020 is estimated at between **US\$600**  
15 **million dollars and US\$1.2 billion dollars**.  
16  
17

18           37. Defendant Facebook, Inc. is a California corporation that was founded in  
19 2004, by Defendant Mark Zuckerberg. Defendant Facebook's Headquarters is located at  
20 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, California 94025. Facebook Inc. (FB) is the largest social  
21 networking site in the world with 2.5 billion monthly active users (MAUs) as of year-end  
22 2019. Facebook also owns and operates the popular photo-sharing app Instagram as well  
23 as messaging apps Messenger and WhatsApp. The company provides virtual-reality  
24 hardware, software, and a developer ecosystem through its Oculus business. Facebook  
25 went public in 2012 and has become one of the world's largest companies with a market  
26 capitalization of **US\$507.92 billion dollars** as of April 14, 2020. Facebook earned net  
27  
28



1 income of US\$18.5 billion dollars on US\$70.7 billion dollars of revenue during fiscal  
2 year 2019 (FY).  
3

4 38. Defendant Mark Zuckerberg is the co-founder, chairman and CEO of  
5 Facebook, Inc. Defendant Zuckerberg co-founded Facebook, Inc., in 2004, with three  
6 fellow classmates at Harvard University at the time. Defendant Zuckerberg is responsible  
7 for setting the overall direction and product strategy for the company. He leads the design  
8 of Defendant Facebook Inc.'s service and development of its core technology and  
9 infrastructure. As the Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Zuckerberg is responsible for  
10 enforcing the acts, policies, practices, and/or customs of Defendant Facebook, Inc.  
11 Defendant Zuckerberg is Facebook's largest shareholder by far. He currently holds over  
12 400 million shares of Facebook, comprising a market value of around US\$82.2 billion.  
13 Zuckerberg's holdings also give him a disproportionate share of voting rights. He controls  
14 57.9% of the total voting shares, giving him effective control of the company.  
15  
16  
17

18 39. Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. engages in the retail sale of consumer products  
19 and subscriptions in North America and internationally. It operates through the North  
20 America, International, and Amazon Web Services (AWS) segments. The company sells  
21 merchandise and content purchased for resale from vendors, as well as those offered by  
22 third-party sellers through retail Websites, such as amazon.com, amazon.ca,  
23 amazon.com.mx, amazon.com.au, amazon.com.br, amazon.cn, amazon.fr, amazon.de,  
24 amazon.in, amazon.it, amazon.co.jp, amazon.nl, amazon.es, and amazon.co.uk. It also  
25 manufactures and sells electronic devices, including kindle e-readers, fire tablets, fire  
26 TVs, and echo; and provides Kindle Direct Publishing, an online service that allows  
27  
28

1 independent authors and publishers to make their books available in the Kindle Store.  
2  
3 Defendant Amazon.Com, Inc., is currently the world's largest online sales company, the  
4 largest Internet company by revenue, and the world's largest provider of virtual assistants  
5 and cloud infrastructure services through its Amazon Web Services branch. Amazon's  
6 net worth as of November 11, 2020, is more **US\$1.7 trillion dollars**, making it the  
7  
8 second-most valuable company in the U.S., trailing only Apple.

9 40. Defendant Jeff Bezos founded Amazon in late 1994. Bezos founded the  
10 aerospace manufacturer and sub-orbital spaceflight services company Blue Origin in  
11 2000. Defendant Bezos owns approximately 53 million shares of Amazon stock.  
12  
13 Defendant Bezos purchased the major American newspaper The Washington Post, in  
14 2013, for \$250 million. Defendant Bezos was one of the first shareholders in Google.  
15 Defendant Bezos invested \$250,000 in 1998. Defendant Bezos' \$250,000 investment  
16 resulted in 3.3 million shares of Google stock, worth about \$3.1 billion dollars in 2017.  
17  
18 As of November 5, 2020, Defendant Bezos had a net worth of **US\$194.0 billion dollars**.

19 41. The Board of Directors of the Defendant companies, and each of them,  
20 jointly and severally, since their creation, and up to the present, has served as a conduit  
21 for the fraudulent objectives, by which the interlocking directors of the Defendant  
22 companies and their subsidiary members, jointly with other individuals, knowingly,  
23 intentionally and unlawfully, have met, planned, devised, organized, and assisted in the  
24 adoption and implementation of part, or all, of the fraudulent artifices that form the basis  
25 of this complaint as defined herein after. As a direct and proximate result of the acts,  
26  
27 omissions and policies described herein, Defendants, and each of them, jointly and  
28

severally, have shared, or will share in US\$2 - \$2.5 Trillion dollars in online Ad revenue this fiscal year.

42. Whenever it is alleged in the complaint that any Defendant did any act or thing, it is meant that its Directors, Officers, agents, employees, or the Directors, Officers, agents or employees of its subsidiaries or affiliates, performed or participated in such act or thing, and in each instance that such act or thing was authorized or ratified by, and done on behalf of, that Defendant. Plaintiff thereupon alleges, the true names and capacities of Defendants sued as Does/Roes 1 through 10 are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues these Defendants by fictitious names. Doe/Roe Defendants include the employees, agents, servants of the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, who directly approved the acts, omissions and policies described herein, as well as agents, officers and employees of the Defendants who are liable in connection with one or more of the claims sued upon here and are responsible in some manner for the wrongful acts and conduct alleged herein. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to show Doe/Roe Defendants' true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.

#### **IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

43. This is an action for violations of federal antitrust law, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding and all claims asserted herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 1337 (antitrust jurisdiction) and 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 39 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (actions arising under the Lanham Act), and 1338 (b) (any action asserting



1 claim of unfair competition joined with a substantial and related claims under the  
2 trademark law) for the claims arising out of the violations of Section 43(a) of the Lanham  
3 Act.  
4

5 44. Venue is proper in this district under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22, and 28 U.S.C.  
6 § 1391 because: (i) each of the Defendants transact business, committed an unlawful or  
7 tortious act, and/or are found, in this district; and (ii) a substantial portion of the conduct  
8 detailed herein, which affected interstate trade and commerce, has been carried out in this  
9 district.  
10

#### 11 **V. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

12 45. Pursuant to the Northern District Civil Local Rule 3-2(d), the intradistrict  
13 assignment should be to the Oakland Division or the San Francisco Division. This action  
14 arises in Oakland and the County of Alameda because a substantial part of the events  
15 giving rise to these claims occurred in the City of Oakland and Alameda County.  
16

#### 17 **VI. THE RELEVANT MARKET**

18 46. Up until 2003, the relevant geographic advertising market for Plaintiff's  
19 claim is worldwide, including the United States and other relevant submarkets thereof.  
20 The technology of the 21st Century, has for all practical purposes, caused the relevant  
21 market and relevant product market to become inextricably intertwined.  
22

23 The relevant market for purposes of Plaintiff's claims consist of the following:  
24

- 25 (a) The Internet via website(s) as a relevant market to sell all products;
- 26 (1) Mobile Networking (Android OS) Hardware Routers, Smartphones, Tablets;
- 27

28 and

- (2) Mobile (Networking) Android OS Apps.

The relevant product market consists of the following:

- (b) Internet based advertisement on Streamed Videos and Movies;
- (c) Internet based advertisement on Streamed Music and Music videos;
- (d) Mobile Networking (Android OS) [Internet] based advertisement on mobile devices;
- (e) Mobile Networking (Android OS) [Internet] based advertisement on Android OS Apps;
- (f) The sale(s) of digital ad based Internet (cloud-based) music, videos, movies, and images; and
- (g) Digital ad based News Feeds.

## VII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

### A. Background

#### 1. Plaintiff's Decade of Serving AdSpend/AdSense & Marketing YouTube!

47. Between the time period October 15, 2008 and November 13, 2013, Plaintiff created two (2) YouTube channels: the "Harry Williby" channel (<http://www.youtube.com/c/HarryWilliby021269>, created November 13, 2013) and "The Attorney Depot™" channel (<http://www.youtube.com/c/TheAttorneyDepotTM>, created October 15, 2008). On October 8, 2008, Plaintiff also created "The Williby Blogs" (<https://willibys-corruptjustice.blogspot.com/>) on Defendant Alphabet's Blogger Platform. Beginning in 2011, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, Google+, dba, Google AdSense (PPC), dba, Blogger, dba, YouTube, LLC., mandated that YouTube channel

1 owners create Google+ accounts to access YouTube. As a direct and proximate result of  
2 this mandate by Defendant Alphabet, Plaintiff created two (2) Google+ accounts: “The  
3 Harry Williby” Google+ account (<https://plus.google.com/+HarryWilliby021269>) and  
4 “The Attorney Depot™” Google+ account.  
5 (<https://plus.google.com/b/114610022579488515977/+TheAttorneyDepotTM>).  
6

7  
8 48. Between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, The Attorney Depot™ channel  
9 published and hosted Daily, Weekly, Monthly and yearly News, legal news, political,  
10 election, trial coverage, documentaries and entertainment videos. Videos hosted on the  
11 The Attorney Depot™ YouTube channel were automatically and simultaneously  
12 published on The Attorney Depot™ Google+ account. The Plaintiff simultaneously  
13 hosted all The Attorney Depot™ videos on Williby Blogs, Twitter and Facebook.  
14 Between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, The Attorney Depot™ YouTube channel  
15 garnered over twenty-one million (21,000,000+) global, public, video views; and  
16 twenty-one thousand (21,000+) return subscribers. Between October 15, 2008 and  
17 August 1, 2018, Plaintiff posted and published Daily, Weekly, Monthly and yearly News,  
18 legal news, political, election, trial coverage text and images posts on The Attorney  
19 Depot™ Google+. These text, image and video posts numbered approximately 10,000  
20 posts. The Google+ account garnered well over two-million viewers and/or visitors as a  
21 direct and proximate result of these videos, text and image posts. Between October 15,  
22 2008 and August 1, 2018, The Attorney Depot™ Channel and Google+ account  
23 produced, globally marketed and branded “trial court coverage” videos on YouTube. The  
24 Attorney Depot™ channel averaged 500,000 -to- 1,000,000 million viewers per month.  
25  
26  
27  
28



1 Between October 8, 2008 and August 1, 2018, Plaintiff's Blogger pages (Williby Blogs)  
2 netted 15k – 40,000 viewers per week, with over one-million global readers/viewers.  
3

4 49. The Harry Williby Channel's primary genre was real life interactions,  
5 including police interrogations and/or police interactions with civilians. Plaintiff branded  
6 raw videos on The Williby Channel as "Streat Beatz™" videos. This genre was so  
7 popular on YouTube, The Williby Channel, grossed approximately 1,000,000  
8 (one-million) viewers per year. Between and November 13, 2018, and August 1, 2018,  
9 The Harry Williby Channel published and hosted Daily, Weekly, Monthly and yearly  
10 News, political, election, documentaries, entertainment and raw videos (or videos shot  
11 live on scene by the bystander). Between November 13, 2013 and August 1, 2018, "The  
12 Harry Williby Channel," publicly displayed approximately eight-hundred and eight-one  
13 (881) videos; garnered eighteen-hundred and forty-nine (1,849) return subscribers; and  
14 has (had) approximately four million, one Hundred and eighty-seven thousand (plus)  
15 viewers (4,187,000+) on the channel. Between November 13, 2013 and August 1, 2018,  
16 videos hosted on "The Harry Williby [YouTube] channel" were automatically and  
17 simultaneously published on the Harry Williby Google+ account. Between November 13,  
18 2013 and August 1, 2018, The Harry Williby Google+ account generated approximately  
19 20-25,000,000 million visitors. Between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, The  
20 Attorney Depot™ YouTube channel, The Attorney Depot™ Google+ account, Williby  
21 Blogs and Plaintiff's Twitter (feed) and Facebook pages were viewed in every country  
22 with an Internet connection. As a direct and proximate result of ten (10) years (or a  
23 decade) of marketing YouTube and The Attorney Depot™ Channel by Plaintiff, virtually  
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1 every major U.S. media network, including the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and  
2 severally, has joined YouTube and now host “trial court coverage” videos.

3  
4 50. The Google AdSense, Pay-Per-Click, (PPC) is a program run by Defendant  
5 Alphabet, dba, Google. Defendant Google purchased the AdSense program on June 18,  
6 2003, from “Applied Semantics.” The AdSense program is a Pay-Per-Click advertising  
7 program. AdSense (PPC) allows publishers (website/page owners) in the Google  
8 Network of content sites to serve automatic text, image, video, or interactive media  
9 advertisements, that are targeted to site content and audience. Google Advertisement  
10 customers purchase an “ad spend account” with Defendants to have these automatic text,  
11 image, video, or interactive media advertisements placed on websites, or pages owned by  
12 the plaintiff. These advertisements are administered, sorted, and maintained by Defendant  
13 Google. While these advertisements are administered, sorted, and maintained by  
14 Defendant Google, Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, administer  
15 Google AdSense, Pay-Per-Click, (PPC) advertisement programs on their respective  
16 owned sites.

17  
18 51. In October 2008, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube,  
19 LLC., by way of electronic advertisement, led Plaintiff to believe that if he created a  
20 Blogger™ website, or a YouTube channel, Plaintiff could serve Advertisements, under  
21 Defendant Google’s “AdSense, PPC” program. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC.,  
22 dba, Youtube, LLC., led Plaintiff to believe that he would receive \$0.25 (cents) each time  
23 a site visitor clicked on one of the Advertisements, hosted by Plaintiff and served by  
24 Defendant.

52. Plaintiff relied upon this electronic advertisement and In October of 2008, Plaintiff created “The Williby Blogs,” (<https://willibys-corruptjustice.blogspot.com/>); and “The Attorney Depot™ Channel” (<https://www.YouTube.com/channel/UCPBu0JFPj9R57SyjfCxHvmw>). Acting upon this same information and belief, as provided by Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., Plaintiff created The “Williby Channel” (<https://www.YouTube.com/c/HarryWilliby021269>) in November of 2013, in an attempt to increase Ad revenue by hosting automatic text, image, video, or interactive media advertisements, served by Defendants. Acting upon this same information and belief, as provided by Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., Plaintiff intentionally hyperlinked directly to, and served videos and blog posts on the following websites (created, managed and operated by Plaintiff):

(I) Harry Williby Google+ profile (<https://plus.google.com/+HarryWilliby021269>);

(II) Harry Williby @ Twitter (<https://twitter.com/wilabee>);

(III) The Attorney Depot™ @ Twitter (<https://twitter.com/AttorneyDepot>);

(IV) The Attorney Depot™ Google+ profile (<https://plus.google.com/+TheAttorneyDepotTM>);

(V) Facebook (Harry Williby) (<https://www.facebook.com/harry.williby>);

(VI) Facebook (Harry J. Williby) (<https://www.facebook.com/Harry.J.Williby>); and

(VII) Facebook Pages (Corrupt Justice; The Attorney Depot; and Streat Beatz).

53. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., dba, Google Analytics tracking system demonstrates that between October 8, 2008 and August 1,



1 2018, Plaintiff's Blogger pages (Williby Blogs) netted 15,000 – 40,000 viewers per week,  
2 with over one-million global readers/viewers; Between October 15, 2008 and August 1,  
3 2018, The Attorney Depot™ YouTube channel garnered over twenty-one million  
4 (21,000,000+) global, public, video views; twenty-one thousand (21,000+) return  
5 subscribers; Between November 13, 2013 and August 1, 2018, "The Harry Williby  
6 Channel," publicly displayed approximately eight-hundred and eight-one (881) videos;  
7 garnered eighteen-hundred and forty-nine (1,849) return subscribers; generated  
8 approximately four million, one Hundred and eighty-seven thousand (plus) viewers  
9 (4,187,000+) on the channel; Between October 8, 2008 and August 1, 2018, The  
10 Attorney Depot™ Google+ page generated approximately 350,000 page visits; and  
11 between November 13, 2013 and August 1, 2018, The Harry Williby Google+ account  
12 generated approximately 20-25,000,000 million visitors/readers/viewers.

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16  
17 54. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., effective  
18 August 1, 2018, terminated Plaintiff's YouTube channels, The "Williby Channel" and  
19 "The Attorney Depot™ Channel." Plaintiff was thus denied access to his Google+, "The  
20 Attorney Depot™ page," effective August 1, 2018. Plaintiff was granted access back to  
21 his Google+, "The Attorney Depot™ page," effective October 12, 2018, after Defendant  
22 Alphabet removed approximately 7,000-to-10,000 posts, placed there by Plaintiff.  
23

24 55. Despite over a decade (ten years) of publishing on Defendants' platform,  
25 under the Google "AdSense (PPC)" program, Plaintiff did not earn \$0.25 per-ad-click.  
26 Plaintiff earned less than \$2,500.00 (over 10 years) with the vast majority of this revenue  
27 being confiscated by Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., dba,  
28

1 Google “AdSense (PPC).” In fact, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba,  
2 Youtube, LLC., dba, Google “AdSense (PPC),” repeatedly, over a ten (10) year time  
3 period, accused and adjudicated Plaintiff guilty of copyright infringement, as the basis for  
4 confiscating the nominal ad revenue plaintiff earned under the Google “AdSense (PPC)”  
5 program.  
6

7  
8 56. Defendant Alphabet, dba, YouTube’s site is a popular site for music and  
9 music videos. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Google, AdSense (PPC)  
10 serves AdSense advertisements on these music videos. Defendant Google replaced  
11 Google Play Music with YouTube Remix. YouTube Remix is a music service that's fully  
12 integrated with YouTube. Between the time period of October 15, 2008 and August 1,  
13 2018, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, dba YouTube, informed plaintiff that music on  
14 the YouTube website could be downloaded for free and could be used by Plaintiff on  
15 videos uploaded by Plaintiff to The Williby Channel and The Attorney Depot™ Channel,  
16 without risk of copyright claims. Plaintiff relied upon these claims by Defendant  
17 YouTube and utilized numerous songs from Defendant’s database on his videos. As a  
18 direct and proximate result of Plaintiff’s use of the copyrighted music, a multitude of  
19 music copyright owners did in fact file music copyright claims against The Williby  
20 Channel and The Attorney Depot™ Channel for the use of this music as provided by  
21 Defendant YouTube. As a direct and proximate result of these music copyright claims  
22 against The Williby Channel and The Attorney Depot™ Channel, Defendant Alphabet,  
23 dba, Google, dba YouTube, required Plaintiff to publicly acknowledge and/or admit the  
24 music copyright claim violations. Defendant Alphabet, dba, YouTube, LLC., then  
25  
26  
27  
28



1 allowed the music copyright owners to generate AdSense revenue from The Williby  
2 Channel and The Attorney Depot™ Channel. Simultaneously, Defendant Alphabet  
3 claimed The Attorney Depot™ Channel was now ineligible for monetization, “due to  
4 multiple claims of copyright infringement,” thus, denying and preventing Plaintiff from  
5 earning, or generating AdSense revenue. The Williby Channel was then terminated “due  
6 to multiple claims of copyright infringement,” and The Attorney Depot™ Channel was  
7 terminated for being hyper-linked to a channel with “multiple claims of copyright  
8 infringement.” As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff’s reliance, upon the false  
9 advertisements of Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, YouTube, LLC., and  
10 Plaintiff’s Channels were terminated and Plaintiff prevented from generating ad revenue  
11 on any of his sites.

15 57. In the same year of 2008, Plaintiff, acting upon information and belief  
16 regarding Defendants’ advertisement capabilities, Plaintiff initiated and advertised an  
17 independent advertisement program on Williby Blogs, and “The Attorney Depot™  
18 Channel.” In 2013, Plaintiff extended this independent advertisement campaign to “The  
19 Williby Channel.” Between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, The Attorney  
20 Depot™ generated \$0.00 in Google AdSense (PPC) revenue; and Plaintiff’s independent  
21 advertising programs netted \$0.00 in advertisement revenue. Between November 11,  
22 2013 and August 1, 2018 Defendant Alphabet paid “The Williby Channel” and “Williby  
23 Blogs” a combined amount of approximately \$2,450.00 in AdSense (PPC) revenue. On  
24 multiple occasions between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, Defendant Alphabet  
25 paid the plaintiff \$0.01 for an entire month of Ad hosting, under the AdSense PPC  
26



1 program. (See Attached Exhibit "A".)

2  
3 58. From the period between October 15, 2008 and August 1, 2018, Defendant  
4 Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba, Youtube, LLC., dba, Google "AdSense (PPC),"  
5 required advertisement customers to purchase an "ad spend account" under Defendants'  
6 Google AdSense (PPC) program. Adsense customer advertisements, which included  
7 automatic text, image, video, or interactive media advertisements, were then hosted and  
8 served on Plaintiff's websites. Defendant Alphabet charged all advertising customers  
9 \$0.10 - \$0.30 for the placement of "bumper," or "non-skippable" advertisements on  
10 websites owned by Plaintiff. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, dba YouTube, also  
11 charged advertising fees per video view. Defendant charged fees on ads referred to as  
12 "bumper ads," "skippable video ads" and "non-skippable video ads. Defendant Alphabet  
13 charged its customers a fee amount unknown to Plaintiff, to place "ad units" on  
14 Plaintiff's videos. A typical video ad earned Defendants between \$0.10 and \$0.30 per  
15 click. Thus, an ad campaign (on YouTube) with a \$0.10 video view would cost (the ad  
16 customer) \$1,000 for every 10,000 people that watch the video ad. However, Defendant's  
17 Google Adsense customer does not have to pay the \$0.10 - \$0.30, unless a viewer/reader  
18 "clicks" on the "ad unit." The total Google AdSense revenue generated Defendant  
19 Alphabet, between 2008 and 2018 was in the aggregate amount of \$680,246,000,000.00  
20 (billion dollars) in on-line "AdSense" advertisement sales.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25 59. Defendant Alphabet's Google "AdSense (PPC)" program requires the  
26 advertisement customer to pay for the advertisement, only if an advertisement consumer  
27 "clicks" on the advertisement. This constitutes free advertisement provided by the  
28

1 Defendants, jointly and severally. Thus, other advertisers, such as Plaintiff, have virtually  
2 no chance of selling advertisements on the Internet. Defendant Alphabet owns all on-line  
3 advertising companies and web platforms, except Facebook and Amazon.com. Between  
4 June 18, 2003 and August 1, 2018, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, LLC., dba,  
5 Youtube, LLC., dba, Google “AdSense (PPC),” acquired all of the competitive online  
6 advertisers. The Google “AdSense (PPC)” program now constitutes the only online,  
7 digital advertising platform available to consumers. Thus, on June 18, 2003, Defendants  
8 embarked upon what is now an online advertisement monopoly, ... by acquisition. The  
9 Google “AdSense (PPC)” program violates not only the antitrust laws, the Google  
10 “AdSense (PPC)” program violates California State Statute, governing Unfair  
11 Competition.  
12  
13  
14

## 15 2. The inextricably intertwined relevant market and relevant product

16  
17 60. In the instant matter, there exists an inextricably intertwined relevant  
18 market and relevant product market. An example of this is the Expedia Group  
19 advertising program with Defendant Google. Expedia and its peer Booking Holdings  
20 typically spend heavily on Defendant Google’s “AdSpend” program. Expedia Group  
21 Chairman Barry Diller said the travel company spends \$5 billion dollars annually on  
22 online, digital advertising. Both Expedia and Booking Holdings have complained of  
23 Defendant Google’s tactics. One tactic includes Defendant Google building its own  
24 travel search products that compete with the travel search products of Expedia and  
25 Booking Holdings. The only option available to Expedia and Booking Holdings in this  
26 case would be to shift advertising to Defendant Facebook, or Defendant Amazon. Both  
27  
28

1 the other defendants use Defendant Google's "AdSpend" and "Adsense" (PPC)  
2 program. All three defendants function on the Android OS and exercise complete  
3 platform control. There are no other relevant market substitutes available to Advertisers,  
4 Content Creators, Website owners, customers and end-users for products within the web  
5 based advertising market, the Internet streamed video and movie market, or the Internet  
6 streamed music, or music video market. There are barriers to entry into the web based  
7 advertising market, including the Internet streamed video; movie market; Internet  
8 streamed music; and music video market. These barriers include Defendants' unlawful  
9 anti-competitive activities to exclude competition. The defendants' anti-competitive  
10 conduct in the relevant market has excluded competitors and resulted in consumers  
11 paying higher prices than they would have paid in competitive markets. Consumers  
12 paying higher prices for the relevant product and the exclusion of competitors are indicia  
13 of Defendants' market power and unlawful anti-competitive conduct, which in itself  
14 constitutes an unlawful monopoly.

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18  
19 **3. The Defendants Complete Market Power Over online, digital**  
20 **advertising**

21  
22 61. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, are a conglomerate  
23 of professional online, digital advertising franchises. The Defendants, and each of them,  
24 jointly and severally, places strict limits on the number of webpages, web page  
25 advertisements any person, or entity can place online. Through the Defendants' Android  
26 operating system and browser monopoly, they control where those pages and ads are  
27 located, and require that all content creators/website designers host and/or use Google  
28



1 AdSense (PPC) to sell online advertisements. The defendants control the complete share  
2 of revenues and financial benefits of Google AdSense (PPC) participation. The entire  
3 online advertisement apparatus is made up of only 3 companies, ... Google, Facebook  
4 and Amazon, Inc., ... the across the entire globe. Any efforts by the Defendants to claim  
5 they are a single entity are strongly rebuffed by Courts, most notably the Supreme  
6 Court's 9-0 ruling against this view in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football  
7 League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).

10 62. Since 2003, Defendant Google has used "Applied Semantics" in a highly  
11 technical manner to improve its market dominating, anti-competitive conduct. "Applied  
12 Semantics" became "Google AdSense," "pay-per-click," (and "Google AdSpend,"  
13 "pay-per-click") meaning that advertisers pay "only when" a person clicks on an ad. With  
14 AdSense, Google broke out of search and onto the wider Web with contextual targeting  
15 technology that soon overwhelmed other players, such as Sprinks and IndustryBrains.  
16 Adsense uses targeted ads on general content pages, based upon the user, by matching  
17 them to text on the pages. Defendant Google went on to become much more than an  
18 "upstart search engine." Defendant Google became the largest of "only" three advertising  
19 companies in the world (including Facebook and Amazon). By 2005, AdSense was about  
20 15 percent of Google's revenue. Defendant Alphabet's search engine [Google] AdSense  
21 ad sales, are the second largest source of revenue for Alphabet. In 2016, Defendant  
22 Alphabet earned nearly all of its revenue from Google advertising based on users' search  
23 requests. "Google AdWords" is an advertising platform that allows businesses to show  
24 their product to relevant potential customers based on their search terms. AdWords

1 helped deliver 96% of the company's revenue in the first quarter of 2011. There exists no  
2 real alternative to AdSense for publication of ads on web properties” given AdSense’s  
3 ability to target ads, leverage Google’s search technology, set up accounts quickly and  
4 easily, and access the largest global advertiser pool on the web. As of 2018, Defendant  
5 Alphabet had an overall market capitalization that exceeded \$500 billion dollars. Two  
6 years later in 2020, Defendant Google’s parent company (Defendant Alphabet) has  
7 entered the \$1 trillion market cap club for the first time.  
8

10 63. Defendant Amazon, Inc., began in 1994 as an online bookstore. The  
11 company has since expanded to a wide variety of other e-commerce products and  
12 services, including online digital advertising, video and audio streaming, cloud  
13 computing, and artificial intelligence. Defendant Bezos initially named his new company  
14 Cadabra. Defendant Bezos later changed the name to Amazon after the Amazon River in  
15 South America, in part because the name begins with the letter A, which is at the  
16 beginning of the alphabet. In November 2007, Bezos launched the Amazon Kindle, a  
17 device that allows a "flow state" in reading and advertisements that are similar to the  
18 experience of video games. In October of 2007, Defendant Amazon was recognized as  
19 the largest online shopping retailer in the world. On February 1, 2018, Defendant  
20 Amazon reported its highest ever profit with quarterly earnings of \$2 billion. In 2020,  
21 Defendant Amazon's online digital ad revenues in the United States are projected to  
22 amount to **\$12.75 billion U.S. dollars** with growth declining to a still impressive 23.5  
23 percent year-over-year. In 2019, Amazon's annual online digital ad revenue grew by 39.4  
24 percent. Defendant Amazon is currently the world's largest online sales company and the  
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1 largest Internet company by revenue.

2  
3 64. Facebook currently makes 98.5% of its money from digital advertising,  
4 mostly ads on Facebook and Instagram. Facebook (FB) makes most of its money by  
5 serving ads on the social media and messaging platforms it owns — Facebook,  
6 Messenger, Instagram, and WhatsApp. Advertisers pay Facebook to make their ads  
7 visible to people. Advertisers can choose to “target” the ads by only showing them to  
8 people who fit certain characteristics. These include age, gender, country, interests, etc.  
9 Advertisers choose the targeting options, and Facebook then shows the ads to the right  
10 people based on automated computer algorithms. Facebook has 2.89 billion monthly  
11 active users across its “family” of products. Of these, 2.26 billion people use at least one  
12 of their products each day. This means that Facebook reaches about 3/4 of the world’s  
13 internet population. Due to its massive user base, Defendant Facebook makes a lot of  
14 money from serving online, digital ads. Most of the ads are “pay-per-click,” meaning that  
15 advertisers pay Facebook each time a person clicks on an ad. Even though each click may  
16 not cost that much, it quickly adds up to billions of clicks and billions of dollars.  
17 According to Defendant Facebook, “there are now 8 million businesses globally that use  
18 their advertising platform.” There are 90 million business pages on Facebook. 140  
19 million businesses use Facebook every month to communicate with prospective  
20 customers and employees, or to engage with their communities (this stat refers, however,  
21 to Facebook products, not just Facebook itself). According to Defendant’s “eMarketer  
22 Facebook” marketing statistics, more than 85% of US marketers have used Facebook as a  
23 marketing platform since 2016 – a figure that has increased to 87% in 2020.  
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65. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google and Defendant Facebook remain the dominant digital advertising companies. They controlled a combined 58 percent of the \$111 billion market, in 2018. This is down from 59 percent in 2017 (Google 38.6% and Facebook 19.9%). Defendant Amazon, Inc., generated \$4.61 billion in U.S. digital ad sales in 2018. This represents 4.2 percent of the total digital ad market. Advertising is quickly becoming one of Defendant Amazon's most lucrative businesses. This is in addition to its e-commerce engine and cloud computing arm. Advertising doesn't have its own category in Defendant Amazon's earnings reports and is listed under a category called "Other." The category "Other." brought in \$2.7 billion in revenue in the first quarter (of 2019), up 34 percent over a year ago. As of October 26, 2020, the total of desktop and mobile banner advertising was \$38.1 billion in FY 2019, a 13.8% increase on 2018's \$33.5 billion. Desktop Banner Advertising dropped from a 22.5% share to 20.3% in 2019. The Banner share on mobile decreased from 35.8% to 35.1%; **however, revenue increased by 21.5% to \$30.4 billion.** However, without any reasonable hope of a "competitive company," that can compete with the Defendants, Facebook, Alphabet, or Amazon, Inc., the market for owning or hosting such a "competitive company," is significantly constrained. The Defendants' complete control over online, digital advertising in the United States, combined with its ability to artificially limit the supply of websites and digital ads and who can host ads, enables it to hold Plaintiff and consumers hostage by imposing anti competitive conditions on being an Advertiser, Content Creator, Website owner, or consumer. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010), the Defendants

1 herein, acts as a cartel, limiting the supply of websites and digital ads, as well as, who can  
2 host ads to create anti competitive pressures on website owners, content creators and ad  
3 consumers.  
4

5 66. Recently, the Defendants have increasingly used Google AdSense (PPC)'s  
6 complete market power and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (hereafter "DMCA")  
7 to exert this anticompetitive pressure on Plaintiff. Through Google's AdSense for  
8 Content program ("AdSense"), Google contracts with website operators who publish ads  
9 on their websites in exchange for a percentage of the money advertisers pay to place the  
10 ads. Google terminated each of Plaintiff's Google's AdSense accounts without cause and  
11 withheld the entirety of the earnings Plaintiff had accrued, but had not yet been paid upon  
12 termination. The Payment Terms of Google's AdSense allows Google, in its sole  
13 discretion, to withhold earnings from Plaintiff, or a publisher for "invalid activity."  
14 Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels were viewed by tens of millions of viewers  
15 and readers, while simultaneously serving Google AdSense ads. After a decade of serving  
16 Google's AdSense ads on multiple webpages for defendants, the defendants, acting in  
17 concert, and jointly, aiding, abetting, and conspiring with each other, accused Plaintiff of  
18 "invalid activity," to wit: "Due to multiple claims of copyright infringement[,] [from  
19 multiple sources,] resulting in the termination of Plaintiff's Google AdSense accounts and  
20 confiscation of all revenue earned. In addition to termination of the AdSense account and  
21 revenue confiscation, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube, terminated  
22 Plaintiff's YouTube channels and blocked Plaintiff's access to the counter-notification  
23 process under 17 U.S.C. § 512, Subsection (g) (1). In retrospect, Defendant Google  
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1 asserted misuse of the DMCA in a filing concerning New Zealand's copyright act.  
2 Defendant Google argued that "takedown notices" targeting a competing business made  
3 up over half (57%) of the notices Google has received; and that more than one-third  
4 (37%), "were not valid copyright claims." However, it is the Defendant Alphabet who  
5 uses the DMCA to target and intimidate competitors of Alphabet, Defendant Facebook  
6 and Defendant Amazon.  
7

8  
9 67. The Defendants Alphabet, and on behalf of the other Defendants, jointly and  
10 severally, and through the Google AdSense, (PPC) program, have entered into online  
11 digital advertising contracts with the following companies:  
12

- 13 • Viacom, dba Paramount Pictures Corporation;
- 14 • Apple Corps Ltd.;
- 15 • Sony Corporation;
- 16 • Hearst Corporation;
- 17 • Walt Disney Company;
- 18 • Tele München Fernseh GmbH + Co. Produktionsgesellschaft (VOD);
- 19 • Icon Film Distribution Pty Ltd (Australia VOD);
- 20 • Mel Gibson and long-time producing partner Bruce Davey (co-owners of  
21 Icon Film Distribution Pty Ltd (Australia VOD); and  
22 • Fintage House, dba, Lasso Group.  
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26 68. These are brand name, global movie, video, music and advertising  
27 companies with major internet presences. Due to the fact the Defendants, jointly and  
28 severally, have multi-billion dollar "AdSpend" accounts with these individuals



1 companies, each company has been allowed by Defendant Alphabet and Defendant  
2 Facebook (and on behalf of Defendant Amazon) to file frivolous copyright claims against  
3 the Plaintiff under the DMCA, causing Plaintiff to lose significant online, digital  
4 advertising revenue.  
5

6 **B. The Monopolistic horizontal price fixing scheme**  
7

8 69. Under the traditional forms of advertising, an advertising customer pays to  
9 place an advertisement, regardless of the size of the ad, the placement, or length of time  
10 the ad runs. Under this tradition, the advertisers pay to place the ad, regardless of what  
11 the consumer does. On March 25, 2004, United States Patent Application No.  
12 20040059708, was filed by Jeffrey A. Dean for AdSense. This patent application has  
13 been assigned to Google, Inc. The patent is titled: “Methods and apparatus for serving  
14 relevant advertisements.” The AdSense methodology states: “*The relevance of*  
15 *advertisements to a user's interests is improved. In one implementation, the content of a*  
16 *web page is analyzed to determine a list of one or more topics associated with that web*  
17 *page. An advertisement is considered to be relevant to that web page if it is associated*  
18 *with keywords belonging to the list of one or more topics. One or more of these relevant*  
19 *advertisements may be provided for rendering in conjunction with the web page or*  
20 *related web pages.*” This “Methods and apparatus for serving relevant advertisements[,]”  
21 is actually an “apparatus” and foundation of Defendants’ market power and unlawful  
22 anti-competitive conduct. After the 2003 launch of Google AdSense, “Pay-Per-Click,”  
23 companies like Plaintiff’s found themselves at a disadvantage when Defendant Google  
24 and the others began offering productivity software for free.  
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70. Defendant Alphabet markets Google AdSense, "Pay-Per-Click," under two different stratagems: An "AdSpend," or an "AdSense" account. The difference between a Google "AdSense" account and an "AdSpend" account is, the "AdSpend" account is used when an advertiser buys advertising space from Google. The "AdSpend," average cost-per-click (CPC) on Google Ads is \$1 to \$2 for the Google Search Network and less than \$1 for the Google Display Network. Generally, small-to-midsize companies will spend \$9000 to \$10,000 per month on Google Ads. Larger companies, such as those listed in paragraph 43, will spend \$1,000,000 to \$10,000,000 per month on Google Ads. Thus, as long as a website visitor does not click on the digital ad, the ad is virtually viewable by the consumer for free, thereby eliminating competitors, such as Plaintiff. These "AdSpend," costs do not include additional costs paid to Defendants for things such as software and technical support. On the other hand, the Google "AdSense" account is the revenue sharing account where Defendant Alphabet pays the website owner, or content creator for serving advertisements on the web page. However, the Google "AdSense" account and the "AdSpend" account are the methodologies in which the Defendants used unlawful anti-competitive conduct to obtain complete market power, thus obtaining a monopoly by acquisition. The "AdSpend" (pay-per-click) account provides free, online, digital advertising to advertisers, thus eliminating all competition. The Google "AdSense" (pay-per-click) account is used to limit the number of advertisements, a website owner, or content creator can post and the amount of revenue a website owner, or content creator can generate. In furtherance of this unlawful anti-competitive conduct, Defendant Alphabet and Defendant Facebook (and on behalf of



1 Defendant Amazon) simply assert “invalid activity,” or a “violation of the DMCA” and  
2 confiscate (for their own benefit) revenue generated through the Google “AdSense”  
3 (pay-per-click) account of Plaintiff (and other website owners, or content creator.) As of  
4 today, over 10 million websites are using Google “AdSense” accounts. Facebook users  
5 are clicking on an average of 12 adverts per month (14 for women, 10 for men). Hence,  
6 the Google “AdSense” (pay-per-click) is merely a “horizontal price fixing scheme.” See  
7 Free Range Content, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02329 (BLF).  
8

10 **4. The Defendants have acquired An Advertising “Monopoly by**  
11 **Acquisition(s).”**

13 **A. The Defendants have divisely purchased all of competitive online digital**  
14 **advertising companies under a Horizontal Market Agreement**

15 71. Defendant Zuckerberg stated in 2010: “We [Facebook] have not once  
16 bought a company for the company. We buy companies to get excellent people... In order  
17 to have a really entrepreneurial culture one of the key things is to make sure we're  
18 recruiting the best people. One of the ways to do this is to focus on acquiring great  
19 companies with great founders.” Acquisitions have been key to growing these businesses  
20 and Defendant Facebook's revenue in general. Defendant Facebook's strategy has been to  
21 buy potential rivals before they can get too big. In the process, the Defendant sometimes  
22 has paid exceptionally high prices for some deals. Defendant Facebook tried to buy  
23 Twitter in 2008 for \$500 Million. The big impact for Defendant Facebook would have  
24 been a massive data merger of the databases of both companies (Twitter/Facebook). In an  
25 email, Defendant Zuckerberg implicitly threatened to create a clone of Twitter if Twitter  
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1 didn't sell. Defendant Facebook later deployed this tactic against the likes of Snapchat  
2 and Twitch. In late 2013, "SnapChat" CEO, Evan Spiegel rebuffed a \$3 billion takeover  
3 offer from Defendant Zuckerberg. The vast majority of Defendant Facebook's  
4 acquisitions have been shut-down.  
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6 72. Defendant Facebook has acquired 82 other companies, including WhatsApp.  
7  
8 The WhatsApp acquisition closed at \$19 billion. Defendant Facebook would later merge  
9 the databases of both the WhatsApp acquisition and Facebook. The Instagram  
10 acquisition, announced on April 9, 2012, appears to have been the first exception to this  
11 pattern. Defendant Facebook makes money from ads on Instagram. In the time since  
12 Spiegel spurned Defendant Zuckerberg, Defendant Facebook has turned Instagram into a  
13 key growth driver and a "Snapchat" killer. Instagram mimics Snapchat features.  
14 Instagram has been combined with Facebook's own service. Instagram now offers  
15 advertisers access to more than 2 billion users, as well as detailed data about their online  
16 "likes" and habits. According to the investment bank Morgan Stanley, "Some Instagram  
17 advertisers are now getting for free a type of sponsorship that they have to pay for on  
18 Snapchat." Defendant's Facebook Marketplace platform has hundreds of millions of  
19 users. Many brands and influencers also rely heavily on Instagram to market their  
20 products. Defendant Facebook launched Instagram Checkout in the US. This makes it  
21 possible for some businesses to sell products directly through the platform. The Israeli  
22 company Onavo was Founded in 2010. Defendant Facebook acquired Onavo in October  
23 2013 for an undisclosed amount some analysts estimated to be between \$100 million and  
24 \$200 million. At the time of the acquisition, Onavo was an independent company. Onavo  
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1 performs web analytics on other mobile apps to determine customer usage. Onavo's  
2 technology allowed Defendant Facebook to make crucial early determinations about  
3 other companies and apps to acquire. Facebook was the second most-used mobile app in  
4 the world over Q3 2019 and the second most downloaded. In addition, Most of Defendant  
5 Facebook's revenue now comes from ads on their mobile apps. The Messaging app  
6 service Beluga was acquired by Facebook in 2011. Defendant Facebook acquired Beluga  
7 and the technology that eventually became the social media company's highly successful  
8 Messenger platform. In the process, Defendant Facebook again expanded its offerings  
9 and eliminated a potential rival. Now, Almost all of their revenue comes from serving  
10 targeted advertising on their internet platforms (Facebook platform, Instagram, Instagram  
11 Stories Facebook Messenger, Facebook Marketplace, and WhatsApp.). Defendant  
12 Facebook claimed no less than 40% of US digital ad revenue in 2018. Defendant  
13 Facebook's unlawful anti-competitive conduct has helped it become one of the world's  
14 leading marketing and advertising platforms.

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19 73. Google purchased the "Google AdSense" program from "Applied  
20 Semantics" in 2003. Applied Semantics was an obscure Santa Monica, Calif., company  
21 that made "software applications for the online, digital advertising, domain name and  
22 enterprise information management markets." The acquisition of "Applied Semantics"  
23 was for \$102 million in cash and stock. The Android operating system was acquired by  
24 Google in 2005. In 2006, Defendant Google paid \$102 million for another Web  
25 advertisement business, "dMarc Broadcasting." In the same year (2006) Defendant  
26 Google announced that it would pay \$900 million over three and a half years for the right  
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1 to sell ads on “MySpace.com.” Defendant Google then purchased Defendant YouTube  
2 for \$1.65 billion dollars in 2006. In 2007, Defendant Google made its largest acquisition  
3 to date by purchasing online, digital advertising firm “DoubleClick” for \$3.1 billion. The  
4 “DoubleClick” acquisition transferred to Defendant Google, valuable relationships that  
5 “DoubleClick” had with Web publishers and advertising agencies. In 2009, Defendant  
6 Google purchased the mobile advertising network “AdMob,” for \$750 million. In 2011,  
7 Defendant Google acquired the survey site Zagat for \$125 million. Defendant Google  
8 acquired the Israel-based startup Waze in June 2013. Defendant Google submitted a 10-Q  
9 filing with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) that revealed Google spent \$1.3  
10 billion on acquisitions during the first half of 2013. The 10-Q filing showed that \$966  
11 million of the total \$1.3B was paid to Waze. As of March 31, 2019 Defendant Google  
12 acquired Night corn, a Video sharing service. As of December 2020, Alphabet has  
13 acquired over 238 companies, The largest acquisition being the purchase of Motorola  
14 Mobility, a mobile (phone) device manufacturing company, for \$12.5 billion. As of  
15 January 14, 2020, Defendant Google acquired AppSheet, a Mobile app development and  
16 Pointy, a Local retail inventory feed software app.

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18 74. Omid Kordestani was senior advisor to the Office of the CEO and Founders  
19 at Google. On October 14, 2015 Kordestani left Google. Twitter announced Omid  
20 Kordestani as its Executive Chairman. In 2017, Defendant Google and Twitter agreed to  
21 an acquisition deal. Google acquired Twitter’s suite of developer products, including its  
22 developer suite Fabric. Fabric includes the crash reporting service Crashlytics. Twitter  
23 acquired Crashlytics back in 2013. “Fabric” is a collection of products that Twitter rolled  
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1 out in 2016 to try and encourage mobile app developers to integrate more closely with  
2 Twitter's core app. Defendant Google acquired "Fabric" and integrated it with its own  
3 developer team, "Firebase." "Firebase," is a backend-as-a-service startup. The company  
4 was acquired by Google in 2014. The developer platform has since expanded. "Firebase"  
5 quadrupled its number of users to 450,000 by mid-2016 and added analytics capabilities  
6 and mobile development tools. By 2019, Defendant ended support for "Fabric."  
7 "Firebase," Defendant Google's mobile and web application development platform,  
8 swallowed "Fabric" and all its features. Incidentally, both Fabric and Firebase were once  
9 separate companies.

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13 75. In 1997, Defendant Bezos used \$54 million dollars raised through Amazon's  
14 initial public offering (IPO) to finance aggressive acquisition of smaller competitors. In  
15 1998, Defendant Bezos diversified into the online sale of music and video. In 2002,  
16 Bezos led Amazon to launch Amazon Web Services, which compiled data from weather  
17 channels and website traffic. In 2013, Bezos secured a \$600 million contract with the  
18 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on behalf of Amazon Web Services. Defendant  
19 Amazon, Inc., returned to making multiple acquisitions per year in 2005. Defendant  
20 Bezos focused on acquiring digital retailers and media websites. Amazon acquired the  
21 video streaming site Twitch. Starting in 2011, Defendant Amazon began shifting its focus  
22 to buying technology startups to develop and improve Amazon Echo and grow its  
23 Amazon Web Services division. In 2019, Amazon acquired parts of a global ad tech  
24 company to bolster its rapidly growing advertising business. Defendant Amazon acquired  
25 Sizmek's Ad Server and its Dynamic Creative Optimization tool, which helps personalize  
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1 ads using data. Defendant Amazon, Inc said in a press release the two companies have a  
2 lot of customers in common, “so we know how valued these proven solutions are to their  
3 customer base.” On August 5, 2013, Defendant Bezos announced his purchase of The  
4 Washington Post for \$250 million in cash. The sale closed on October 1, 2013. In March  
5 2014, Defendant Bezos made his first significant change at The Washington Post.  
6 Defendant Bezos removed the online paywall (making news content and advertising free)  
7 for subscribers of a number of U.S. local newspapers in Texas, Hawaii, and Minnesota.  
8 In January 2016, Defendant Bezos reinvented the newspaper as a media and technology  
9 company by reconstructing its digital media, mobile platforms, and analytics software.  
10 After a surge in online readership in 2016, the paper was profitable for the first time since  
11 Defendant Bezos made the purchase in 2013. Defendant Amazon’s advertising includes  
12 sponsored products in search and display ads to reach audiences based on their likely  
13 purchase intentions, while the e-commerce retailer’s trove of first-party data about  
14 millions of customers helps with ad targeting.

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19 76. Advertising drives a majority of revenue for Defendant Google (dba  
20 Twitter) and Defendant Facebook, which charge advertisers to have their marketing  
21 content appear on search results and news feeds. Defendant Amazon employs a similar  
22 strategy. Defendant Amazon uses its online marketplace and other platforms, giving  
23 vendors, authors, and other advertisers ways to reach potential customers. One of  
24 Defendant Amazon’s main competitive advantages as it gears up to share in a larger  
25 portion of advertising revenue with dominant digital advertising players Google and  
26 Facebook, is the data Defendant Amazon has on customer purchasing habits. Defendant  
27  
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1 Bezos developed the mantra "Get Big Fast", establishing the company's need to scale its  
 2 operations to produce market dominance. eMarketer forecasts e-commerce channel  
 3 advertising to represent 12.2% of all U.S. digital ad spending by the end of this year  
 4 (2020). Defendant Amazon is the dominant player by far. As a consequence of the  
 5 Horizontal Market Agreement, competition between Defendants has been entirely  
 6 eliminated in the three markets. to wit: Digital Advertising, Android OS and Online sales  
 7 of goods. Accordingly, Defendants Amazon, Facebook and Google are now the only  
 8 three digital advertisers in the United States and the only three beneficiaries of Defendant  
 9 Google's AdSpend/AdSense.

10 **B. The Google "AdSense" (pay-per-click) "horizontal price fixing scheme"**  
 11 **And the Acquired Advertising Monopoly has and Continues to Net the Defendants**  
 12 **Trillions of Dollars.**

13 77. In early 2020, Defendant Alphabet, dba, Defendant Google, disclosed that  
 14 on an annual basis, Defendant YouTube generated \$15 billion last year and contributed  
 15 roughly 10 percent to all Google revenue. These figures make Defendant YouTube's ad  
 16 business nearly one fifth the size of Defendant Facebook's, and more than six times  
 17 larger than all of Defendant Amazon-owned Twitch. Defendant Alphabet, dba Google,  
 18 LLC., dba, YouTube, LLC., will earn \$39.58 billion dollars in U.S. advertising revenue  
 19 this year (2020), compared with \$41.80 billion dollars in 2019. Despite the decline,  
 20 Google's ad revenues will still exceed the \$36.48 billion earned in 2018. Defendant  
 21 Alphabet, dba Google, LLC., dba, YouTube, LLC., and its former or current subsidiaries,  
 22 generated Google AdSense revenue, in the following amounts, for the following quarters:



- 1       • For the quarter ending June 30, 2018, Defendant Alphabet generated
- 2       AdSense revenue in the amount of \$32.657B, a 25.56% increase
- 3       year-over-year;
- 4
- 5       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending June
- 6       30, 2018 was \$123.898B, a 24.8% increase year-over-year;
- 7
- 8       • Defendant Alphabet's annual AdSense revenue for 2017 was \$110.855B, a
- 9       22.8% increase from 2016;
- 10
- 11       • Defendant Alphabet's annual AdSense revenue for 2016 was \$90.272B, a
- 12       20.38% increase from 2015;
- 13
- 14       • Defendant Alphabet's annual AdSense revenue for 2015 was \$74.989B, a
- 15       13.62% increase from 2014;
- 16
- 17       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending
- 18       December 31, 2014 was \$66.001B, a 15.25% increase year-over-year;
- 19
- 20       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending
- 21       December 31, 2013 was \$55.519B, a 52.75% increase year-over-year;
- 22
- 23       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending
- 24       December 31, 2012 was \$46.039B, a -2.84% decrease year-over-year;
- 25
- 26       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending
- 27       December 31, 2011 was \$37.905B, a 25.40% increase year-over-year;
- 28       • Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending

December 31, 2009 was \$23.651B, a 17.07% increase year-over-year; and

- Defendant Alphabet's AdSense revenue for the twelve months ending December 31, 2008 was \$21.796B, a 18.11% increase year-over-year.

78. The total AdSense revenue for Defendant Alphabet, between 2008 and 2018 was in the aggregate amount of \$680,246,000,000.00 (billion dollars) in on-line digital "AdSense" advertisement revenue. As of 2020, and a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful, anti-competitive conduct, Defendant Google massively beat Wall Street expectations on profit margins. Defendant Google's hardware businesses are lumped together with subscription services like YouTube Premium and YouTube Music Premium in Defendant Google's "Other" category, all of which added up to a total of \$17 billion of revenue in 2019. This suggests that Defendant Google's hardware business (motorola mobility, Pixel phones and laptops; Nest doorbells, cameras, speakers, thermostats, Chromecast dongle and the Google Wifi router) rakes in at least \$2 billion, but theoretically a bit more. The defendants expect revenue to rebound by more than 20% in 2021 and to see 11.8% growth in 2022.

79. Defendant Facebook's annual/quarterly revenue history and growth rate from 2009 to 2020 has been abnormally astronomical. Revenue is the top line item on an income statement from which all costs and expenses are subtracted to arrive at net income. Approximately 42.8% of Defendant Facebook's global revenue in 2019 came from the United States. Facebook revenue for Q3 2019 came to a stately \$17.65 billion. This compares to \$16.89 billion in Q2 2019 (a 5% increase), and \$13,727 in Q3 2018 (a 29% increase). Indeed, it is the highest single quarterly Facebook revenue figure ever

generated, beating the previous record of \$16.91 billion in Q4 2018. Defendant Facebook's revenue from Canada region was **\$1.98 billion during 2019**. Defendant Facebook's revenue from the International markets such as Europe, India, Canada, etc. clocked \$15.06 million in 2016. Facebook fiscal year starts from January 1st. Interestingly, the fiscal 2016 was the first time when the company reported over \$10 billion in advertising revenue from the United States. This represented 45.5% of the total annual revenue in 2016. In 2019, Europe contributed \$4.12 billion (23%); Asia \$3.27 billion (19%); and the rest of the world \$1.77 billion (10%). Of all major global digital ad sellers, only Defendant Google's business is worth more than Defendant Facebook's. eMarketer stats forecasting total net ad revenue over 2019 (published in March 2019) estimated Facebook's total for the year would come to \$67.37 billion, with Google at \$103.73 billion. Facebook total net ad revenue is over twice the figure of third-place Alibaba (\$29.2 billion).

- Facebook revenue for the quarter ending September 30, 2020 was \$21.470B, a 21.63% increase year-over-year.

- Facebook revenue for the twelve months ending September 30, 2020 was \$78.976B, a 18.71% increase year-over-year.

- Facebook annual revenue for 2019 was \$70.697B, a 26.61% increase from 2018 (In 2019, the social media company reported its highest-ever annual revenue of \$30.23 billion from the United States, with 25.4% YoY growth.).

- Facebook annual revenue for 2018 was \$55.838B, a 37.35% increase from 2017 (Of that \$55.83 billion, a tidy \$21.11 billion was profit ).



- Facebook annual revenue for 2017 was \$40.653B, a 47.09% increase from 2016.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2016 was \$27.6B, a 54.2% increase from 2015.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2015 \$17.93B, an increase of 44% year-over-year.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2014 \$12.47B, an increase of 58% year-over-year.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2013 \$7.87B, an increase of 55% year-over-year.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2012 \$1.585B, an increase of 40% year-over-year.
- Facebook annual revenue for 2011 \$3.71B, an increase of 88% year-over-year.

80. Defendant Facebook, Inc. held its initial public offering (IPO) on Friday, May 18, 2012. The IPO was the biggest in technology and one of the biggest in Internet history, with a peak market capitalization of over \$104 billion. Prior to 2011, Defendant Facebook was tight-lipped about its revenue numbers, which is typical of private companies. Market experts estimate Defendant Facebook made between \$700M - \$1.1 billion in total revenue between the years 2008 through 2010. Even in the earlier days, Defendant Facebook's growth was explosive. 2013's figure of \$7.87 billion represents a tenfold increase over 2009's \$777 million. Five years on from that, in 2018, the figure had increased sevenfold once more. Defendant Facebook's market valuation is now approximately \$607 billion dollars. The total AdSense revenue for Defendant Facebook, between 2008 and 2018 was in the (approximate) aggregate amount of \$365,250,000,000.00 (billion dollars) in on-line digital "AdSense" advertisement revenue. As of January 8, 2019, Facebook (FB) had a market capitalization of \$409.6 billion dollars.

81. As of October 2020, Amazon's advertising revenue rose 51% to \$5.4 billion

1 dollars in Q3 from a year earlier. The growth in online, digital ad sales was greater than  
2 Amazon's total revenue gain of 37% to a record \$96.1 billion dollars. Subscription  
3 revenue, which includes the fees that people pay for Amazon Prime memberships,  
4 audiobooks, digital video, digital music and e-books, rose 33% to \$6.57 billion dollars.  
5 Amazon's ad revenue growth was stronger in Q3 than in the prior quarter, when it  
6 reported a 41% yearly gain. The company anticipates total revenue will grow anywhere  
7 from 28% to 38% in Q4 (2020) as consumers continue to show a greater preference for  
8 online shopping. Defendant Amazon's ad business accounted for \$10.32 billion in  
9 revenue last year (2019) and is expected to grow to \$12.75 billion dollars in 2020.  
10 Defendant Amazon's ad revenue growth this year (2020) helps to solidify its place as the  
11 third-biggest digital ad platform in the U.S. behind Defendant Alphabet's Google and  
12 Defendant Facebook.

13  
14 82. As of October 2019, Ad spend through Amazon's DSP was up 30% in Q3,  
15 compared with a 27% increase in Q2, as advertising brands increasingly leveraged the  
16 ability to target ads on Defendant Amazon's web properties as well as on those web  
17 properties Defendant Amazon doesn't own. In Q3, 32% of the Ad spend through  
18 Amazon's DSP went to properties not owned by the e-commerce giant. The cost of digital  
19 ads on Amazon in Q3 accelerated as cost-per-thousand impressions (CPM) rose 15%, up  
20 from the 5% increase seen in Q2. Ad spend on Defendant Amazon's Sponsored Products  
21 increased 30% year-over-year in the U.S. and 50% for international campaigns. Revenue  
22 generated by Defendant Amazon's Sponsored Products jumped 30% while clicks climbed  
23 18% and the cost-per-click rose 10%. The portion of ad spend allocated to brand  
24  
25  
26  
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1 awareness was 42% in Q3, a significant lift over the 26% measured in Q1. The majority  
 2 of Defendant Amazon's DSP ad spend still goes to purchase-focused campaigns. In  
 3 furtherance of this unlawful anti-competitive conduct, Last year in 2019, Defendant  
 4 Google held 31.6% of total digital advertising spending with Defendant Facebook and  
 5 Defendant Amazon holding 22.7% and 7.8% respectively. This year, market analysts  
 6 expect Defendant Google to claim 29.4% of digital ad spending with Defendant  
 7 Facebook and Defendant Amazon clawing 23.4% and 9.5%, respectively.

10 **5. The Defendants have jointly conspired to engage in unlawful**  
 11 **anti-competitive conduct from 1998 -to - Present.**

13 **A. The "Obama Phone" (UMX U686CL).**

14 83. The Barack Obama administration, well into the internet and wireless age,  
 15 agreed that broadband and cellular services are essential services. Citizens of various  
 16 federal programs now qualify for a free-service cell phone. The UMX U686CL is a cell  
 17 phone subsidized by the US government for low-income users. The UMX U686CL is  
 18 provided by (the Sprint owned) Virgin Mobile's Assurance Wireless program at \$35 per  
 19 phone. Assurance Wireless is an offshoot of the Lifeline Assistance program (LAP). The  
 20 LAP is a Federal Communications Commission free phone plan. The LAP is often  
 21 referred to as the Obama Phone because it was expanded in 2008, when President Barack  
 22 Obama took office. The UMX U686CL runs on the Android OS. The Android operating  
 23 system was acquired by Google in 2005. Between 2005 and 2020, Defendant Alphabet  
 24 has paid a total of \$80 billion dollars out to Android developers. The UMX device  
 25 comes with hidden apps installed. The first app, "Android/Trojan.Dropper.Agent.UMX,"



1 is heavily obfuscated malware that installs adware and other unwanted apps without the  
2 knowledge or permission of the user. The "Android/Trojan.Dropper.Agent.UMX."  
3 contains striking similarities to two other trojan droppers. For one, it uses identical text  
4 strings and almost identical code. Secondly, the app contains an encoded string. When  
5 this string is decoded, it contains a hidden library named:  
6 "com.android.google.bridge.Libgmp" that aggressively displays ads. Once the library is  
7 loaded into memory, it installs software Malwarebytes calls  
8 "Android/Trojan.HiddenAds." The malware that installs these programs is hidden in the  
9 phone's settings app. This makes it virtually impossible to uninstall. The phone can't  
10 operate properly without the Settings app. Market experts agree on one thing: "If you  
11 Uninstall the Settings app, you've just made yourself a pricey paper weight." This  
12 conduct represents the brain of Defendants Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook's unlawful,  
13 anti-competitive conduct.

#### 18 **B. The Anti-Competitive Android Operating System**

19 84. The Android operating system was first developed by Android, Inc., a  
20 software company located in Silicon Valley. After Defendant Google acquired Android  
21 in 2005, the Android operating system was developed by Google for use in all of its  
22 touchscreen devices, tablets, and cell phones. The vast majority of phones on Earth run  
23 Android. As a result, and in furtherance of the conspiracy to engage in unlawful,  
24 anti-competitive conduct, Android and Google Mobile Services (GMS) are now  
25 synonymous with each other, even though they are actually quite different, ... Defendant  
26 Alphabet provides both Android and Google Mobile Services for free. The Android Open  
27  
28

1 Source Project (AOSP) is an open-source software stack for any device, from  
2 smartphones to tablets to wearables, created by Google. Defendant Google believes  
3 giving Android away for free increases the size of the world's Web-connected population.

4 The company believes that increasing the Web-connected population will inevitably lead  
5 to more Google searches — which Google can monetize with search ads. GMS, on the  
6 other hand, are different. GMS are a range of Google-branded services that Google wants  
7 you to use for daily interaction. These services include Gmail, Google Maps, Google+,  
8 Google Play, Chrome and YouTube, and while these run on Android OS to a large extent,  
9 many of them are also available on iOS. Google doesn't charge a fee for GMS, it places  
10 stringent approval processes on all device OEMs that want to offer GMS, and has moved  
11 some of the key Android core functionality and APIs into GMS in order to better control  
12 and monetize them. Android increasingly dominates as it becomes fragmented, leading to  
13 the balance of power to swing from GMS to AOSP. An Android device without Google  
14 Play is an Android device without access to more than a million apps.

15 85. Defendant Amazon's Kindle Fire and the Fire smartphone are completely  
16 Android-based, but devoid of any Google Mobile Services. Defendant Amazon has had  
17 to create its own app store, API stack and developer program. OEMs that are not as big as  
18 Amazon, but want to build their own branded ecosystems on Android, will reach out to  
19 providers to deliver white labeled app stores, and API and app management platforms in  
20 order to create a third party developer portal. Facebook for Android refers to the official  
21 mobile app developed by Defendant Facebook for Android cell phones and tablets. The  
22 app is free to download and install from the Google Play store. Defendant Facebook's



1 official suite of apps include Facebook Messenger, Facebook Groups, Facebook at Work,  
2 and Facebook Mentions. Defendant Facebook's Instagram added 10 million users in just  
3 ten days, after making its service available on Android.

4  
5 86. Defendant Google created the underlying value of the Android OS.  
6 Defendant Amazon and Defendant Facebook, as well as Alibaba, Baidu, Microsoft,  
7 Tencent and Xiaomi are all using the Android OS. Defendant Google announced Android  
8 Pay almost directly after Apple announced Apple Pay. Google's most notable payments  
9 acquisition was Softcard, a contactless NFC based mobile payments solution. AT&T,  
10 Verizon, and T-Mobile wireless service carriers have agreed to pre-install Google  
11 payment apps on their android phones. Defendant Google's Android is used daily by 1.17  
12 billion people worldwide, while 1.35 billion people use Defendant Facebook's Apps  
13 daily. On Thanksgiving Day 2020, online, web-based sales shattered previously recorded  
14 profits. Consumers spent \$5.1 billion online on Thanksgiving Day 2020 alone. Spending  
15 is up 21.5% from last year (2019). Nearly 50% of the web-based purchases were made on  
16 an android smartphone. These numbers and profits are a direct and proximate result of  
17 Defendants Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook's unlawful, anti-competitive conduct.  
18  
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20  
21  
22 **C. Twitter and the Unlawful Conspiracy to Engage in Unlawful,**  
23 **Anti-Competitive Conduct**

24 87. Defendant Bezos was one of the first shareholders in Google in 1998.  
25 Defendant Bezos was also an early investor in the current Twitter. Defendant Bezos  
26 invested about \$15 million in Twitter (TWTR) just over a decade ago in 2008, through  
27 his investment firm Bezos Expeditions. Twitter founder Jack Dorsey was an early angel  
28



1 investor in Instagram. Dorsey previously supported Instagram financially and allegedly  
2 expressed interest in buying Instagram prior to Defendant Facebook's acquisition of the  
3 company. In fact, Twitter had a deal in place to buy Instagram for \$525 million back in  
4 March 2012. However, Defendant Zuckerberg prevailed with a \$1 Billion dollar offer.  
5 Dorsey (@jack) unfollowed Defendant Zuckerberg (@finkd) on Twitter in December of  
6 2019, after Zukerberg purchased Instagram. Dorsey now, the CEO of Twitter and Square,  
7 receives a monster financial return he made on his angel investment in Instagram, which  
8 he gets back many times over in cash and pre-IPO Facebook stock.

9  
10  
11 88. Defendant Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg tried to acquire Twitter not once,  
12 but twice through official channels and via co-founder Dorsey. In 2008, Facebook  
13 executive Chris Cox had been meeting in coffee shops with Dorsey, who had just been  
14 exiled from Twitter. Cox wanted to hire Dorsey. A Facebook owned Twitter would have  
15 reaped bigger profits, making ads on Facebook a little better, but really supercharging the  
16 ads on Twitter. The combined information would have allowed for precision targeting of  
17 sponsored tweets. The 330 million or so users on Twitter now are chicken feed for  
18 Facebook. Dorsey's exile from Twitter ended in March 2011, when then-CEO Dick  
19 Costolo brought him back.

20  
21  
22 89. Defendant Google having acquired Android OS in 2005, now owns all  
23 Twitter Development tools as of 2019. The Twitter advertising page reads: "This page  
24 and certain other Twitter sites place and read third party cookies on your browser that are  
25 used for non-essential purposes including targeting of ads. Through these cookies,  
26 Google, LinkedIn, NewsCred and Logicad collect personal data about you for their own  
27  
28

1 purposes.”

2  
3 90. The video live-streaming app Periscope was acquired by Twitter in 2015.  
4 Periscope is being shut down. On December 15, 2020, Defendant Google (the owner of  
5 Twitter) announced: “We have made the difficult decision to discontinue Periscope as a  
6 separate mobile app by March 2021.” This isn’t the first video service Twitter has  
7 acquired and subsequently discontinued. The company also bought Vine, a short video  
8 app in 2012 before shutting it down in 2017. Thus, Defendant Bezos, (on behalf of  
9 Amazon) Twitter CEO Dorsey, Defendants Facebook/Zuckerberg and Defendant  
10 Alphabet, dba Google are working together as apparent beneficiaries of this unlawful,  
11 anti-competitive conduct.  
12  
13

14 **D. The Obama Administration, the UMX U686CL (Android OS) and the**  
15 **“Cloud-based” Conspiracy to Engage in Unlawful, Anti-Competitive Conduct**  
16

17 91. Former Pres. Obama (while campaigning for President in the 2008 election)  
18 told Google employees during a 2007 visit to Google’s headquarters in Mountain View,  
19 California: “What we shared is a belief in changing the world from the bottom up, not  
20 from the top down.” Between October 15, 2008 August 1, 2018, Defendant Alphabet,  
21 dba, Google, dba, YouTube, invited, allowed and supported (now) Former President  
22 Barack Obama to campaign, raise funds and secure votes and voters, via Obama’s  
23 YouTube channel(s) Obama Dotcom (pre-election channel); The Obama White House  
24 (President’s Channel); and The Obama Foundation (Presidency & PostPresidential  
25 Channel). Defendant Google employees emerged as the No. 2 donors to the Democratic  
26 National Committee in the 2008 election. Defendant Google employees and the  
27  
28



1 company's political action committee gave \$1.6 million to Democrats in the 2008  
2 presidential election. Google hosted multiple fundraising events for former President  
3 Barack Obama. Google's fund-raising executives for Obama's Presidential campaign  
4 included Susan Wojcicki and Marissa Mayer. Defendant Schmidt and other Google  
5 executives forked over \$25,000 apiece to help pay for the inaugural celebration.  
6 Then-Google Chief executive, Page, also wrote a check to help pay for Obama's  
7 inauguration. Defendant Schmidt also served as an informal economic adviser during the  
8 Obama campaign.  
9

10  
11 92. In 2008, multiple "ex-Google employees" joined the Obama administration  
12 in various roles. Defendant Schmidt became a member of Obama's Council of Science  
13 and Technology Advisers. Google's former head of global public policy, Andrew  
14 McLaughlin, was named deputy chief technology officer in Obama's administration.  
15 President Obama's appointment of McLaughlin to a position in his administration,  
16 resulted in McLaughlin being in a position that shaped policy, ... that affected Google's  
17 rivals. Defendant Google's, Vice President Marissa Mayer, acting as co-chairwoman of a  
18 report commissioned by the Knight Foundation and the Aspen Institute, called for greater  
19 broadband deployments and "open-access policies." Defendant Google's, Vice President  
20 Mayer was the sole author of the report. Obama's FCC chairman Julius Genachowski and  
21 Obama's Chief Technology Officer, Aneesh Chopra, praised the report. Genachowski  
22 and Chopra both said the paper would guide Obama's Internet policy. Obama and his tech  
23 regulators, including Genachowski, had long supported one of Google's top policy  
24 priorities: codifying "Net neutrality," or rules that prohibit network providers like AT&T,  
25  
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1 Verizon, and the cable operators from prioritizing traffic and content that run on their  
2 networks. While working for Defendant Google, Obama's deputy chief technology  
3 officer McLaughlin, championed Google's policy goals.

4  
5 93. Immediately upon taking office in 2008, Obama made the  
6 government-subsidized cell phone, the UMX U686CL, which runs the Android OS,  
7 available to millions of low-income families. UMX U686CL disbursements ballooned to  
8 \$2.2 billion during President Barack Obama's first term. Over the years since Obama's  
9 election as President, preinstalled (advertising) malware has been found on a raft of  
10 low-cost Android phones from a variety of providers and manufacturers.

11  
12  
13 94. Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty appointed Vivek Kundra to the  
14 cabinet post of Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for the District of Columbia, on March  
15 27, 2007. Kundra used Defendant Google's cloud-based web applications while  
16 employed in the D.C. (City) government. The District of Columbia paid \$479,560.00 for  
17 the "Enterprise Google Apps" license. Since its deployment in July 2008 Google Apps  
18 has been available to over 38,000 D.C. city employees. In 2008, Kundra served as  
19 technology adviser on President Barack Obama's transition team. Kundra was officially  
20 named to the post of Federal Chief Information Officer by President Obama on March 5,  
21 2009. The Federal Chief Information Officer is responsible for directing the policy and  
22 strategic planning of federal information technology investments as well as for oversight  
23 of federal technology spending. Kundra oversaw the government's tech spending. On  
24 September 15, 2009, during an event at NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountain  
25 View, California, Kundra announced a new site that lets federal agencies buy Google  
26  
27  
28

1 "cloud computing" Apps that run on the Internet, instead of installing software on their  
2 computers. Kundra also announced the launching of the federal government strategy and  
3 the (Google) cloud computing portal Apps.gov. Defendant Brin attended this event and  
4 said Defendant Google was launching a "government cloud" data center specifically  
5 designed for government agencies.

6  
7  
8 95. In late 2010, hoping to spur use of Gmail, the D.C. (City) government ran a  
9 pilot program. The City selected about 300 users and had them use the Defendant  
10 Google's product (Gmail) for three months. Google participated closely in the project.  
11 The first major cloud project during Kundra's tenure was GSA's migration of email/Lotus  
12 Notes to Defendant Google's Gmail and Salesforce.com's platform. GSA awarded a  
13 contract for email to Defendant Google in December 2010. In July 2011, the General  
14 Services Administration (GSA) became the first federal agency to migrate its email  
15 services for 17,000 employees and contractors to the cloud-based Google Apps for  
16 Government.

17  
18  
19 96. GSA awarded a five-year contract to Salesforce.com in August 2011. In  
20 January 2012, Kundra joined Salesforce.com as Executive Vice President of Emerging  
21 Markets (Most notably, Salesforce.com made an official announcement on Tuesday,  
22 December 1, 2020, of their plans to buy SLACK TECHNOLOGIES INC., for \$27.7  
23 billion.). In February, 2017 Kundra joined Outcome Health as EVP of Provider Solutions.  
24 He was then promoted to Chief Operating Officer in July. Vivek left Outcome in Nov  
25 2017 after major investors filed a lawsuit alleging improper practices against its founders  
26 for misleading advertisers and investors.



1           97. In 2007, Facebook Co-Founder Chris Hughes met with Jim Brayton (then)  
2 Senator Obama's Internet director, via phone. A couple of weeks before Obama's official  
3 announcement that he was running for President, Brayton and Hughes met in person over  
4 coffee at Union Station in D.C. Brayton decided to hire Hughes on the spot. Hughes  
5 created the on-line campaign apparatus that got Barack Obama elected as President of the  
6 United States. Hughes helped develop the most robust set of Web-based  
7 social-networking tools ever used in a political campaign. Obama's campaign manager  
8 David Plouffe said (on April 1, 2009): "Technology has always been used as a net to  
9 capture people in a campaign or cause, but not to organize." Chris saw what was possible  
10 before anyone else." Hughes' key tool was My.BarackObama.com, or MyBO for short.  
11 The website "Obama for America" (<https://www.ofa.us/>) was originally created as  
12 My.BarackObama.com by Hughes. The networking Web site, interfaced with Facebook  
13 and allowed Obama supporters to create groups, plan events, raise funds, download tools  
14 and connect with one another. By the time the campaign was over, volunteers had created  
15 more than 2 million profiles on Facebook, planned 200,000 offline events, formed 35,000  
16 Facebook groups, posted 400,000 blogs, and raised \$30 million on 70,000 personal  
17 Facebook fund-raising pages.

18           98. Sheryl Sandberg is Chief Operating Officer for Defendant Facebook, Inc.  
19 Sandberg has been COO at Facebook since March of 2008. Prior to working for  
20 Defendant Facebook, Inc., Sandberg was vice president of Global Online Sales and  
21 Operations at Google. Prior to this, Sandberg was Chief of Staff for the United States  
22 Treasury Department under President Clinton. Sandberg also sat on President Obama's



1 Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. In 2016, Google executives and Sandberg, on  
2 behalf of Facebook, met with President Obama to discuss strategies including counter  
3 speech initiatives and efforts to identify potential terrorists online. Facebook provided ad  
4 credits worth up to \$1,000 to those who post counter-extremist messages, and together  
5 with the State Department, launched competitions in 45 college classes around the world.  
6 Those who participated in the competition were provided a budget of \$2,000 and \$200 in  
7 ad credits.

8  
9  
10 99. On April 20, 2011, President Barack Obama made a campaign-style visit to  
11 the nexus of social communications, Facebook, Inc.'s headquarters, in Menlo Park,  
12 California, at the invitation of Defendants Zuckerberg and COO Sandberg. President  
13 Barack Obama, Defendant Zuckerberg, and Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg answered  
14 questions from users as part of a Facebook Live town hall meeting. By visiting Facebook  
15 headquarters in Silicon Valley, Obama sought to connect to tens of millions of people  
16 who have adopted social media as a prime method of communications.

17  
18  
19 100. Defendant Facebook's hosting President Obama in April 2011 at Facebook's  
20 headquarters was choreographed and timed to Defendant Facebook's much-expected  
21 initial public offering (IPO). President Obama got to talk directly to potential voters.  
22 Facebook got incredible validation. In July 2011, Facebook was the most popular  
23 third-party app on Google's Android platform. Facebook came in third place on Google's  
24 first-party apps. In August 2011, Facebook introduced Facebook Messenger, a new  
25 mobile app. It became available August 11th in the US and Canada for Android on  
26 Google's Android Market and for the iPhone on Apple's App Store. This app is the result  
27  
28

1 of Facebook's acquisition of Beluga. In December of 2011, Facebook became the most  
2 popular Android app among adult smartphone owners in the US.

3  
4 101. Facebook filed its \$5 billion IPO in February of 2012, stating: "*We had 432*  
5 *million MAUs who used Facebook mobile products in December 2011. While most of our*  
6 *mobile users also access Facebook through personal computers, we anticipate that the*  
7 *rate of growth in mobile usage will exceed the growth in usage through personal*  
8 *computers for the foreseeable future, in part due to our focus on developing mobile*  
9 *products to encourage mobile usage of Facebook.*"

10  
11 102. In 2012, Defendants Facebook, Inc., Defendant Zuckerberg and COO  
12 Sandberg integrated political campaign data with Defendant Facebook's data. This  
13 integrated data change was critical to President Barack Obama's 2012 re-election.

14  
15 103. Carol Davidsen is the former director of integration and media analytics at  
16 Obama for America. Davidsen is a data expert. She worked on the Obama campaign from  
17 November 2011 to November 2012. On Twitter, Davidsen explained how the 2012  
18 Obama campaign harnessed Defendant Facebook's Application Programming Interface  
19 (API) to access the company's "social graph." Defendant Facebook's "social graph"  
20 maps the Facebook users connections. This enabled the Obama campaign to access  
21 information on Defendant Facebook users' friends when they used the Facebook log-in  
22 button to access the campaign's website.

23  
24 104. On March 18, 2018, Davidsen tweeted: "I worked on all of the data  
25 integration projects at O[bama] F[or] A[merica]. In a subsequent tweet on March 18,  
26 2018, Davidsen added: "They came to office in the days following election recruiting &

1 were very candid that they allowed us to do things they wouldn't have allowed someone  
2  
3 else to do because they were on our side."

4 105. Defendant Facebook has denied that there was any favoritism toward the  
5 Obama campaign in the 2012 election. However Barack Obama's re-election team built a  
6 vast digital data operation that for the first time combined a unified database on hundreds  
7 of millions of American voters with the power of Facebook to target individual voters to  
8 a degree never achieved before. "The [Obama 2012] campaign's exhaustive use of  
9 Facebook was so intense, it triggered the site's internal safeguards."  
10

11 106. Defendant Facebook had over 432 million monthly active mobile users as of  
12 December 2011. This represents 51.1 percent (up from 50.3 percent) of Facebook's total  
13 user base of 845 million monthly active users. Thirteen point four (13.4) percent accessed  
14 Facebook strictly through mobile, while the rest accessed Facebook from desktop and  
15 mobile. Thus, by allowing Obama to harness Facebook API's, Defendant Facebook, in  
16 furtherance of the unlawful conspiracy to engage in anti-competitive conduct, generated  
17 billions of dollars in online ad revenue. Facebook's mobile user must access Facebook  
18 using the Android OS, which is preloaded with malware that installs adware and other  
19 unwanted apps without the knowledge or permission of the user.  
20  
21

22 107. Federal law "bans corporations from making 'direct or indirect' contributions  
23 to federal candidates." This ban doesn't just include cash, but anything of value. "In other  
24 words, corporations cannot provide federal candidates with free services of any kind."  
25 Defendant Facebook gave the Obama campaign free access to this type of data when it  
26 normally does not do so for other entities, or usually charges for such access to this data.  
27  
28



1 Defendant Facebook appears to have violated the federal ban on in-kind contributions by  
2 a corporation. The Obama campaign appears to have violated the law by accepting such a  
3 corporate contribution. U.S. Election officials all agree on one point: "Carol Davidsen's  
4 admissions should provide a sufficient basis for opening a federal investigation into what  
5 appears to be a clear and serious violation of the law."  
6

7  
8 108. In 2008, it was Google and Facebook that went to Barack Obama and met  
9 him at San Francisco airport and told him all about the power of this personal data. In  
10 2010, Defendant Facebook divulged unique user IDs to advertisers, which were used to  
11 track consumers. In the same year, the "Silicon Valley Insider" published old instant  
12 messages in which Zuckerberg makes incendiary remarks such as calling the earliest  
13 Facebook members "dumb fucks" for trusting him with their information.  
14

15 109. In 2016, Defendant Zuckerberg said live video was the future of Facebook,  
16 and he had a big get to help it grow: President Barack Obama. The plan was for Obama  
17 and Zuckerberg to talk together in some manner on Facebook Live, potentially allowing  
18 many thousands of people around the globe to tune in. In May 2016, viewers tried to  
19 watch a BuzzFeed interview with Obama on "Facebook Live," but the stream failed.  
20 C-SPAN resorted to showing streams from Facebook Live and Periscope (Twitter's live  
21 video product) in order to broadcast the sit-in by members of the House of  
22 Representatives.  
23

24  
25 110. Defendant Facebook then paid news outlets like The New York Times,  
26 CNN, and BuzzFeed more than \$50 million to encourage them to produce more  
27 Facebook live video content.  
28

111. The Facebook data mining in 2012 was a win-win situation for Obama, and allowed by Defendant Facebook, in furtherance of Defendant Facebook's conspiracy to engage in unlawful, anti-competitive conduct. Facebook's D.C. office established ties to the Obama administrations. Defendant Facebook hired Marne Levine, former chief of staff of Obama's National Economics Council, as its new vice president of global public policy. Thus, the Defendants, Facebook and Zuckerberg, and each of them, jointly and severally, have engaged the highest Office(s) of the United States, in furtherance of their conspiracy to engage in unlawful, anti-competitive conduct.

112. On October 8, 2009, Defendant Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos sat down for a lunch meeting with President Obama. Defendant Amazon was ramping up its efforts to sell cloud-computing services to federal government agencies. "Cloud Computing" represented a potentially huge new market for the company.

113. With its Kindle tablet, Defendant Amazon had a product it wanted to sell. Defendant Amazon launched Kindle Singles Corner in June of 2013. A Kindle single is a type of e-book which is published through Amazon's Kindle Store. Kindle Singles Corner was made available to both Kindle device and Android OS App users, and priced between \$0.99 and \$4.99.

114. In July of 2013, the Defendant Amazon conducted a sit-down interview with President Obama. The interview was featured on Defendant's new Kindle Singles Corner. In July of 2013 President Obama praised Defendant Amazon for the firm's job creation, which notably put independent bookstores out of business.

115. In 2019, Defendant Amazon's federal corporate income tax bill was zero.

1 The Obama administration vocally supported several of the tax credits and deductions  
2 used by Amazon. The research and development (R&D) credit allows companies to  
3 quickly recover the cost of expenditures for research and experimentation. President  
4 Obama in several of his budget proposals, not only supported the R&D credit, Obama  
5 advocated for making it permanent and expanding it. Defendant Amazon also utilized full  
6 business expensing, which allows companies to deduct the cost of new equipment  
7 purchased. In 2019, Defendant Amazon also deducted losses from previous years and for  
8 stock compensation granted to employees.  
9

10  
11 116. Jay Carney is a top advisor to Defendant Jeff Bezos and architect of  
12 Defendant Amazon's HQ2. Carney is Senior Vice-President of Worldwide Corporate  
13 Affairs at Amazon. Carney is essentially Amazon's public policy and communications  
14 chief. Carney was President Barack Obama's press secretary from 2011 to 2014. For the  
15 first two years of Obama's presidency, Carney was director of communications for Vice  
16 President Joe Biden.  
17

18  
19 117. Defendant Bezos hired Carney as Defendant Amazon was entering a tougher  
20 regulatory environment. Carney had all the important connections. Carney is a unique  
21 presence in the company's highest ranks. He's one of only two remote members of  
22 Bezos' exclusive S-team, the 18 most senior executives who work closely with the CEO,  
23 along with Amit Agarwal, the head of Amazon India.  
24

25 118. Every policy team member's performance is tracked through a rigorous  
26 internal program called "Watering the flowers." The flowers represent elected officials,  
27 and the goal is to create a well-tended "garden" of pro-Amazon policymakers, from state  
28



1 governors and senators down to local officials and economic development teams,  
2  
3 according to current and former employees. Based on sales management software from  
4 Salesforce.com, the program measures employees on things like how many meetings and  
5 events they attend with power players.

6  
7 119. In 2017, Carney hired Michael Punke, a former U.S. ambassador to the  
8 World Trade Organization, to lead Defendant Amazon's public policy two years ago.  
9 Carney hired Susan Pointer from Google in 2018 to lead international public policy.  
10 Thus, it is clear that the ingratiation with Obama and hiring of ex-Obama and Google  
11 executives was done in furtherance of Defendant Bezos and Defendant Amazon's  
12 conspiracy to engage in unlawful, anti-competitive conduct.

13  
14 120. In 2007, Obama became the seventh presidential candidate to visit Google's  
15 main campus in Mountain View. After an introduction by Google's Senior VP David  
16 Drummond, Obama unveiled his new policy agenda on technology and innovation. He  
17 reaffirmed his support for network neutrality, saying: "The Internet is perhaps the most  
18 open network in history. We have to keep it that way."

19  
20 121. Obama was interviewed by Defendant and then-Google CEO Eric Schmidt.  
21 Defendant Schmidt says, during the Q&A, that he thinks of the job of running for  
22 president much like trying to get a job at Google — it's difficult. Obama laid out a  
23 detailed package of technology policies designed to [...], put high-speed broadband  
24 within reach of all Americans, [...] and, drive America's competitiveness. As part of his  
25 plan, (then) Sen. Obama said he would use the Internet to give citizens better visibility  
26 into, and greater participation in, the workings of their government, stating: "*I'll put*  
27  
28

1 government data online in universally accessible formats. I'll let citizens track federal  
 2 grants, contracts, earmarks, and lobbyist contacts. I'll let you participate in government  
 3 forums, ask questions in real time, offer suggestions that will be reviewed before  
 4 decisions are made, and let you comment on legislation before it is signed. And to ensure  
 5 that every government agency is meeting 21st century standards, I'll appoint the nation's  
 6 first Chief Technology Officer."

9 122. [Obama] talked about his "Google for Government" bill (which is now law)  
 10 to create a searchable database for every dollar of federal spending. [Obama] said, "If you  
 11 give people good information, they will make good decisions." In the first presidential  
 12 debate, (then) Senator Barack Obama mentioned he worked with Senator Tom Coburn  
 13 "to set up what we call a Google for Government, which says that we are going to list  
 14 every dollar of federal spending to make sure that the taxpayer can take a look and see."  
 15 The actual name of this law is the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act  
 16 of 2006 (S. 2590) (FFATA), and it mandates the Office of Management Budget to ensure  
 17 the existence and operation of a single searchable website, accessible by the public at no  
 18 cost to access information on federal grants, contracts, earmarks and loans. This "single  
 19 searchable website" is the same "cloud-based" website Defendant Brin stated Defendant  
 20 Google would build when he attended the NASA event with Vivek Kundra.

24 123. On July 1, 2010, Obama called "Sergey Brin's Google" one of the "great  
 25 ventures" that was made "possible because of immigrants." On May 10, 2011, Obama  
 26 referred to [Defendant] Google as a "great American company" that "created countless  
 27 jobs" and was founded by an immigrant. However, Defendant Google may well be one of  
 28



1 the “great ventures” and a “great American company” that “created countless jobs.”

2  
3 However, Defendant Brin and Google’s meeting(s) and working for Barack Obama’s  
4 administration(s) were done in furtherance of Defendant’s conspiracy to engage in  
5 unlawful, anti-competitive conduct.

6  
7 **E. The Obama and the Biden Administrations Are “Unnamed**  
8 **Conspirators” in the Defendants’ Conspiracy to Engage in Unlawful,**  
9 **Anti-Competitive Conduct**

10 124. In 2019-2020, Defendant Amazon contributed \$8.9 million dollars through  
11 individual and PAC donors to federal candidates. Defendant Amazon’s top recipient was  
12 Joe Biden, who received \$1.7 million dollars. Defendant Amazon’s PAC contributed just  
13 over \$1 million to the total spending, including a \$5,000 donation from Defendant Bezos.  
14 As with the Obama campaign(s) and administration(s) in 2008 and 2012, certain  
15 confirmed names on (President-elect) Joe Biden’s transition team are intrinsically  
16 associated with the Defendants’ unlawful, anti-competitive conduct. Biden has publicly  
17 confirmed the following persons to his transition team:

- 18 • Tom Sullivan, international tax director at Amazon - State Department;
- 19 • Mark Schwartz, enterprise strategist at Amazon Web Services: Executive  
20 Office of Management and Budget team (White House);
- 21 • Michael Hornsby, director of customer success at Salesforce.com: General  
22 Services Administration (GSA) team;
- 23 • Phillip Carter, senior corporate counsel at Tableau Software (owned by  
24 Salesforce.com): Department of Veterans Affairs; and



- Will Fields, senior associate at Sidewalk Labs (owned by Defendant Alphabet): Treasury review panel.

125. President Biden is also reportedly considering former Alphabet, dba, Google CEO [and Defendant] Eric Schmidt for a leading role in a tech industry task force in the Biden administration. Alphabet contributed \$21 million dollars to the 2020 Presidential election. The top recipients were Joe Biden and Democrat super PACs. Defendant Alphabet's employees and PACs contributed a whopping \$3.66 million dollars to the Joe Biden campaign since 2019. Defendant Pichai contributed a total of \$10,000 through six donations to Google's PAC. Defendant Larry Page made a \$5,000 one-time donation in late 2019.

126. Employees and PACs affiliated with Defendant Facebook donated a total of \$6 million dollars during the 2020 election cycle. The Joe Biden campaign alone received \$1.3 million dollars from the Defendant Facebook PAC. Defendant Zuckerberg made direct political donations to the Facebook PAC. However, Defendant Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, gave \$400 million dollars to local governments in order to foot the bill for 2020 election-related costs. Thus, the Defendants, jointly and severally, and in furtherance of the conspiracy to engage in unlawful, anti competitive conduct, have donated approximately \$432 million dollars to the Democrat Party and the Biden campaign in the 2020 election cycle.

127. On December 9, 2020, Defendant YouTube stated (on their official blog): "Yesterday was the safe harbor deadline for the U.S. Presidential election and enough states have certified their election results to determine a President-elect. Given that, we

1 will start removing any piece of content uploaded today (or anytime after) that misleads  
2 people by alleging that widespread fraud or errors changed the outcome of the 2020 U.S.  
3 Presidential election, in line with our approach towards historical U.S. Presidential  
4 elections. For example, we will remove videos claiming that a Presidential candidate won  
5 the election due to widespread software glitches or counting errors. We will begin  
6 enforcing this policy today, and will ramp up in the weeks to come.”

9 128. The Representatives of the Defendants dominate the entire Biden transition  
10 team. The Defendants regarded the eight years from 2009 to 2016 as a golden age in  
11 which Obama-Biden chose to revert to traditional laissez-faire policies. The  
12 Obama-Biden policies allowed the Defendants to grow into a monopoly and do as they  
13 liked without the heavy hand of federal regulation. It was Twitter (owned by Defendant  
14 Google) that led the way when it came to shutting down news coverage of the revelations  
15 about Hunter Biden's influence-peddling reported by the New York Post. It was Twitter  
16 (owned by Defendant Google) who also shut down the subsequent revelations pointing  
17 toward the former Vice President Biden's direct involvement in his son's schemes to  
18 profit from his father's role as Obama administration point man on policy toward Ukraine  
19 and China. The agenda of all of the Defendants' technology executives now helping  
20 Biden fill the thousands of administration posts, will be to ensure that reforms aimed at  
21 punishing Defendants for their monopoly exploitation of the public information highway,  
22 ... will never materialize. Given the Defendants place at the table in Biden's incoming  
23 administration, there's no reason to think this monopoly will diminish, rather than grow,  
24 over the next four years.

1           **6. The Defendants have jointly conspired with mainstream media and**  
2  
3 **movie outlets to engage in unlawful anti-competitive conduct on the YouTube**  
4 **Website.**

5           **A. YouTube's Background**

6           129. YouTube was founded by Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim. The  
7  
8 domain name "YouTube.com" was activated on February 14, 2005 with video upload  
9 options being integrated on April 23, 2005. The three creators realized they couldn't find  
10 any videos of it on the internet, after noticing that this type of platform did not exist they  
11 made the changes to become the first major video sharing platform.  
12

13           130. The idea of the new company was for non-computer experts to be able to  
14 use a simple interface that allowed the user to publish, upload and view streaming videos  
15 through standard web browsers and modern internet speeds. Thus, YouTube was created  
16 as an easy to use video streaming platform that wouldn't stress out the new internet users  
17 of the early 2000s.  
18

19           131. YouTube allows users to upload videos, view them, rate them with likes and  
20 dislikes, share them, add videos to playlists, report, make comments on videos, and  
21 subscribe to other users. The site has a wide variety of user-generated and corporate  
22 media videos. Utilizing the YouTube slogan "Broadcast Yourself," YouTube was  
23 marketed as an alternative to (mainstream) Major Media and Movie outlets.  
24

25           132. Before being purchased by Google, YouTube declared that its business  
26 model was advertisement-based, making 15 million dollars per month. This kickstarted  
27 YouTube's rise to becoming a global media dominator, creating a \$15-billion dollar  
28



1 annual advertising, video and music sales business that has surpassed most television  
2 stations and other media markets.

3  
4 133. Defendant YouTube now operates as one of Defendant Google's  
5 subsidiaries. Advertising is YouTube's central mechanism for gaining revenue.  
6 Advertisements were launched on the site beginning in March 2006. In April 2006,  
7 YouTube started using Google AdSense. Defendant Google bought the site in November  
8 2006 for US\$1.65 billion. At the time YouTube was Defendant Google's second-largest  
9 acquisition.  
10

11  
12 134. On March 31, 2010, YouTube launched a new design with the aim of  
13 simplifying the interface and increasing the time users spend on the site. In May 2010, it  
14 was reported that YouTube was serving more than two billion videos a day, which was  
15 "nearly double the prime-time audience of all three major US television networks  
16 combined." According to May 2010 data published by market researchers, YouTube is  
17 the dominant provider of online video in the United States, with a market share of  
18 roughly 43 percent and more than 14 billion videos viewed during May.  
19

20  
21 135. In May 2011, YouTube reported on the company blog that the site was  
22 receiving more than three billion views per day. In January 2012, YouTube stated that the  
23 figure had increased to four billion videos streamed per day.

24  
25 136. On October 25, 2012, The YouTube slogan (Broadcast Yourself) was taken  
26 down due to the live stream of the U.S. presidential debate. Defendant YouTube  
27 relaunched its design and layout on December 4, 2012 to be very similar to the mobile  
28 and tablet app version of the site. In 2012, the site had eight hundred million unique users

1 a month. In March 2013, the number of unique users visiting YouTube every month  
2 reached 1 billion.

3  
4 137. As of October 2020, YouTube is the second-most popular website in the  
5 world, behind Google, according to Alexa Internet. Alexa Internet, Inc. is an American  
6 web traffic analysis company based in San Francisco and a wholly owned subsidiary of  
7 Defendant Amazon. Starting from 2010 and continuing to the present, Alexa ranked  
8 Defendant YouTube as the third most visited website on the Internet after Defendants  
9 Google and Facebook.  
10

11 **B. The YouTube AdSpend/Adsense Conspiracy To Mislead Plaintiff As A**  
12 **Content Creator/Website Designer.**  
13

14 138. In October 2008, Plaintiff joined Defendant's Blogger™ and YouTube  
15 websites, based strictly upon Defendants marketing the sites as alternatives to  
16 (mainstream) Major Media and Movie outlets. However, nothing was further from the  
17 truth. The agreement between Google to purchase YouTube in 2006 came after YouTube  
18 presented three agreements with major media companies in an attempt to avoid  
19 copyright-infringement lawsuits.  
20

21  
22 139. On June 4, 2007, Hearst-Argyle Television Inc. (now Hearst, Inc.) one of the  
23 nation's largest operators of local TV stations, began distributing news, weather and  
24 entertainment video to Google Inc.'s YouTube in a revenue-sharing agreement. The deal  
25 between Defendant YouTube and Hearst/Walt Disney marked the first time a TV station  
26 got paid when people viewed their content on the YouTube site. Hearst is partnered with  
27 the Walt Disney Company. Effective June 4, 2007, five of Hearst-Argyle's biggest  
28

1 stations began posting local video content to channels on YouTube. The stations included  
2 WCVB in Boston and KCRA in Sacramento, Calif.

3  
4 140. Most notably, In Williby v. Hearst, Case No. [5:15-cv-02538-EJD] (a case  
5 regarding a video posted on YouTube) Counsel for the Defendants, Hearst., Inc.,  
6 successfully argued that the California federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case in  
7 which they were named defendants. However, nothing was, or remains further from the  
8 truth. Hearst, Inc., in partnership with the Walt Disney Company had YouTube  
9 AdSpend/Adsense PPC Revenue sharing accounts as early as June 2007. Defendants and  
10 their counsel withheld this information during the proceedings. Williby v. Hearst  
11 proceeded before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in  
12 2015-2016. At all times mentioned herein (2008 -thru- present) Defendant YouTube was  
13 owned, operated and conducted all business within the State of California.

14  
15  
16 141. Hearst received an undisclosed portion of the revenue generated from  
17 advertising sold against the video clips it made available to YouTube. Jordan Hoffner,  
18 (then) head of premium-content partnerships for YouTube, said both companies would  
19 likely [continue to] sell ad inventory, and the ads would take various forms. Newspaper  
20 sales of local online video ads totaled \$81 million in 2006, compared with \$32 million for  
21 TV stations. Thus,.

22  
23  
24 142. Defendant Google continued to market YouTube as an alternative to  
25 mainstream, major media. Again, nothing is further from the truth. Hearst, Inc., owns  
26 newspapers, magazines, television channels, and television stations, including the San  
27 Francisco Chronicle. Hearst, Inc., owns 50% of the A&E Networks cable network group  
28



1 and 20% of the sports cable network group ESPN, both in partnership with The Walt  
 2 Disney Company. Hearst is the largest affiliate of Walt Disney Company's "ABC" Media  
 3 Company. In 2006, Hearst reached about 18% of U.S. households. In the same year,  
 4 Hearst's 26 television stations streamed 38 million videos on their Web sites in 2006, up  
 5 29% from a year earlier.  
 6

7  
 8 143. In addition to Hearst, Inc. and the Walt Disney Company, and as early as  
 9 2007, Defendants had in fact established AdSpend/Adsense accounts on YouTube for  
 10 "Icon Film Distribution Pty Ltd (Australia VOD)," "Tele München Fernseh GmbH + Co.  
 11 Produktionsgesellschaft VOD (TMG)," "Viacom, dba, Paramount Pictures," "Zefr  
 12 SonyPictures," "Live Storms Media," "Lasso Entertainment," "Apple Corps Ltd.,"  
 13 "cocheusadoooo," "VideoVigilanteOKC," "Content Media Corporation International  
 14 Limited," "Remove Your Media LLC," Brian M. Heiss, Jean-Xavier de Lestrade, Robert  
 15 Schmidt and John Nicholas Broomfield, a documentary producer.  
 16  
 17

18 144. Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube, knowing since June 2007,  
 19 that YouTube would not be operated as an alternative to mainstream media, allowed each  
 20 of the competing parties listed above, to file copyright claims against plaintiff, ...  
 21 resulting in the termination of both Plaintiff's YouTube channels. Plaintiff not only  
 22 served Adsense advertisements for a decade (2008-2018) for Defendant Alphabet, dba,  
 23 Google, dba, YouTube, Plaintiff now knows he was serving ads and generating revenue  
 24 for parties who Plaintiff believed were his competitors, ... for a period of ten years.  
 25

26 [Emphasis added.]  
 27

28 145. Plaintiff was intentionally misled by the Defendant Alphabet, dba, Google,

1 dba, YouTube for a period of ten years. The Defendants, jointly and severally, and  
2 through the AdSense program, or horizontal price fixing scheme, misled Plaintiff into  
3 designing websites and creating content, ... all for the benefit of the Defendants  
4 (Facebook, Google, Amazon) and mainstream media and movie studios.  
5

6 146. The specific acts as set forth below clearly demonstrate Defendants had no  
7 intentions of operating YouTube as an alternative to mainstream, major media, or movie  
8 studios. Specifically:  
9

- 10 • YouTube entered into a marketing and advertising partnership with NBC  
11 (owned by Hearst, Inc.) in June 2007;  
12
- 13 • On July 23, 2007 and November 28, 2007, CNN and YouTube produced  
14 televised presidential debates in which Democratic and Republican US  
15 presidential hopefuls fielded questions submitted through YouTube;  
16
- 17 • On June 19, 2007, (then) Google CEO Eric Schmidt went to Paris to launch  
18 the new localization system. The interface of the YouTube website is  
19 available with localized versions in 89 countries, one territory (Hong Kong)  
20 and a worldwide version;  
21
- 22 • In November 2008, YouTube reached an agreement with MGM, Lions Gate  
23 Entertainment, and CBS, allowing the companies to post full-length films  
24 and television episodes on the site, accompanied by advertisements in a  
25 section for US viewers called "Shows". The move was intended to eliminate  
26 competition with websites such as Hulu, which features material from NBC,  
27 Fox, and Disney;  
28

- 1       • In early 2009, YouTube registered the domain [www.youtube-nocookie.com](http://www.youtube-nocookie.com)  
2       for videos embedded on United States federal government websites;
- 3       • In January 2010, YouTube introduced an online film rentals service which is  
4       currently available only to users in the US, Canada and the UK;
- 5       • In March 2010 YouTube began free streaming of certain content, including  
6       60 cricket matches of the Indian Premier League;
- 7       • According to YouTube, the 60 cricket matches were the first worldwide free  
8       online broadcast of a major sporting event;
- 9       • During November 2011, the Google+ social networking site was integrated  
10      directly with YouTube and the Chrome web browser, allowing YouTube  
11      videos to be viewed from within the Google+ interface;
- 12      • In October 2012, for the first-time ever, YouTube offered a live stream of  
13      the U.S. presidential debate and partnered with ABC News to do so;
- 14      • On April 4, 2012, YouTube and Paramount Pictures reached a deal to make  
15      nearly 500 films available to rent online;
- 16      • In May 2013, YouTube launched a pilot program to begin offering some  
17      content providers the ability to charge \$0.99 per month or more for certain  
18      channels, but the vast majority of its videos would remain free to view;
- 19      • Defendant Google launched YouTube TV in April 2016, initially in just five  
20      markets. It's now available in the top 100 U.S. markets, with YouTube TV  
21      expanding to more than a dozen additional markets. This gives Defendant  
22      Google coverage of the top 100 U.S. markets, reaching over 85% of U.S.



households;

- In early March of 2018, YouTube TV became available on Roku players and Apple TV devices. This is in addition to Xbox One consoles, Android TVs, Samsung and LG 2016 and 2017 smart TVs, Chromecast, and Chromecast built-in TVs;
- On March 13, 2018, Under a deal with Turner Networks, YouTube TV added the programmer's suite of eight networks, including CNN, TBS and TNT. With the addition of Turner, YouTube TV now offers more than 50 networks in the base package, including local ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC stations, plus cable networks like ESPN, AMC, and FX, and local sports networks from NBC Sports, Fox Sports, and NESN in select markets;
- In 2019, YouTube TV offers a 7-day free trial to subscribers
- In 2019, Verizon Wireless offers new & existing Android phone customers a 30-day free trial of YouTube TV; and
- On December 1, 2020, YouTube TV begins offering new subscribers a 21-day free trial.

147. The new markets where YouTube TV is now available are: Honolulu; Lexington, Ky.; Dayton, Ohio; El Paso, Texas; Burlington, Vt.; Plattsburgh, N.Y.; Richmond, Va.; Petersburg, Va.; Mobile, Ala.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Champaign, Ill.; Springfield, Ill.; Columbia, S.C.; Charleston, S.C.; Harlingen, Texas; Wichita, Kan.; Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; and Scranton, Pa.

148. In 2012, Defendant YouTube's employee, Malik Ducard, (then) director of

1 content partnerships at YouTube is quoted as saying: "Paramount Pictures is one of the  
2 biggest movie studios on the planet. We're thrilled to bring nearly 500 of their films to  
3 movie fans in the U.S. and Canada on YouTube and Google Play."

4  
5 149. In 2012, YouTube's online video store was a growing rental library that  
6 typically charged \$2 to \$4 per viewing. Prior to 2012, NBC Universal, Sony Pictures,  
7 Warner Bros., the Walt Disney Co. and many independent studios made deals to rent  
8 their latest releases through YouTube.

9  
10 150. Thus, it is clear Defendants had no intentions of operating YouTube as an  
11 alternative to mainstream, major media, or movie studios.

12  
13 151. 20th Century Fox was the only major studio that had not signed with  
14 YouTube in 2012. Walt Disney acquired 21st Century Fox (successor) Company on  
15 March 20, 2019 for \$71.3 billion dollars. Disney at the time was the world's largest  
16 media company and under contract with Defendant YouTube. This was the largest and  
17 perhaps most complicated acquisition of one media company to another in history.

18  
19 152. 21st Century Fox, which was owned by media mogul Rupert Murdoch,  
20 included the 20th Century Fox, Fox Searchlight, Fox 2000, Blue Sky Animation film  
21 studios, The Fox News, Fox Sports Stations, FX Cable Stations, and National Geographic  
22 TV holdings along with a 30% share of Hulu (video) streaming and other international  
23 holdings. Disney already owned a 30% stake in Hulu. The deal made Disney, already the  
24 largest media conglomerate in the world, even larger making up nearly a third of the  
25 entertainment media landscape.

26  
27  
28 153. In May of 2019, Sinclair Broadcast Group and the Walt Disney Company

1 closed a \$9.6 billion dollar deal for Sinclair to buy 21 Fox Regional Sports Networks  
2 and Fox College Sports. The deal was announced in May after Disney bought the  
3 networks as part of its acquisition of Twenty-First Century Fox. Disney was required to  
4 divest the 21 regional sports networks as part of its acquisition of 21st Century Fox's  
5 film and TV assets in order to obtain clearance from the U.S. Department of Justice.  
6

7  
8 154. On March 5, 2020, YouTube TV and Sinclair Broadcast Group reached a  
9 deal covering most of the Fox regional sports networks (RSNs). The deal between  
10 Google and Sinclair will keep 19 of the 21 Sinclair-owned Fox RSNs on YouTube TV  
11 through the end of the 2020 Major League Baseball season.  
12

13 155. Under the deal with Sinclair, YouTube TV will carry the following  
14 Fox-branded RSNs: Fox Sports Arizona, Fox Sports Carolinas, Fox Sports Detroit, Fox  
15 Sports Florida, Fox Sports Indiana, Fox Sports Kansas City, Fox Sports Midwest, Fox  
16 Sports New Orleans, Fox Sports North, Fox Sports Ohio, Fox Sportstime Ohio, Fox  
17 Sports Oklahoma, Fox Sports Prime Ticket (L.A.), Fox Sports San Diego, Fox Sports  
18 South, Fox Sports Southeast, Fox Sports Southwest, Fox Sports Sun, Fox Sports  
19 Tennessee, and Fox Sports Wisconsin.  
20

21  
22 156. YouTube TV had over 2 million subscribers at the end of 2019, according  
23 to Defendant Google. YouTube TV doesn't bring YouTube videos to the TV. That's the  
24 duty of the free YouTube app. Instead, YouTube TV offers live TV, video-on-demand  
25 and a cloud-based DVR. YouTube TV just added improved integration with Android  
26 TV. Defendant Google owns YouTube and Android TV.  
27

28 157. The YouTube TV streaming service now includes 85-live TV channels



1 including: ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC (with all four in 98% of U.S. markets), plus cable  
2 nets including ESPN, HGTV, TNT, AMC, Food Network, CNN and Fox News, as well  
3 as content from the YouTube Originals channel.  
4

5 158. YouTube TV had one big competitive gap: the channels from ViacomCBS.  
6 That changed: Eight (8) ViacomCBS channels (BET, CMT, Comedy Central, MTV,  
7 Nickelodeon, Paramount Network, TV Land and VH1) were added to YouTube TV,  
8 with more mainstream channels being added soon.  
9

10 159. Thus, Walt Disney buys 21st (successor to 20th) Century Fox for  
11 multi-billions, sells 21 Station affiliates to Sinclair Group, only for (Defendant)  
12 YouTube TV to host 19 of the 21 channels sold by Disney, ... under another  
13 multi-billion dollar ad and pay-per-view structured price scheme.  
14

15 160. Defendant YouTube TV also touts its no-limits cloud DVR, which lets  
16 customers record an unlimited amount of programming that is available for nine months.  
17 YouTube TV allows up to six accounts per household, each with its own content  
18 recommendations and personal DVR. Customers can access the service on up to three  
19 devices simultaneously.  
20

21 161. As of 2020, every major media outlet and major movie studio is now under  
22 contract with Defendant YouTube, or YouTube TV, to either sell digital ads, movies,  
23 music, apps, news stories, and/or television shows. Thus, it is clear Defendants had no  
24 intentions of operating YouTube as an alternative to mainstream, major media, or movie  
25 studios.  
26

27 162. This unlawful, anti competitive conduct has and continues to net the  
28

1 Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, multi-billion dollars in direct  
2 revenue and AdSense/AdSpend revenue. The facts as set forth above clearly demonstrate  
3 the Defendants had no intentions of operating YouTube as an alternative to mainstream,  
4 major media, or movie studios. In fact, it is clear Defendants had every intention of  
5 engaging in a unlawful conspiracy to engage in unlawful, anti-competitive conduct, as  
6 early as June 2007.  
7

8  
9 163. Despite all this backdoor dealings and public maneuvering, the U.S. and  
10 multiple State Governments have failed to act, ... or simply accepted campaign donations  
11 from the defendants and looked the other way. The Defendants are indeed more than a  
12 business: They are an unlawful cartel violating antitrust laws and abusing their complete  
13 market control and power. Further, Plaintiff negotiated in good faith and went to  
14 incredible lengths to keep all of his websites and YouTube channels. The Defendant's  
15 Google AdSense/AdSpend horizontal price-fixing scheme (standing alone, or in  
16 combination with Android OS, Google Search, etc..) is a classic act of a cartel misusing  
17 market power to achieve monopolistic cartel payments and generating anti competitive  
18 profits and complete control of the relevant market in the pursuit of anticompetitive  
19 payments. By forcing consumers to choose between paying those monopolistic cartel  
20 payments – which far exceed the marginal costs of operating an ad service, or lose the  
21 ability to reach the desired market, the Defendants place consumers in a Hobson's choice  
22 that all consumers of monopolistic goods and services face: pay up, way up, or lose.  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 164. Oprah Winfrey's OWN network was added to YouTube TV in December  
28 2020. The YouTube TV streaming service added 10 new channels, including: Discovery

1 Channel; HGTV; Food Network; TLC; Investigation Discovery; Animal Planet; Travel  
2 Channel; and MotorTrend on April 10, 2019, ... along with a \$10.00 price hike.

3  
4 165. YouTube TV presently costs \$65 per month, which reflects a \$15 price hike  
5 that started on July 30, 2020. It was formerly \$50 per month, after the April 10, 2019  
6 price hike moved it up from \$40.

7  
8 166. Hulu with 60% ownership by Walt Disney and with its Hulu Live TV just  
9 upped its price to \$65 per month, but still offers 20 fewer channels than YouTube TV  
10 (though it's got its own exclusive original shows).

11  
12 167. Past price hikes were timed with content additions. When YouTube TV got  
13 Turner channels in 2018, it went up by \$5, and the 2019 addition of local channels and  
14 Discovery channels saw a price jump of \$10.

15  
16 168. Defendants' conduct in creating, supporting and approving the Google  
17 AdSense PPC horizontal price fixing scheme is also premised upon a fluctuating policy  
18 on the types of content that is eligible to be monetized with advertising, or who can  
19 monetize content, or websites. The Defendants have collectively acted to increase the  
20 prices paid by advertisers for the ability to host an online news feed, digital ads to sums  
21 that far exceed the prices any advertiser would have to pay in a competitive online news,  
22 or digital ad market, or online marketplace.

23  
24 169. Specifically, the Defendants met and agreed collusively to impose the  
25 Google AdSpend/AdSense PPC fees in meetings dating back to 2003. As a collective, the  
26 Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, leveraged their monopoly position as  
27 the sole major Internet (Search) browser, online news feed providers, digital ad, App  
28



1 providers and online sales businesses in the United States, ... and all tied in with their  
2  
3 Android OS. The antitrust laws, and the laws regarding contracts, were adopted to  
4 prevent this exact kind of economic bullying and ensure a competitive marketing system.

5 170. In a competitive marketplace, Defendants could not command, nor demand  
6 multi-billion dollar annual ad revenues; instead, they could only seek the market rates  
7 consistent with the market brand and relevant market. However, the Defendants are  
8 anything but a competitive market. Once again, in a country with over 325 million  
9 citizens, the Defendants, jointly and severally currently control 98% of the U.S. Internet  
10 market(s). The Internet is its own market. For an App developer, online content creator,  
11 website designer, advertiser, or consumer, the Defendants, Facebook, Google and  
12 Amazon are the only businesses in town.  
13  
14

15 171. Because of the complete control that the Defendants have over the Internet  
16 market, demand for online products are effectively inelastic: i.e., the value of higher  
17 online prices far exceeds any reduction in demand caused by the higher prices, in part  
18 because demand is generally well above the "brick market," so even if some existing  
19 consumers choose not to purchase Defendants' online products, others are eager to buy.  
20  
21 In short, digital advertisers have to pay anti competitive prices if they want to advertise  
22 online and, if they cannot, they simply cannot advertise. No one business could demand  
23 these anti competitive prices alone; indeed, 98% control of the vast Internet Market  
24 requires the collective effort of all the Defendants. As the United States Court of Appeals  
25 for the Second Circuit has recognized, such industry-wide agreements tend to "stiffen the  
26  
27 spines" of otherwise competing interests. U.S. v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290, 305 (2d Cir.  
28

1 2015). By acting in concert – in an agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman  
2 Act – Facebook, Google and Amazon “stiffen” their “spines” to ensure that each of the  
3 Defendants demand the same of the online consumer and use the same platforms  
4 (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Amazon, AdSpend/Adsense, Android OS, Google Play,  
5 Google Search, YouTube, etc.).  
6

7  
8 **C. The Relevant Market Applicable To Defendants’ Misconduct**

9 172. The relevant market in this action is the Internet market, which spans the  
10 United States and all consumers, advertisers, website designers, content creators, cities  
11 and communities that are willing to utilize the Internet for online news feeds and to  
12 purchase goods (music, news, videos, movies, electronic accessories, software) and  
13 services in the geographic United States. There are multiple barriers that prohibit entry  
14 into this market.  
15

16 173. With respect to the product market, as alleged above, there is no substitute  
17 for Internet marketing, online news feeds, digital advertising, online movies, videos,  
18 music, global news feeds, or Apps. There is no other competitive search engine (key  
19 word) Internet market in the United States. The Yahoo search engine is no substitute for  
20 the Google, Amazon, or Facebook cartel. Even to the extent Yahoo has made limited  
21 attempts to enter the United States search engine (key word) Internet market as a  
22 competitor, those efforts failed.  
23

24 174. Marissa Mayer joined Defendant Google in 1999 as employee number 20.  
25 She started out writing code and overseeing small teams of engineers, developing and  
26 designing Defendant Google's search offerings. She became known for her attention to  
27  
28

1 detail, which helped land her a promotion to product manager, and later she became  
2 director of consumer web products. She oversaw the layout of Defendant Google's  
3 well-known, unadorned search homepage. She was also on the three-person team  
4 responsible for Google AdWords, which is an advertising platform that allows businesses  
5 to show their product to relevant potential customers based on their search terms.  
6 AdWords helped deliver 96% of the company's revenue in the first quarter of 2011.  
7 Mayer was the vice president of Google Search Products and User Experience until the  
8 end of 2010, when she was asked by then-CEO Eric Schmidt to head the Local, Maps,  
9 and Location Services. In 2011, she secured Google's acquisition of survey site Zagat for  
10 \$125 million. On July 16, 2012, Mayer was appointed president and CEO of Yahoo!,  
11 effective the following day.

12  
13  
14  
15 175. In 2015, Verizon expanded into content ownership by acquiring AOL. AOL  
16 and Yahoo were amalgamated into a new division formerly named Oath Inc., currently  
17 known as Verizon Media. In 2017, Verizon acquired Yahoo!. It was announced in  
18 January 2017 that Mayer would step down from the company's board upon the sale of  
19 Yahoo!'s operating business to Verizon Communications for \$4.8 billion dollars. Mayer  
20 announced her resignation on June 13, 2017.

21  
22  
23 176. Yahoo! owns a 20% stake in the Chinese e-commerce company Alibaba  
24 Group (after selling 20%). Alibaba was set up in 1999 and operates retail,  
25 business-to-business and consumer-to-consumer platforms. It has expanded at a  
26 breakneck pace into digital advertising, financial services, film production and other  
27 fields. Alibaba's founder, Jack Ma, is China's richest entrepreneur and one of its most  
28



1 prominent business people worldwide with a net worth of \$59 billion. China has the  
2 world's biggest population of internet users at 940 million. Alibaba said revenue rose  
3 30% over a year earlier in the three months ending in September to 155.1 billion yuan  
4 (\$23.4 billion dollars). Alibaba said shoppers spent 498.2 billion yuan (\$75.1 billion  
5 dollars) on its online platforms from Nov. 1, 2020 to November 11, 2020, during the  
6 Singles Day shopping festival. The informal holiday begun in the 1990s has become the  
7 world's biggest retail spending period. Alibaba Group is the 4th largest digital (PPC)  
8 advertiser after Defendants Google, Facebook and Amazon.  
9

10  
11 177. Mayer essentially structured the Yahoo! Search engine, or browser, as a  
12 market host for Defendant Google's products, including: Apps, digital ads, movies,  
13 music, apps, online news feeds, and/or television shows.  
14

15 178. In 2019, Defendant Google, dba, YouTube TV and Verizon Media partnered  
16 up to make YouTube TV available on Verizon Wireless Android Phones (with a 30-day  
17 free trial of YouTube TV).  
18

19 179. The Internet market is a unique market. The Defendants wholly control the  
20 process of establishing websites, operating systems, search engines, App development  
21 advertising protocols, their locations, and monetization of the foregoing, if allowed by  
22 Defendants. If an App developer, website designer, content creator, advertiser, or a  
23 potential website designer, content creator, advertiser, does not abide by the process  
24 controlled by Defendants, then they stand to lose their online website, franchise or not get  
25 selected as a business capable of monetization. These website designers, content creators,  
26 and advertisers cannot go elsewhere. Defendants Google, Facebook and Amazon own all  
27  
28

1 advertising platforms, ... as well as the Android OS that is required to participate in App  
2 development, online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales. Traditional  
3 advertising is not a substitute for an online news feed, online sales franchise, or a digital  
4 advertising platform.  
5

6 180. With respect to the geographic market, the vast majority of demand for  
7 Internet Advertising, sales and online news feeds is in the United States, and the  
8 Defendant companies are located in the United States. Despite some Internet Advertising  
9 and online sales abroad, no Defendant has based itself in a foreign city, and at the time of  
10 the anti-competitive conduct alleged herein, the United States market dominated Internet  
11 Advertising and online sales, and there was no substitute outside of the United States.  
12

13 181. Thus, the Defendants have leveraged their Internet Search Browser and  
14 Android OS monopoly, to obtain a monopoly in the U.S. market for website designers,  
15 content creators, and advertisers, news feeds, as well as for Internet Advertising and  
16 online sales.  
17

18  
19 **D. Defendants' Conduct Has Injured Competition**  
20

21 182. In a competitive market, actual and potential app developers, website  
22 designers, content creators, and advertisers (often with investing private interests) could  
23 build or renovate webpages, or platforms for the purposes of hosting online news feeds,  
24 Internet Advertising and online sales, and they would be able to compete to host an  
25 online enterprise on a level playing field. However, the Defendants have complete control  
26 over the Internet, the Android OS, online news feeds, Internet Advertising and online  
27 sales; and the Defendants have agreed to strictly limit the number and location of online  
28



1 companies to maintain that power. Thus, even if a website designers, content creators,  
2 and advertisers and/or private investors built a new Internet platform and had the capital  
3 and infrastructure to operate an online news feed, digital advertising franchise, they could  
4 not do so without Defendant's permission and the requisite cartel payments to Defendants  
5 through the AdSpend/Adsense horizontal price fixing scheme.  
6

7  
8 183. As a result of the artificially restricted supply in the market of Internet  
9 Advertising and online sales, Defendants have caused excess demand among actual and  
10 potential website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or private investors for  
11 an online news feed, digital advertising or Internet sales franchise. Defendants then  
12 capitalize on their complete market power by charging supra-competitive prices to  
13 participate in the market. Those who will not pay are shadow banned, banned through  
14 termination of websites, or have their websites and channels demonetized.  
15

16  
17 184. As a result of Defendants' conduct, many actual or potential participants  
18 cannot realistically participate in the online news feed, digital advertising or Internet sales  
19 franchise market even though there is, or would be, considerable interest in their  
20 communities in hosting an online franchise. The market has been limited to Facebook,  
21 Google and Amazon and to the small number of affiliate companies willing to meet  
22 Defendants' supra-competitive demands.  
23

24 **E. Defendants' Anticompetitive Conduct Has Injured Plaintiff**  
25

26 185. The Defendants consciously joined and participated in the conspiracy by  
27 violating the antitrust laws, supporting and approving the AdSpend/Adsense horizontal  
28 price fixing scheme (including but not limited to software support and collecting support



1 fees), demonetizing, shadow banning and terminating Plaintiff's websites and YouTube  
2 channels as a competitor for an online news feed, digital advertising and/or sales  
3 franchise. Such collusive conduct has been enormously injurious to Plaintiff.  
4

5 186. Among other damages, Plaintiff has invested ten (10) years labor, the  
6 marketing of YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Blogger over 10 years and significant  
7 sums of money, totaling over \$1 million, in reliance on the Defendants Advertising and  
8 Online sales Policies; and on the Plaintiff's Brand presence within the Google, Facebook,  
9 YouTube portfolio of platforms. Further, Plaintiff has lost significant income, in the  
10 minimum amount of \$1 billion dollars a year (2008-2018) that he derived from Plaintiff's  
11 Brand presence within the Google, Facebook, YouTube portfolio of platforms as well as  
12 the economic activity Plaintiff's brand presence generates. In addition, Plaintiff now owns  
13 a Facebook, YouTube, Google blogspot and Twitter account that has been shadow  
14 banned, demonetized and terminated by the Defendants and, thus, has incurred the  
15 significant diminution in property value caused by that shadow ban, demonetization and  
16 termination.  
17  
18  
19

20 187. All of these losses and injuries are directly related to, and caused by, the  
21 anticompetitive conduct of Defendants, including their contract, combination, or  
22 conspiracy in the restraint of trade and interstate commerce, and their resulting breach of  
23 the AdSpend/Adsense contract as outlined and formulated by the Defendants.  
24

## 25 **VIII. THE NEED FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF**

26

27 188. In the absence of preliminary relief, consumers will be deprived of their  
28 choice of Apps, browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, sales

1 franchises and consumers and the public will be deprived of the benefits of competition  
2 during the pendency of this action. Relief at the conclusion of this case cannot remedy the  
3 damage done to consumers and the public during the interim.  
4

5 189. In addition, the damage to competitors and competition during the pendency  
6 of this case that would occur in the absence of preliminary relief cannot practically be  
7 reversed later.  
8

9 190. Aided by Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, Google's share of the  
10 relevant market and product market has increased dramatically in the top 100 U.S.  
11 markets, reaching over 85% of U.S. consumers, an increase from 18% in 2006;  
12 Consumers spent \$5.1 billion online (on Facebook, Google and Amazon products) on  
13 Thanksgiving Day 2020 alone. Spending is up 21.5% from last year (2019). Nearly 50%  
14 of the web-based purchases were made on an android smartphone. In the absence of  
15 interim relief, Defendants' share of the browsers, operating systems, online news feeds,  
16 digital advertising, and sales franchises market will grow substantially as a result, among  
17 other things, of Google's tying of its Internet browser to the Android OS and other anti  
18 competitive practices.  
19  
20  
21

22 191. Defendants' App, browser, operating systems, online news feeds, digital  
23 advertising, and sales franchise market competitors will be effectively foreclosed from  
24 important opportunities to supply alternative browsers, operating systems, online news  
25 feeds, digital advertising, and sales franchise markets to customers so long as the tie-in  
26 and Defendants' other exclusionary practices continue. In particular, due to the market's  
27 network effects, the significant increase in Defendants' share of the App, browser,  
28

1 operating system, online news feeds, digital advertising, and sales franchise markets that  
2 will result in the absence of preliminary relief will tip the market in favor of the  
3 Defendants and accelerate its dominance and competition's demise.  
4

5 192. In addition, the barriers that exist to the entry of new competitors, or the  
6 expansion of smaller existing competitors, including network effects, mean that  
7 dominance once achieved cannot readily be reversed.  
8

9 193. In the absence of preliminary relief, the increase in each Defendant's  
10 position that will result from its continuing illegal conduct will so entrench it (and so  
11 weaken its competitors) that the cost of reversing the Defendants' imminent domination  
12 of the Internet browser, operating system, online news feeds, digital advertising, and sales  
13 franchise markets "could be prohibitive." See *United States v. Microsoft Corporation*,  
14 980 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.D.C. 1997).  
15

## 16 **IX. CAUSES OF ACTION**

### 17 **COUNT I: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

#### 18 **Shadow Banning: Damages/Disgorgement**

19 194. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
20 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
21

22 195. The Defendants, jointly and severally have violated Section 1 of the  
23 Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), by engaging in a contract, combination or conspiracy in  
24 restraint of trade and interstate commerce, the nature and effect of which is to restrict the  
25 ability of Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or  
26 private investors to maintain and sponsor an online news feed, digital advertising, or  
27  
28



1 online sales franchise at competitive prices.

2  
3 196. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade  
4 and interstate commerce, Defendants have imposed anti competitive prices and complete  
5 control for hosting of online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise by  
6 offering Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or  
7 private investors a Hobson's choice: pay the enormous demands associated with online  
8 news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, or lose your website, or ability  
9 to advertise online. These demands have forced website designers, content creators, and  
10 advertisers – like Plaintiff, that will not pay the supra-competitive price of the  
11 Defendants demands for hosting online news feeds, online sales franchises, or digital  
12 advertising – out of the market for online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales  
13 franchise, as evidenced by the Defendants' shadow banning of Plaintiff's websites and  
14 YouTube channels. Indeed, as a result of Defendants' shadow ban of Plaintiff's websites  
15 and YouTube channels, Plaintiff lost not only the revenue, the channels and websites, but  
16 also any chance to host online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises  
17 in the future. In a competitive marketplace, Defendants could not have successfully  
18 demanded these monopolistic terms, conditions, or payments; and the Plaintiff would still  
19 be online hosting advertising, music, movies and news feeds.  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 197. Defendants' unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of  
25 trade and interstate commerce operates as a shadow ban.  
26

27 198. Defendants' shadow ban constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. First,  
28 Defendants have complete control over the Internet and their platforms. Second, the clear

1 objective of Defendants' misconduct is to limit the number of competitive online news  
2 feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises and to increase Defendants' profits,  
3 by providing shadow banning competitive websites and platforms to collect exorbitant  
4 advertising fees, and monopolistic fees paid by wealthier media corporations. Third,  
5 Defendants' shadow ban is not necessary for the production of online news feeds, digital  
6 advertising, online sales franchises, or the achievement of any pro-competitive business  
7 objective.  
8

9  
10 199. Each of the Defendants is a participant in this unlawful contract,  
11 combination or conspiracy.  
12

13 200. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff has  
14 suffered injury from the loss of his websites and YouTube channels and the economic  
15 activity generated by Plaintiff's brand presence within the Google, Facebook, YouTube  
16 portfolio of platforms. These losses, current and future, are significant and were directly  
17 caused by Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade.  
18

19 201. Further, Defendants' unlawful shadow ban has resulted in enormous profits  
20 for each of the Defendants, including monetary concessions from media corporations and  
21 inflated advertising revenue enjoyed by the Defendants, and all other media corporations  
22 sharing in the Adsense PPC advertising fees assessed on the Plaintiff. The policies  
23 underlying the Sherman Act, and the federal proscription of anticompetitive behavior  
24 (including shadow banning, or group boycotts), demands that these illicit profits be  
25 disgorged.  
26  
27

28 202. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of damages against the

1 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
2 for each year 2008-2018) or in an amount to be determined at trial. Further, under Section  
3 15 of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff seeks a trebling of his damages.  
4

5 203. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
6 disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.  
7

8 **COUNT II: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

9 **Demonetization: Damages/Disgorgement**

10 204. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
11 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
12

13 205. There is a relevant market for the hosting of online news feeds, digital  
14 advertising, or online sales franchises in the United States, as alleged above.

15 206. Within this relevant geographic market, Defendants have violated Section 1  
16 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), by engaging in a contract, combination or conspiracy  
17 in restraint of trade and interstate commerce, the nature and effect of which is to restrict  
18 the ability of Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers to  
19 maintain and/own an online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises at  
20 competitive prices.  
21

22 207. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade  
23 and interstate commerce, Defendants have imposed anti competitive prices and complete  
24 control for hosting of online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise by  
25 offering Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or  
26 private investors a Hobson's choice: pay the enormous demands associated with online  
27  
28



1 news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, or lose your website, or ability  
2 to advertise online. These demands have forced website designers, content creators, and  
3 advertisers – like Plaintiff, that will not pay the supra-competitive price of the  
4 Defendants demands for hosting online franchises, or digital advertising – out of the  
5 market for online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, as evidenced  
6 by the Defendants’ demonetization of Plaintiff’s websites and YouTube channels. Indeed,  
7 as a result of Defendants’ demonetization of Plaintiff’s websites and YouTube channels,  
8 Plaintiff lost not only the revenue, the channels and websites, but also any chance to host  
9 online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises in the future. In a  
10 competitive marketplace, Defendants could not have successfully demonetized Plaintiff’s  
11 websites and YouTube channels, or demanded monopolistic terms, conditions, or  
12 payments; and the Plaintiff would still be online hosting advertising, music, movies and  
13 news feeds.

14  
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18 208. Defendants’ unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of  
19 trade and interstate commerce operates as a concerted demonetization of Plaintiff’s  
20 YouTube channels and websites (or a refusal to deal).

21  
22 209. Defendants’ concerted demonetization of Plaintiff’s YouTube channels and  
23 websites constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. First, Defendants have complete  
24 control over the Internet and their platforms. Second, the clear objective of Defendants’  
25 misconduct is to limit the number of competitive online news feeds, digital advertising,  
26 or online sales franchises and to increase Defendants’ profits, by demonetizing  
27 competitive platforms to collect exorbitant advertising fees, and monopolistic fees paid  
28

1 by wealthier media corporations. Third, Defendants' concerted demonetization of  
2 Plaintiff's YouTube channels and websites is not necessary for the production of online  
3 news feeds, digital advertising, online sales franchises, or the achievement of any  
4 pro-competitive business objective.  
5

6 210. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff has  
7 suffered injury from the loss of his websites and YouTube channels and the economic  
8 activity generated by Plaintiff's brand presence within the Google, Facebook, YouTube  
9 portfolio of platforms. These losses, current and future, are significant and were directly  
10 caused by Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade.  
11

12 211. Further, Defendants' unlawful concerted demonetization of Plaintiff's  
13 YouTube channels and websites has resulted in enormous profits for each of the  
14 Defendants, including monetary concessions from media corporations and inflated  
15 advertising revenue enjoyed by the Defendants, and all other media corporations sharing  
16 in the AdSense PPC advertising fees assessed on the Plaintiff. The policies underlying the  
17 Sherman Act, and the federal proscription of anticompetitive behavior (including  
18 concerted demonetization), demands that these illicit profits be disgorged.  
19

20 212. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of damages against the  
21 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
22 for each year 2008-2018) or in an amount to be determined at trial. Further, under Section  
23 15 of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff seeks a trebling of his damages.  
24

25 213. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
26 disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.  
27  
28

**COUNT III: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)****Termination of Websites/Channels: Damages/Disgorgement**

214. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

215. There is a relevant market for the hosting of online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises in the United States, as alleged above.

216. Within this relevant geographic market, Defendants have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), by engaging in a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and interstate commerce, the nature and effect of which is to restrict the ability of Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers to maintain and/or own an online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises at competitive prices.

217. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade and interstate commerce, Defendants have imposed anti competitive prices and complete control for hosting of online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise by offering Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or private investors a Hobson's choice: pay the enormous demands associated with online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, or lose your website, or ability to advertise online. These demands have forced website designers, content creators, and advertisers – like Plaintiff, that will not pay the supra-competitive price of the Defendants demands for hosting online news feeds, online franchises, or digital advertising – out of the market for online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales



1 franchise, as evidenced by the Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's websites and  
2 YouTube channels. Indeed, as a result of Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's websites  
3 and YouTube channels, Plaintiff lost not only the revenue, the channels and websites, but  
4 also any chance to host an online news feed, digital advertising, or online sales franchises  
5 in the future. In a competitive marketplace, Defendants could not have successfully  
6 terminated Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels, or demanded monopolistic terms,  
7 conditions, or payments; and the Plaintiff would still be online hosting advertising,  
8 music, movies and news feeds.  
9

10  
11 218. Defendants' unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of  
12 trade and interstate commerce operates as a termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels  
13 and websites.  
14

15 219. Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels and websites  
16 constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. First, Defendants have complete control  
17 over the Internet and their platforms. Second, the clear objective of Defendants'  
18 misconduct is to limit the number of competitive online news feeds, digital advertising,  
19 or online sales franchises and to increase Defendants' profits, by terminating competitive  
20 platforms to collect exorbitant advertising fees, and monopolistic fees paid by wealthier  
21 media corporations. Third, Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels and  
22 websites is not necessary for the production of online news feeds, online sales franchises,  
23 online digital advertising, or the achievement of any pro-competitive business objective.  
24  
25

26 220. Each of the Defendants is a participant in this unlawful contract,  
27 combination or conspiracy.  
28

1           221. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff has  
2 suffered injury from the loss of his websites and YouTube channels and the economic  
3 activity generated by Plaintiff's brand presence within the Google, Facebook, YouTube  
4 portfolio of platforms. These losses, current and future, are significant and were directly  
5 caused by Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade.  
6

7  
8           222. Further, Defendants' unlawful termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels  
9 and websites has resulted in enormous profits for each of the Defendants, including  
10 monetary concessions from media corporations and inflated advertising revenue enjoyed  
11 by the Defendants, and all other media corporations sharing in the Adsense PPC  
12 advertising fees assessed on the Plaintiff. The policies underlying the Sherman Act, and  
13 the federal proscription of anticompetitive behavior (including termination of YouTube  
14 channels and websites), demands that these illicit profits be disgorged.  
15

16  
17           223. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of damages against the  
18 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
19 for each year 2008-2018) or in an amount to be determined at trial. Further, under Section  
20 15 of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff seeks a trebling of his damages.  
21

22           224. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
23 disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.  
24

25           **COUNT IV: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

26           **Price Fixing: Damages/Disgorgement**

27           225. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
28 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

1           226. There is a relevant market for the hosting of online news feeds, digital  
2 advertising, or online sales franchises in the United States, as alleged above.  
3

4           227. Within this relevant geographic market, Defendants have violated Section 1  
5 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), by engaging in a contract, combination or conspiracy  
6 in restraint of trade and interstate commerce, the nature and effect of which is to restrict  
7 the ability of Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers to  
8 maintain and/or own an online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises at  
9 competitive prices.  
10

11           228. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade  
12 and interstate commerce, Defendants have imposed anti competitive prices and complete  
13 control for hosting of online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise by  
14 offering Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or  
15 private investors a Hobson's choice: pay the enormous demands associated with online  
16 news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, or lose your website, or ability  
17 to advertise online. These demands have forced website designers, content creators, and  
18 advertisers – like Plaintiff, that will not pay the supra-competitive price of the  
19 Defendants demands for hosting online news feeds, sales franchises, or digital advertising  
20 – out of the market for online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, as  
21 evidenced by the Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels.  
22 Indeed, as a result of Defendants' termination of Plaintiff's websites and YouTube  
23 channels, Plaintiff lost not only the revenue, the channels and websites, but also any  
24 chance to host online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises in the  
25  
26  
27  
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1 future. In a competitive marketplace, Defendants could not have successfully terminated  
2 Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels, or demanded monopolistic terms, conditions,  
3 or payments; and the Plaintiff would still be online hosting advertising, music, movies  
4 and news feeds.  
5

6 229. Defendants' unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of  
7 trade and interstate commerce operates as a horizontal price fixing scheme.  
8

9 230. Defendants' horizontal price fixing scheme constitutes an unreasonable  
10 restraint of trade. First, Defendants have complete control over the Internet and their  
11 platforms. Second, the clear objective of Defendants' misconduct is to limit the number  
12 of competitive App developers, online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales  
13 franchises and to increase Defendants' profits through the artificially inflated and  
14 monopolistic fees paid by wealthier media corporations. Third, Defendants' horizontal  
15 price fixing scheme is not necessary for the production of Apps, online news feeds,  
16 digital advertising, online sales franchises, or the achievement of any pro-competitive  
17 business objective.  
18  
19

20 231. Each of the Defendants is a participant in this unlawful contract,  
21 combination or conspiracy.  
22

23 232. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff has  
24 suffered injury from the loss of his websites and YouTube channels and the economic  
25 activity generated by Plaintiff's brand presence within the Google, Facebook, YouTube  
26 portfolio of platforms. These losses, current and future, are significant and were directly  
27 caused by Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade.  
28

1           233. Further, Defendants' unlawful horizontal price fixing scheme has resulted in  
2 enormous profits for each of the Defendants, including monetary concessions from media  
3 corporations and inflated advertising revenue enjoyed by the Defendants, and all other  
4 media corporations sharing in the AdSense PPC advertising fees assessed on the Plaintiff.  
5 The policies underlying the Sherman Act, and the federal proscription of anticompetitive  
6 behavior (including horizontal price fixing schemes), demands that these illicit profits be  
7 disgorged.  
8

9  
10           234. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of damages against the  
11 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
12 for each year 2008-2018) or in an amount to be determined at trial. Further, under Section  
13 15 of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff seeks a trebling of his damages.  
14

15           235. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
16 disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.  
17

18           **COUNT V: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

19           **Exclusive Dealing and Other Exclusionary Agreements**

20           236. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
21 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
22

23           237. Google's agreements with ISPs, ICPs, and others pursuant to which such  
24 companies agree not to license, distribute, or promote non-Google, Facebook, or Amazon  
25 products (or to do so only on terms that materially disadvantage such products), and its  
26 agreements with OEMs restricting modification or customization of the Android OS,  
27 Apps and the PC/tablet/Android Smartphone boot-up sequence and screens, unreasonably  
28

1 restrict competition and thus violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. These agreements  
2 unreasonably restrain trade and restrict the access of Defendants' competitors to  
3 significant channels of distribution, thereby restraining competition in the Internet  
4 browser market, among other markets.  
5

6 238. The purpose and effect of these agreements are to restrain trade and  
7 competition in the Internet browser, operating system, online news feeds, digital  
8 advertising, Apps and sales franchise markets. These agreements violate Section 1 of the  
9 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
10

11 239. After the commencement of the United States' Congressional investigation  
12 of Defendants' exclusionary agreements, the Defendants modified certain of those  
13 agreements. However, the continuing anticompetitive effects of the agreements are  
14 substantial; the modified agreements are themselves anticompetitive and there is a serious  
15 threat that, unless enjoined, the Defendants will reimpose the unlawful terms that they  
16 have only recently expressed an intention not to enforce.  
17  
18

19 **COUNT VI: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1, & 2)**

20 **Unlawful Tying**

21 240. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
22 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
23

24 241. The Android operating systems, Apps and Google's, Amazon's and  
25 Facebook's Internet browser software are separate products. They are sold in different  
26 markets; their functions are different; there is separate demand for them; and they are  
27 treated by the Defendants and by other industry participants as separate products. It is  
28



1 efficient for Defendants not to tie them and/or to permit OEMs to distribute Android  
2 without Google, Amazon's and Facebook's Internet browser software, or Apps.

3  
4 242. Defendant Google, for the benefit of each Defendant, jointly and severally,  
5 has tied and plans again to tie its Internet browser to its separate Android operating  
6 system, which has monopoly power, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15  
7 U.S.C. § 1, & 2.  
8

9 243. The purpose and the effect of this tying are to prevent customers from  
10 choosing among Internet browsers, Apps, or operating systems on their merits and to  
11 foreclose competing browsers, Apps, or operating systems from an important channel of  
12 distribution, thereby restraining competition in the Internet browser market.  
13

14 **COUNT VII: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

15 **Horizontal Market-Division Agreements: Equitable Relief**

16  
17 244. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
18 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

19 245. The Defendants' Horizontal Market Agreement consists of Defendants'  
20 agreement to use the Google AdSpend/AdSense, pay-per-click, advertising protocol and  
21 the Android OS. The Defendants' Horizontal Market Agreement constitutes a per se  
22 illegal market allocation and price-fixing agreement designed to eliminate competition  
23 between the Defendants for operating systems, digital advertising, the sale of online  
24 goods and services, the nature and effect of which is to allocate the markets to the  
25 Defendants, to give the Defendants the ability to fix the prices of operating systems,  
26 digital advertising, the sale of online goods and services, and to permit the Defendants to  
27  
28

1 control the future of online markets, and enable the elimination of, competitor products.

2  
3 246. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade  
4 and interstate commerce, Defendants' products are the principal competitive products to  
5 each other's own dynamic control system design software (Android OS), the overall  
6 effect of the Horizontal Market Agreement is to eliminate the competition between  
7 Defendants in the three relevant markets (online sales, digital advertising and Operating  
8 Systems). Consumers are harmed both by the elimination of the Defendants' products as  
9 a competitive alternative to each other's products. The competition between the  
10 Defendants' products provided Defendants an incentive to facilitate interoperation with  
11 third-party products, as an unwillingness by one to do so would likely advantage the  
12 other.  
13  
14

15 247. Each of the Defendants cooperated with a small number of companies to  
16 facilitate interfaces between Defendants' products and those companies' products that  
17 compete with Defendants' products in the individual markets.  
18

19 248. Defendants' Horizontal Market Agreement was not designed to, nor had the  
20 effect of, increasing economic efficiency or rendering the markets more competitive. As a  
21 consequence of the elimination of competition resulting from the Horizontal Market  
22 Agreement, the Defendants will have less incentive to provide such technical cooperation  
23 to competitors selling only individual products, thus further reducing competition for  
24 consumers who value integrated products.  
25  
26

27 249. In the alternative, the Horizontal Market Agreement has resulted in  
28 anticompetitive effects in the online sales, digital advertising and Operating Systems

1 markets by depriving customers of the benefits of competition between the Defendants'  
2 products, including competition based on price, service, functionality, and interfaces with  
3 other firms' products. The Horizontal Market Agreement constitutes an unreasonable  
4 restraint of trade in the markets for online sales, digital advertising and Operating  
5 Systems, and adversely affects interstate commerce.  
6

7  
8 250. The Horizontal Market Agreement and Defendants' actions in implementing  
9 it violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

10 **COUNT VIII: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

11 **Declaratory Judgment**

12  
13 251. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
14 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

15 252. There is a relevant market for the hosting of browsers, operating systems,  
16 online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchises in the United  
17 States, as alleged above.  
18

19 253. Within this relevant geographic market, Defendants have violated Section 1  
20 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), by engaging in a contract, combination or conspiracy  
21 in restraint of trade and interstate commerce, the nature and effect of which is to restrict  
22 the ability of Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers to  
23 maintain and/own an online news feeds, digital advertising, develop Apps, or online sales  
24 franchises at competitive prices.  
25

26  
27 254. Through their unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade  
28 and interstate commerce, Defendants have imposed in part, through governmental



1 agency, anti competitive prices and complete control of operating systems, hosting of  
2 Apps, online news feeds, digital advertising, and online sales franchises by offering  
3 Plaintiff and other website designers, content creators, and advertisers and/or private  
4 investors a Hobson's choice: pay the enormous demands associated with operating  
5 systems, Apps, online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchise, or lose  
6 your website, or ability to advertise online. These demands have forced website  
7 designers, content creators, and advertisers – like Plaintiff, that will not pay the  
8 supra-competitive price of the Defendants demands for hosting, Apps, online news feeds,  
9 sales franchises, or digital advertising – out of the market for Apps, online news feeds,  
10 digital advertising, or online sales franchise, as evidenced by the Defendants'  
11 governmental agency, horizontal price fixing scheme, shadow banning, demonetization  
12 and termination of Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels. Indeed, as a result of  
13 Defendants' shadow banning, demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's websites and  
14 YouTube channels, Plaintiff lost not only the revenue, the channels and websites, but also  
15 any chance to host online news feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises in the  
16 future. In a competitive marketplace, Defendants could not have successfully  
17 implemented a horizontal price fixing scheme, shadow banned, demonetized, or  
18 terminated Plaintiff's websites and YouTube channels, or demanded monopolistic terms,  
19 conditions, or payments without governmental agency; and the Plaintiff would still be  
20 online hosting advertising, music, movies and news feeds.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27 255. Defendants' unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of  
28 trade and interstate commerce operates as a governmental agency, horizontal group

1 shadow ban, concerted demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's websites and  
2 YouTube channels. Defendants' conduct also operates as a horizontal price fixing  
3 scheme.  
4

5 256. Defendants' unlawful conduct constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.  
6 First, Defendants have complete market power in the relevant market. Second, the clear  
7 objective of Defendants' misconduct is to limit the number of competitive online news  
8 feeds, digital advertising, or online sales franchises and to increase Defendants' profits,  
9 through governmental agency, a horizontal price fixing scheme, by a horizontal group  
10 shadow ban, a concerted demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's YouTube  
11 channels, competitive websites and platforms to collect exorbitant advertising fees, and  
12 monopolistic fees paid by wealthier media corporations. Third, Defendants'  
13 governmental agency, horizontal price fixing scheme, horizontal group shadow ban,  
14 concerted demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels, competitive  
15 websites and platforms is not necessary for the production of online news feeds, digital  
16 advertising, online sales franchises, or the achievement of any pro-competitive business  
17 objective.  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 257. Each of the Defendants is a participant in this unlawful contract,  
23 combination or conspiracy.

24 258. Accordingly, Plaintiff, as a shadow banned, demonetized and terminated  
25 online franchise owner, is entitled to an Order of this Court declaring that:  
26

27 (a) Defendants jointly and severally, at all times mentioned herein, were acting in  
28 governmental agency;

(b) Defendants' group shadow ban, concerted demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels, competitive websites and platforms; and their refusal to comply with their own contract, amount to an unreasonable restraint on trade and interstate commerce and a violation of the antitrust laws; and

(c) redistribution of a fair portion the resulting ill-gotten supra-competitive gains obtained by Defendants through artificially set advertising/hosting fees to Plaintiff as a quid pro quo for breaching the terms of those contracts,

#### **COUNT IX: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2)**

##### **Conspiracy to Monopolize (browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchise platforms): Injunctive Relief**

259. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

260. There is a relevant market for the browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchises in the United States, as alleged above.

261. Beginning in, or about September 1998 and continuing until the filing of this Complaint, the exact dates being unknown to the plaintiff, the defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, have engaged in a continuing agreement, combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition in the production and sale of browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchises in the United States, as alleged above, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (conspiracy to monopolize through concerted action directed at the



1 acquisition of monopoly power).

2  
3 262. In furtherance of this agreement, combination and conspiracy, the  
4 defendants did the following things, among others:

5 a. Defendants Facebook, Zuckerberg, Bezos, Amazon, Alphabet, dba, Google,  
6 dba, YouTube, Brin, Page, Sundai and Schmidt met and agreed (with  
7 multiple unnamed parties) between themselves to limit the number of  
8 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps  
9 and online sales franchise platforms in the United States, by agreement that  
10 each Defendant would acquire competing companies in the relevant  
11 markets; and by agreement the acquired competing companies were to be  
12 closed, dismantled, or with rare exception, were absorbed into Defendants'  
13 companies, thereby conspiring to suppress, eliminate competition and divide  
14 the revenue and profits from the supply of the sale of browsers, operating  
15 systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales  
16 franchise platforms in the United States, between each Defendant as nearly  
17 equally as possible;

18 b. Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, met and further agreed  
19 (with multiple unnamed parties) to unlawfully secure the acquisitions of  
20 competitive websites, businesses, and advertising platforms including:  
21 Social/Photos, Search engines, Enterprise Tools/Productivity, Advertising,  
22 Commerce, Maps/Automobiles, Mobile, Dev Tools/Cloud Platform, Media  
23 and Entertainment, Cybersecurity, stealth semiconductor firm, Payments,  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 Multimedia & Graphics, Software, Wearables, Robotics, Energy, Consumer  
2 Products & Services, Smart Home, Telecommunications, Computer  
3 Software & Services, Aerospace & Defenses, Music, Business Intelligence,  
4 Analytics & Performance Mgmt, Healthcare, Internet Software & Services,  
5 Software/Gaming, Software/AI, Consumer electronics, Mobile Software &  
6 Services and Scientific & Engineering companies, thereby conspiring to  
7 suppress, eliminate competition and divide the revenue and profits from the  
8 supply of the sale of browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital  
9 advertising, Apps and online sales franchise platforms in the United States,  
10 between each Defendant as nearly equally as possible;  
11  
12

13  
14 c. The Defendants met and further agreed between themselves to utilize  
15 “Applied Semantic,” or Google AdSpend/Adsense as the primary and  
16 exclusive point-of-sale and payment software for the purchase of online,  
17 digital advertising systems and payment for hosting online news feeds and  
18 digital advertising systems, thereby conspiring to suppress, eliminate  
19 competition and divide the revenue and profits from the supply of the sale of  
20 online news feeds, digital advertising systems and online goods between  
21 each Defendant as nearly equally as possible;  
22  
23

24 d. The Defendants met and further agreed between themselves and AT&T,  
25 Verizon, and T-Mobile wireless service carriers to pre-install Google  
26 payment apps on their phones, thereby conspiring to suppress, eliminate  
27 competition and divide the revenue and profits from the supply of the sale of  
28

1 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps  
2 and online sales franchise platforms in the United States, between each  
3 Defendant as nearly equally as possible;  
4

5 e. Defendants Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, met and further agreed between  
6 themselves and corporate leaders of Alibaba, Baidu, Microsoft, Tencent and  
7 Xiaomi to acquire and utilize the Android OS as the primary and exclusive  
8 online operating system, thereby conspiring to suppress, eliminate  
9 competition and divide the revenue and profits from the supply of the sale of  
10 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps  
11 and online sales franchise platforms in the United States, between each  
12 Defendant as nearly equally as possible;  
13

14 f. Defendants Facebook, Zuckerberg, Bezos, Amazon, Alphabet, dba, Google,  
15 dba, YouTube, Brin, Page, Sundai and Schmidt met and further agreed with  
16 the Chief Executive Officers of every movie and media company in the  
17 United States to exclusively buy, sell and host, videos, music, movies, news  
18 feeds and serve advertisements on videos, music, movies, news feeds and  
19 social media sites owned, or operated by the Defendants, jointly and  
20 severally, thereby conspiring to suppress, eliminate competition and divide  
21 the revenue and profits from the supply of the sale of browsers, operating  
22 systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales  
23 franchise platforms in the United States, between each Defendant as nearly  
24 equally as possible;  
25  
26  
27  
28



1 g. The Defendants further met, conspired and agreed between themselves to  
2 allow the 2012 Obama Presidential campaign to harness Defendant  
3 Facebook's Application Programming Interface (API) to access the  
4 company's "social graph," which mapped the Facebook users connections  
5 and enabled the Obama campaign to access information on millions of  
6 Defendant Facebook users' friends when they used the Facebook log-in  
7 button to access the campaign's website; and  
8

9  
10 h. The Defendants further agreed between themselves to allow political  
11 campaigning and fundraising on their respective platforms, and to fund the  
12 Democrat party and the political campaigns of Barack Obama, Hillary  
13 Clinton and Joe Biden in 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020, in order to escape  
14 governmental antitrust scrutiny.  
15

16  
17 263. The aforesaid agreement, combination and conspiracy had the following  
18 effects, among others:

19 f. it suppressed, restrained, and eliminated competition in the development of  
20 Apps, the sale of online news feeds, digital advertising systems and online  
21 goods in the United States;  
22

23 g. it reduced the number of operating systems to one; reduced independent  
24 advertisers, news feed providers, online (music, movie, videos) sales  
25 platforms on the Internet from over two-hundred (420) to three (3) (Four (4)  
26 including Chinese-owned Alibaba);  
27

28 h. it substantially raised the price of advertising and goods sold on the Internet;

i. it caused the U.S. purchase contract officer(s), to nevertheless award technological procurement contracts to Defendants as an undefinitized contract action, obligating the United States to pay Defendants unfair and unreasonable prices, that exceed billions of dollars, with the exact amount to be determined later; and

j. It increased the costs and profits proposed by Defendants as fair and reasonable for the price of browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchise platforms in the United States to levels significantly in excess of historical costs and profits.

264. Each of the Defendants is a participant in this unlawful agreement, combination or conspiracy.

265. As a result of the illegal agreement, combination and conspiracy alleged in this Complaint, the plaintiff, Harry J. Williby, has been injured and financially harmed by the defendants.

#### **COUNT X: Violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2)**

##### **Monopolization (of browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchise platforms): Injunctive Relief**

266. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

267. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, possesses monopoly power in the market for browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps, PC/tablet/smartphones and online sales franchise platforms.

1 Through the anticompetitive conduct described herein and above, the Defendants, and  
 2 each of them, jointly and severally, have willfully maintained, and unless restrained by  
 3 the Court will continue to willfully maintain, that power by anticompetitive and  
 4 unreasonably exclusionary conduct. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and  
 5 severally, have acted with an intent illegally to maintain its monopoly power in the  
 6 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales  
 7 franchise platforms market, and its illegal conduct has enabled it to do so, in violation of  
 8 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

11 **COUNT XI: Violation of the Lanham Act (Sections 43(a) 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A))**

13 **False designations of origin, false descriptions: Damages/Disgorgement**

14 268. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
 15 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

16 269. Defendants' unauthorized use in commerce of spurious copies of the  
 17 Corrupt Justice™/The Attorney Depot™/Wilabee™ Trademark in connection with the  
 18 distribution, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, and/or sale of the  
 19 YouTube/Blogger/Facebook/Amazon corporations constitutes use of a symbol or device  
 20 that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the affiliation or connection  
 21 of Defendants with Corrupt Justice™/The Attorney Depot™/Wilabee™ and as to the  
 22 origin, sponsorship, association, or approval of Defendants' anti competitive Products in  
 23 violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

24 270. Defendants' actions as alleged herein, including but not limited to their  
 25 unauthorized use in commerce of spurious copies of the Corrupt Justice™/The Attorney  
 26



1 Depot™/Wilabee™ Trademark, constitutes use of a false designation of origin and  
 2 misleading description and representation of fact that is likely to cause confusion,  
 3 mistake, or deception as to the affiliation or connection of Defendants with Corrupt  
 4 Justice™/The Attorney Depot™/Wilabee™ and as to the origin, sponsorship, association,  
 5 or approval of Defendants' anti competitive Products in violation of Section 43(a) of the  
 6 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  
 7  
 8

9 271. At all relevant times, Defendants had actual and direct knowledge of  
 10 Plaintiff's prior use and ownership of the Corrupt Justice™/The Attorney  
 11 Depot™/Wilabee™ Trademark. Defendants' conduct is therefore willful and reflects  
 12 Defendants' intent to exploit the goodwill and strong brand recognition associated with  
 13 the Corrupt Justice™/The Attorney Depot™/Wilabee™ Trademark.  
 14

15 272. Defendants' wrongful acts will continue unless enjoined by this Court.  
 16

17 273. Defendants' acts have caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable injury  
 18 to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and is thus damaged in an amount  
 19 not yet determined.  
 20

21 274. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
 22 disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.

## 23 **COUNT XII: LANHAM ACT FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)**

### 24 **Damages/Disgorgement**

25 275. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
 26 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
 27

28 276. Beginning in, or about June 2003 and continuing until the filing of this

1 Complaint, the exact dates being unknown to the plaintiff, the defendants, and each of  
2 them, jointly and severally, have published, distributed and disseminated electronic  
3 advertising brochures and other advertising statements which include false and/or  
4 misleading representations and disparaging accusations regarding Plaintiff's product.  
5

6 277. Defendants' association of its AdSpend/AdSense products with the phrase  
7 "pay-per-click," or with statements indicating Plaintiff would receive \$0.25 per-click for  
8 hosting digital advertising on his websites and/or YouTube channels, constitutes a false  
9 or misleading representation of fact regarding the actual amounts paid to plaintiff for  
10 hosting digital advertising on his websites and/or YouTube channels.  
11

12 278. Defendants' use of false or misleading representations of fact in commercial  
13 advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, or qualities of  
14 Defendants' goods.  
15

16 279. Defendants' use of false or misleading representations of fact has the  
17 tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the target consumer audience, or actually  
18 deceives the target consumers.  
19

20 280. Defendants' false or misleading representations of fact are material because  
21 they are likely to influence the operating and/or purchasing decision of the target  
22 consumers.  
23

24 281. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, falsely or  
25 misleadingly represented products that are advertised, promoted, sold and distributed in  
26 interstate commerce.  
27

28 282. Plaintiff has been and continues to be injured by Defendants' false or

misleading representations of fact through the diversion of sales or loss of goodwill.

283. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, knows that its representations of fact are false or misleading.

284. Defendants' false or misleading representations of fact were done with bad faith and malice or reckless indifference to Plaintiff's and consumers' interests.

285. Defendants' bad faith false or misleading representations of fact regarding the payment amount and methodology of its product makes this an exceptional case within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

286. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, continues to make false or misleading representations of fact regarding the payment amount and methodology of its product and will continue to do so unless enjoined by this Court as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1116.

287. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of Defendants' profits due to sales of the falsely or misleadingly represented product, any damages sustained by Plaintiff, and the costs of the action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

288. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.

**COUNT XIII: LANHAM ACT FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER 15 U.S.C. §**

**1125(a) (as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and**

**Defendants Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV):**

**Damages/Disgorgement**

289. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this



1 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

2  
3 290. Beginning in, or about June 2003 and continuing until the filing of this  
4 Complaint, the exact dates being unknown to the plaintiff, the defendants, and each of  
5 them, jointly and severally, have published, distributed and disseminated electronic  
6 advertising brochures and other advertising statements which include false and/or  
7 misleading representations and disparaging accusations regarding Plaintiff's product.  
8

9 291. Defendants' association of its YouTube/YouTube TV products with the  
10 phrases "YouTube," "Broadcast Yourself," or with statements indicating  
11 YouTube/YouTube TV product websites are an "alternative to mainstream media and  
12 movie corporations," constitutes a false or misleading representation of fact regarding the  
13 actual affiliation, association and business relationships Defendant YouTube/YouTube  
14 TV has with mainstream media and movie corporations.  
15

16 292. Defendants' use of false or misleading representations of fact in commercial  
17 advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, or qualities of  
18 Defendants' goods.  
19

20 293. Defendants' use of false or misleading representations of fact has the  
21 tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the target consumer audience, or actually  
22 deceives the target consumers.  
23

24 294. Defendants' false or misleading representations of fact are material because  
25 they are likely to influence the operating and/or purchasing decision of the target  
26 consumers.  
27

28 295. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, falsely or

1 misleadingly represented products that are advertised, promoted, sold and distributed in  
2 interstate commerce.

3  
4 296. Plaintiff has been and continues to be injured by Defendants' false or  
5 misleading representations of fact through the diversion of sales or loss of goodwill.

6  
7 297. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, knows that its  
8 representations of fact are false or misleading.

9  
10 298. Defendants' false or misleading representations of fact were done with bad  
11 faith and malice or reckless indifference to Plaintiff's and consumers' interests.

12  
13 299. Defendants' bad faith false or misleading representations of fact regarding  
14 the actual affiliation, association and business relationships Defendant  
15 YouTube/YouTube TV has with mainstream media and movie corporations, makes this  
16 an exceptional case within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

17  
18 300. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, continues to make  
19 false or misleading representations of fact regarding the actual affiliation, association and  
20 business relationships Defendant YouTube/YouTube TV has with mainstream media and  
21 movie corporations, and will continue to do so unless enjoined by this Court as provided  
22 by 15 U.S.C. § 1116.

23  
24 301. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of Defendants' profits due to sales of the  
25 falsely or misleadingly represented product, any damages sustained by Plaintiff, and the  
26 costs of the action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

27  
28 302. In addition, or alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of  
disgorgement against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.

**COUNT XIV: Breach of Contract****(as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and Defendants****Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV): Damages**

303. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

304. Plaintiff fully performed all the “Terms and Conditions,” covenants and promises to be performed on the part of the Plaintiff under the YouTube/Blogger/Google AdSense Program.

305. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, failed to make all payments and perform all obligations under the “Terms and Conditions,” covenants and promises of the YouTube/Blogger/Google AdSense Program.

306. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, breached the “Terms and Conditions,” covenants and promises of the YouTube/Blogger/Google AdSense Program by failing to make timely payments and by failing to pay all outstanding amounts, accrued interest, and fees upon demand.

307. Although Plaintiff has demanded that Defendants perform all obligations under the “Terms and Conditions,” covenants and promises of the YouTube/Blogger/Google AdSense Program, Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse to take any steps necessary to fully and completely make timely payments; pay all outstanding amounts; accrued interest; or fees.

308. As noted above, Defendant Alphabet, Inc., dba, Google, dba, YouTube,



1 LLC., is the alter-ego of Defendant Jeff Bezos, dba, Amazon, Inc.

2  
3 309. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' continuous breaches,  
4 Plaintiff has suffered extreme financial losses in the form of lost profits. Plaintiff has  
5 been damaged in the minimum amount of \$1 Billion dollars for each year, beginning in  
6 2008, or in an amount to be proven at trial as a result of Defendants' breach of the  
7 "Terms and Conditions," covenants and promises of the YouTube/Blogger/Google  
8 AdSense Program.  
9

10 310. Plaintiff's damages are ongoing and increasing due to Defendants' breach of  
11 the "Terms and Conditions," covenants and promises of the YouTube/Blogger/Google  
12 AdSense Program.  
13

14 **COUNT XV: Fraud**

15 **(as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and Defendants**

16 **Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV)**  
17

18 303. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
19 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
20

21 311. The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, misrepresented to  
22 Plaintiff that YouTube was a video advertising platform being marketed as an alternative  
23 to mainstream media and movie outlets, when in fact, as early as 2007, Defendants were  
24 in fact entering into multi-billion dollar contracts to host videos, movies, and televisions  
25 shows on behalf of mainstream media stations and movie outlets.  
26

27 312. The Defendants knew they were hosting videos, movies, and televisions  
28 shows on behalf of mainstream media and movie outlets, rather than operating as an

1 alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets. The Defendants, and each of them,  
2 jointly and severally, perpetrated this fraud and misrepresentation by utilizing content  
3 creators/Blogger™ designers not affiliated with mainstream media and movie outlets,  
4 like Plaintiff, to build and market YouTube as an alternative to mainstream media and  
5 movie outlets.  
6

7  
8 313. Defendants' misrepresentations were material. Plaintiff would not have spent  
9 ten (10) years creating two (2) YouTube channels (The Attorney Depot™ and The Harry  
10 Williby) if Plaintiff had known Defendants were actually under multi-billion dollar  
11 contract with mainstream media and movie outlets (for the entire ten (10) year period).  
12

13 314. The Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to rely on its misrepresentations.  
14 The Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, knew that stating they were an  
15 alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets, Plaintiff would build and market  
16 YouTube as an alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets. The Defendants, and  
17 each of them, jointly and severally, had reason to expect that Plaintiff would rely on the  
18 misrepresentations that it made to Plaintiff because of the continuous contractual  
19 relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants.  
20

21  
22 315. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representations Defendants made over  
23 the course of ten (10) years, while designing Blogger™ pages and YouTube channels.  
24

25 316. Plaintiff was justified in relying upon Defendants' representations that they  
26 were an alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets, because Defendants  
27 continued to use and advertise the phrases "YouTube," "Broadcast Yourself," and  
28 "YouTube [Content] Creator," and the Defendants never once, during the period of 2008

1 through 2018, advertise, announce, or inform Plaintiff that they were in fact, under  
 2 multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet  
 3 in the country.  
 4

5 317. Plaintiff has been substantially harmed by Defendants' misrepresentations,  
 6 because Plaintiff spent ten (10) years designing Blogger™ pages and YouTube channels,  
 7 for the multi-trillion dollar profit of the Defendants and mainstream media and movie  
 8 outlets, while netting negative profits, or earnings.  
 9

10 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  
 11

12 **COUNT XVI: Negligent Misrepresentation**

13 **(as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and Defendants**

14 **Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV)**

15 318. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
 16 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
 17

18 319. The Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiff that YouTube was an alternative  
 19 to mainstream media and movie outlets, when in fact Defendants were signing  
 20 multi-billion dollar contracts with mainstream media and movie outlets. The Defendants  
 21 made such misrepresentations by electronic advertising, which Plaintiff relied upon for a  
 22 period of ten (10) years.  
 23

24 320. The Defendants had no reasonable grounds to believe that these  
 25 misrepresentations were true. Plaintiff joined YouTube as a content creator in October  
 26 2008. As early as 2007, the Defendants had in fact entered into a multi-million dollar  
 27 agreement to host videos and shows produced and owned by mainstream media outlet,  
 28



1 NBC.

2  
3 321. The Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to rely on its misrepresentations.  
4 The Defendants knew that because of its representation that YouTube was an alternative  
5 to mainstream media and movie outlets, Plaintiff would build and market YouTube as an  
6 alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets. The Defendants knew that Plaintiff  
7 would rely on the misrepresentations made to him, because YouTube/Google AdSense  
8 used unique, confidential content creator identification numbers, when allowing creators  
9 to upload/host videos and/or when paying through the Google AdSense program.  
10

11 322. Plaintiff was justified in relying upon Defendants' representations that they  
12 were an alternative to mainstream media and movie outlets, because Defendants  
13 continued to use and advertise the phrases "YouTube," "Broadcast Yourself," and  
14 "YouTube [Content] Creator," and the Defendants never once, during the period of 2008  
15 through 2018, advertise, announce, or inform Plaintiff that they were in fact, under  
16 multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet  
17 in the country.  
18

19 323. Plaintiff has been substantially harmed by Defendants' misrepresentations,  
20 because Plaintiff spent ten (10) years designing Blogger™ pages and YouTube channels,  
21 for the multi-trillion dollar profit of the Defendants and mainstream media and movie  
22 outlets, while netting negative profits, or earnings.  
23

24 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  
25

26  
27 **COUNT XVII: Breach Of Implied-In-Fact-Contract**

28 **(as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and Defendants**

**Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV)**

324. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

325. By their actions, the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, entered into a contract with Plaintiff, whereby Plaintiff would create content and Defendants would provide advertisement on said content, and pay Plaintiff based upon consumer access to said advertisements.

326. Because Defendants required Plaintiff and mainstream media and movie outlets to use unique, confidential content creator identification numbers, when allowing creators to upload/host videos and/or when paying through the Google AdSense program, the Defendants knew, or had reason to know that they were required to accurately advertise, announce, or inform Plaintiff that they were in fact, under multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet in the country.

327. When allowing the uploading/hosting of videos and/or when seeking payment through the Google AdSense program, Defendants did use the unique, confidential content creator identification numbers. The Defendants then reaped and shared billions of dollars (\$2.2 Trillion Dollars to date) in advertising revenue, with mainstream media/movie outlets, each year beginning in 2008 and continuing to present date, through the Google AdSense program.

328. The Defendants breached the implied-in-fact contract with Plaintiff through its fraudulent conduct in which they identified as an independent entity, when in fact they were under multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream media and

1 movie outlet in the country. Additional breaches occurred when the Defendants allowed  
 2 the mainstream media and movie outlets in the country to file and prevail upon frivolous  
 3 copyright claims against Plaintiff.  
 4

5 329. Plaintiff has been harmed by Defendants' breach. Based upon Defendants'  
 6 conduct, Plaintiff was led to believe that he was uploading/hosting videos on behalf of an  
 7 independent video streaming service; and that Plaintiff would receive the appropriate  
 8 negotiated payment for those videos through the Google AdSense program. Plaintiff was  
 9 instead deceived into uploading/hosting videos on behalf of Defendants and mainstream  
 10 media/movie outlets.  
 11

12 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  
 13

14 **COUNT XVIII: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing**  
 15 **(as to Defendants Bezos, Amazon, Brin, Schmidt, Page, Pichai and Defendants**  
 16 **Alphabet, dba, Google, dba, YouTube/YouTube TV)**  
 17

18 330. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
 19 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
 20

21 331. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into contracts whereby Plaintiff created  
 22 Blogger™ pages and YouTube channels. In fulfilling their duty to act in good faith (a  
 23 higher standard amongst merchants) the Defendants must accurately advertise, announce,  
 24 and/or inform Plaintiff that they were in fact, under multi-billion dollar contractual  
 25 relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet in the country, giving Plaintiff a  
 26 basis to make an informed decision, and negotiate adequate compensation.  
 27

28 332. The Defendants knew, or had reason to know that they were required to



1 accurately identify for whom they were actually under contractual relationships with.

2  
3 333. The Defendants knew, or had reason to know that the advertisement revenue  
4 they were generating was directly dependent upon the Blogger™ pages and YouTube  
5 channels created by Plaintiff.

6  
7 334. When allowing the uploading/hosting of videos and/or when seeking  
8 payment through the Google AdSense program, Defendants did use the unique,  
9 confidential content creator identification numbers. Plaintiff duly performed his duties  
10 under the contract.

11  
12 335. The Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
13 governing every contract with Plaintiff by identifying as an independent entity, when in  
14 fact they were under multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream  
15 media and movie outlet in the country, reaping massive and ill-gotten profits.

16  
17 336. The Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
18 governing every contract with Plaintiff, because the facts and evidence indicates the  
19 Defendants had no intention of operating as an alternative to mainstream media, or movie  
20 outlets. The Defendants in fact began secret multi-million contract negotiations with  
21 mainstream media and movie outlets beginning in 2006. Plaintiff, based upon  
22 Defendants' intentional and malicious breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealings,  
23 joined YouTube and Blogger™ in 2008.

24  
25 337. Plaintiff has been harmed by Defendants' breach. Had the Defendants  
26 informed Plaintiff that they were in fact, under multi-billion dollar contractual relations  
27 with every mainstream media and movie outlet in the country, Plaintiff would have had a  
28

1 basis to make an informed decision, and negotiate adequate compensation.

2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

3 **COUNT XIX: Unfair Competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200**

4 **(as to all Defendants)**

5  
6 338. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
7 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

8  
9 339. The Defendants are engaged in the business practice of representing  
10 themselves as an independent entity, hosting online, digital advertisements on Blogger™  
11 pages, websites and YouTube channels, utilizing the Android OS and the Google  
12 AdSpend/Adsense payment program, when in fact they are under multi-billion dollar  
13 contractual relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet in the country.  
14

15 340. The Defendants' practice is unfair because it is unethical, oppressive and  
16 unscrupulous. The Defendants falsely represented themselves as an alternative to  
17 mainstream media/movie outlets and an independent entity, to take advantage of the  
18 unpaid labor, marketing and video editing/production skill sets of Plaintiff as a content  
19 creator and blog/website designer. Instead of acting as an alternative to mainstream  
20 media/movie outlets and an independent entity, Defendants were in fact, under  
21 multi-billion dollar contractual relations with every mainstream media and movie outlet  
22 in the country. Upon information and belief, the Defendants profited by representing  
23 themselves as an alternative to mainstream media/movie outlets and an independent  
24 entity, taking advantage of the unpaid labor, marketing and video editing/production skill  
25 sets of Plaintiff as a content creator and blog/website designer, thereby converting  
26  
27  
28

1 Plaintiffs' profits for their own use.

2  
3 341. Defendants further damaged Plaintiff by terminating and demonetizing  
4 Plaintiff's Blogger pages and YouTube channels. This wilful and egregious behavior  
5 damages Plaintiff's reputation and the trust Plaintiff and his channels, Blogger pages and  
6 websites have earned over a ten (10) year period.

7  
8 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

9 **COUNT XX: Conversion**

10 **(as to all Defendants)**

11  
12 342. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
13 Complaint as if fully restated herein.

14 343. The Defendants willfully interfered with Plaintiff's rights to its personal  
15 property. The Defendants, through, wilful misrepresentations and a fraudulent schemes of  
16 artifice, induced Plaintiff to develop of Blogger™ pages, websites and YouTube channels  
17 purportedly on behalf of Plaintiff and Defendants, but with full knowledge that Plaintiff  
18 was in fact developing Blogger™ pages, websites and YouTube channels on behalf of  
19 Defendants and mainstream media and movie outlets.  
20

21  
22 344. Defendants' intentional and deceitful acts enabled them to dispose of the  
23 property in a manner inconsistent with Plaintiff's property rights. These property rights  
24 include the sale of digital advertisement at a designated price.

25  
26 345. Defendants' unauthorized transfer of Plaintiff's property caused substantial  
27 damages to Plaintiff.

28 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.



**COUNT XXI: Quantum Meruit****Restitution****(as to all Defendants)**

346. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully restated herein.

347. Defendants, in operating YouTube and enacting the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service, intended to benefit Host Websites and YouTube channels owners by establishing standards and procedures for hosting videos, content and payment decisions. The Policies are supposed to limit subjective decision-making and are designed to protect the interests and investments of Host Websites and YouTube channels owners like Plaintiff.

348. Indeed, there can be no doubt that the operation of YouTube and enacting the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service were enacted for the benefit of Plaintiff. The Google AdSense Online Terms of Service were promulgated after the Defendants purchased Applied Semantics in 2003 and YouTube in 2006. Now, 18 years after their enactment, the Defendants have turned their back both on the purpose of the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service and Plaintiff.

349. The Google AdSense Online Terms of Service holds: *"As used in these Terms of Service, "you" or "publisher" means the individual or entity using the Services (and/or any individual, agent, employee, representative, network, parent, subsidiary, affiliate, successor, related entities, assigns, or all other individuals or entities acting on your behalf, at your direction, under your control, or under the direction or control of the*

1 same individual or entity who controls you). "We," "us" or "Google" means Google LLC,  
2 and the "parties" means you and Google."

3  
4 350. The Defendants have long held that their Google AdSense contract with  
5 publishers/content creators could be terminated at any time. Such contracts are too unfair  
6 to be enforceable. During the past 10 years, Plaintiff has invested over a million dollars to  
7 attract, retain and support YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages, all  
8 spent in reliance on the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service and the obligations of  
9 Defendants under those Policies.  
10

11 Plaintiff made those investments with the express understanding between Plaintiff and  
12 the Defendants that: (a) Defendants would comply with the Google AdSense Online  
13 Terms of Service; (b) Defendants would support Plaintiff as the Host of YouTube  
14 channels and Blogger™ pages, and (c) Plaintiff would recoup his investments in the  
15 YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages through the revenues generated  
16 by the Google AdSense program. The Defendants and all their subsidiaries benefited  
17 tremendously from Plaintiff's investment in the YouTube channels and Blogger™ pages.  
18

19 351. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants believed that Plaintiff's investment in the  
20 YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages was gratuitous, or that the Google  
21 AdSense Online Terms of Service somehow did not apply to Plaintiff or the Defendants.  
22 In fact, the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service continues, holding: "*Unless*  
23 *expressly authorized in writing by Google, you may not enter into any type of*  
24 *arrangement with a third party where that third party receives payments made to you*  
25 *under the AdSense Terms or other financial benefit in relation to the Services.*"  
26  
27  
28

1           352. By virtue of allowing mainstream media/movie outlets to earn AdSense  
2 revenue, in blatant violation of the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service, Defendants  
3 have deprived Plaintiff of the revenues necessary to recoup his investment in the  
4 YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages. Defendants have made no effort  
5 to reimburse Plaintiff for the investments it made in the YouTube channels and  
6 Blogger™ pages, or otherwise compensate Plaintiff for the unlawful shadow banning,  
7 demonetization and termination of Plaintiff's YouTube channels and Blogger™ and  
8 Facebook pages.  
9

10  
11           353. Defendants are estopped from denying the obligatory nature of the Google  
12 AdSense Online Terms of Service. The Defendants adopted the Terms specifically to  
13 provide a process and standards to reign in subjective decision-making in the hope of  
14 avoiding further antitrust liability. Defendants, through their legal representatives, have  
15 admitted that the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service imposes obligations on the  
16 Defendants, and that the Terms must be satisfied for a Google AdSense payment to be  
17 approved. Given the history of the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service – and the  
18 Defendants' position regarding the Terms' role in the payment process – Plaintiff relied  
19 on the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service in structuring his relationship with the  
20 Defendants. Plaintiff's reliance caused Plaintiff to lose his significant investment in the  
21 YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages, therefore allowing Defendants to  
22 reverse course and reject the Google AdSense Online Terms of Service – while enriching  
23 themselves – would be unjust.  
24  
25  
26  
27

28           354. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff lost, and



1 has been deprived of, his investment in the YouTube channels and Blogger™ and  
2 Facebook pages.  
3

4 355. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to restitution in the amount of all sums  
5 invested by Plaintiff in the YouTube channels and Blogger™ and Facebook pages, in an  
6 amount to be determined at trial.  
7

8 **COUNT XXII: Unjust Enrichment Under California Law**

9 **Damages/Disgorgement**

10 **(as to all Defendants)**

11 356. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this  
12 Complaint as if fully restated herein.  
13

14 357. As a result of their unlawful and inequitable conduct described above,  
15 Defendants have and will continue to benefit and be unjustly enriched as a direct result of  
16 their collusive actions to the detriment of Plaintiff.  
17

18 358. Plaintiff is entitled to the amount of Defendants' ill-gotten gains resulting  
19 from their unlawful, unjust, and inequitable conduct, and are entitled to reimbursement of  
20 all ill-gotten gains.  
21

22 359. The economic benefit Defendants derived is a direct and proximate result of  
23 Defendants' unlawful practices.  
24

25 360. The financial benefits Defendants derived rightfully belong to Plaintiff.  
26 Defendants have retained these benefits bestowed upon them under inequitable and  
27 unjust circumstances at the expense of Plaintiff. Defendants were enriched by their illegal  
28 activities at the expense of Plaintiff and thus Defendants should be ordered to make

1 restitution for the benefit of Plaintiff because it would be unjust to allow Defendants to  
2 retain the benefits.  
3

4 ///

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1 **X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

2 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff Harry J. Williby respectfully requests that the Court  
3 enter judgment against Defendants and grant the following relief:  
4

5 1. On Count One of the Complaint, judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against  
6 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
7 for each year 2008-2018) or an amount to be determined at trial and trebled pursuant to  
8 15 U.S.C. § 15, and/or disgorgement in an amount to be determined at trial;  
9

10 2. On Count Two of the Complaint, judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against  
11 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
12 for each year 2008-2018) or an amount to be determined at trial and trebled pursuant to  
13 15 U.S.C. § 15, and/or disgorgement in an amount to be determined at trial;  
14

15 3. On Count Three of the Complaint, judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against  
16 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
17 for each year 2008-2018) or an amount to be determined at trial and trebled pursuant to  
18 15 U.S.C. § 15, and/or disgorgement in an amount to be determined at trial;  
19

20 4. On Count Four of the Complaint, judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against  
21 Defendants, jointly and severally, in a minimum amount of \$10 Billion Dollars (\$1BN  
22 for each year 2008-2018) or an amount to be determined at trial and trebled pursuant to  
23 15 U.S.C. § 15, and/or disgorgement in an amount to be determined at trial;  
24

25 5. On Count Five of the Complaint, That the Court adjudge and decree as  
26 follows:  
27

28 a. That Defendants' conduct in requiring OEMs to license and distribute the



1           Android operating system, or any other software product as a condition of  
2           licensing any Android operating system product violates Sections 1 and 2 of  
3           the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; and

- 4
- 5           b. That Defendants' agreements with OEMs restricting their right to modify  
6           the screens and functions of the Android operating system, or to add  
7           non-Google Internet browser software or other software products during the  
8           boot-up sequence, or to substitute non-Google Internet browser software or  
9           other software products for Google Internet browser software or other  
10          software products, violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  
11          §§ 1 and 2.

12

13

14          6. On Count Six of the Complaint, That the Court adjudge and decree as  
15 follows:

- 16
- 17           a. That Defendants' conduct in requiring persons to license and  
18           distribute its Internet browser software or any other software product  
19           as a condition of receiving placement in or access to any Android  
20           operating system product, including any screen or function thereof,  
21           violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2;  
22           and  
23
- 24           b. That Defendants' conduct in requiring or inducing persons to agree  
25           not to license, distribute, or promote any non-Google Internet  
26           browser, or to license, distribute, or promote such browser only on  
27           terms or under conditions that materially disadvantage it, violates  
28

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.

7. On Count Seven of the Complaint, That the Court adjudge and decree as follows:

- a. That the Horizontal Market Agreement constitutes an illegal restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and issue an injunction requiring rescission of the Horizontal Market Agreement and that the Defendants' use of the AdSpend/AdSense Pay-Per-Click program be enjoined;
- b. that the Defendants, their officers, directors, agents, employees and successors and all other persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf be enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, directly or indirectly, continuing, maintaining, or renewing the Horizontal Market Agreement, or from engaging in any other combination, conspiracy, contract, agreement, understanding or concert of action having a similar purpose or effect, and from adopting or following any practice, plan, program, or device having a similar purpose or effect;
- c. that the Defendants, their officers, directors, agents, employees and successors and all other persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf be enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, directly or indirectly, continuing, maintaining, or renewing the shadow ban, demonetization, or termination of Plaintiff's website(s) or video

1 channels, or removal of any content thereof on said website(s) or  
2 video channels, without order of this Court;  
3

4 d. that the Plaintiff have such other relief as the Court may deem just  
5 and proper to redress, and prevent recurrence of, the alleged violation  
6 and to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the Defendants' past  
7 violation(s); and  
8

9 e. that the Plaintiff recover the costs of this action.

10 8. On Count Eight of the Complaint, an Order of the Court declaring that  
11 Defendants': (i) funding, employment and service in the Obama and Biden  
12 Administrations (ii) shadow ban, demonetization, and termination of Plaintiff's  
13 website(s) or video channels and refusal to comply with their own Google AdSense  
14 Online Terms of Service, and (iii) redistribution of the resulting ill-gotten  
15 supra-competitive gains through artificially set digital advertising fees to all mainstream  
16 media/movie outlets as a quid pro quo for breaching the terms of those Google AdSense  
17 Online Terms of Service, amount to government agency and an unreasonable restraint on  
18 trade and interstate commerce and a violation of the antitrust laws.  
19

20 9. On Count Nine of the Complaint, That the Court adjudge and decree as  
21 follows:  
22

23 a. That the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, have  
24 attempted to monopolize, through government agency and political  
25 financial contributions, the market for Internet browsers, mobile  
26 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising,  
27  
28



1 Apps and online sales franchise platforms in violation of Section 2 of  
2  
3 the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

4 10. On Count ten of the Complaint, That the Court adjudge and decree as  
5 follows:

6 a. That the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, have willfully  
7 maintained its monopoly in the market for Internet browsers, mobile  
8 browsers, operating systems, online news feeds, digital advertising, Apps  
9 and online sales franchise platforms in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman  
10 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and  
11

12 b. That the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, have engaged  
13 in and/or are currently engaged in government agency and extraordinary  
14 political campaign funding to willfully maintain and fund its monopoly in  
15 the market for Internet browsers, mobile browsers, operating systems, online  
16 news feeds, digital advertising, Apps and online sales franchise platforms in  
17 violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.  
18

19 (i) That Google, Facebook and Amazon, and all persons acting on their behalf  
20 or under their direction or control, and all successors thereto, be preliminarily and  
21 permanently enjoined from:  
22

23 a. Donating any further computing, data service, or data access to political  
24 parties, or persons affiliated, or acting on behalf of a political party in the  
25 United States;  
26

27 b. Donating any further monies, currencies (whether U.S., or foriegn) or items  
28

1 of monetary, or financial value to political parties, or persons affiliated, or  
2 acting on behalf of a political party in the United States;

3  
4 c. Enforcing Copyright takedown notices without full compliance with the  
5 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205,  
6 1301–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001) and full compliance with 17 U.S. Code § 107  
7 - Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use;

8  
9 d. Enforcing Copyright takedown notices on behalf of mainstream media  
10 and/or movie companies Defendants have entered into monetary contracts  
11 with and specifically those entities named herein said complaint;

12  
13 e. Utilizing Pay-Per-Click in the selling of digital advertisements;

14  
15 f. Utilizing Pay-Per-Click as the payment methodology for Content Creators,  
16 Website Owners, or YouTube Channel Owners;

17  
18 g. Removing any content from, shadow banning, or demonetizing Plaintiff's  
19 competing website, wilabee.com, without direct, written approval of the  
20 Court;

21  
22 h. Requiring any person to license or distribute Google's Internet browser  
23 software or any other software product or service as a condition of licensing  
24 or distributing any Android operating system product;

25  
26 i. Requiring or inducing any person to agree not to license, distribute, or  
27 promote any non-Google Internet browser software or other software  
28 product, or to do so on any disadvantageous, restrictive or exclusionary  
terms;

1 j. Taking or threatening any action adverse to any person in whole or in part as  
2 a direct or indirect consequence of such person's failure to license or  
3 distribute Google's Internet browser software or other software product, of  
4 such person's licensing or distributing any non-Google Internet browser or  
5 other software product, or of such person's cooperation with Plaintiff, or the  
6 United States;  
7

8  
9 k. Restricting the right of any person to modify the screens, boot-up sequence  
10 or functions of any Android operating system product which such person has  
11 licensed so as automatically or otherwise to add non-Google Internet  
12 browser software or other software products, including but not limited to  
13 alternative user interfaces, or automatically or otherwise to substitute such  
14 non-Google Internet browser software or other software product for  
15 Google's Internet browser software or other software product, so long as  
16 such addition or substitution does not materially impair the performance of  
17 such Google/Android operating system product;  
18

19  
20 l. Effecting assignments or transfers, forming new entities or associations, or  
21 utilizing any other device for the purpose of circumventing or otherwise  
22 avoiding the prohibitions set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (l).  
23

24 (ii) That the Court enter such other preliminary and permanent relief as is  
25 necessary and appropriate to restore competitive conditions in the markets affected by  
26 Defendants' unlawful conduct.  
27

28 11. On Count eleven of the Complaint, For judgment that Defendants, and each



1 of them, jointly and severally, have:

2  
3 (i)

4 a. have violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a);

5 And

6 b. Finding this to be an exceptional case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117;

7  
8 (ii) That an injunction be issued enjoining and restraining Defendants, and each  
9 of them, jointly and severally, and each of their officers, agents, servants, employees, and  
10 attorneys, and all those in active concert or participation with it from:

11 a. Using the Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt Justice™ Trademark or  
12 any other reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of the  
13 Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt Justice™ Trademark on or in  
14 connection with any goods or services;

15  
16 b. Engaging in any course of conduct likely to cause confusion, deception or  
17 mistake, or to injure Plaintiff's business reputation or dilute the distinctive  
18 quality of the Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt Justice™  
19 Trademark, including through the continued importation, distribution, sale  
20 or offering for sale of counterfeit Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt  
21 Justice™ products;

22  
23 c. Using any simulation, reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation  
24 of the Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt Justice™ Trademark in  
25 connection with the promotion, advertisement, display, sale, offer for sale,  
26 manufacture, production, importation, circulation, or distribution of any  
27  
28

1 products;

2  
3 d. Making any statement or representation whatsoever, or using any false  
4 designation of origin or false description, or performing any act, which can  
5 or is likely to lead the trade or public, or individual members thereof, to  
6 believe that any products manufactured, distributed, or sold by Defendants  
7 are in any manner associated or connected with Wilabee™/The Attorney  
8 Depot™/Corrupt Justice™, or are sold, manufactured, licensed, sponsored,  
9 approved, or authorized by Wilabee™/The Attorney Depot™/Corrupt  
10 Justice™;  
11

12  
13 e. Destroying, altering, removing, or otherwise dealing with the unauthorized  
14 products or any books or records which contain any information relating to  
15 the importation, manufacture, production, distribution, circulation, sale,  
16 marketing, offer for sale, advertising, promotion, rental or display of all  
17 unauthorized products which infringe or dilute the Wilabee™/The Attorney  
18 Depot™/Corrupt Justice™ Trademark; and  
19

20  
21 f. Effecting assignments or transfers, forming new entities or associations, or  
22 utilizing any other device for the purpose of circumventing or otherwise  
23 avoiding the prohibitions set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (f).

24 (iii) For an assessment of: (a) damages suffered by Plaintiff, trebled, pursuant to  
25 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b); or, in the alternative, (b) all illicit profits that Defendants derived  
26 while using counterfeits and/or infringements of the Wilabee™/The Attorney  
27 Depot™/Corrupt Justice™ Trademark, trebled, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b); or, in  
28

1 the alternative, (c) statutory damages, awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §  
 2 1117(c), of up to \$2,000,000 for each trademark that Defendants have counterfeited  
 3 and/or infringed; (d) plaintiff be awarded a 10% market profit share of  
 4 YouTube/YouTube TV; and (e) an award of Plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees to the  
 5 full extent provided for by Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117; and  
 6

7  
 8 (iv) For costs of suit, and for such other and further relief as the Court shall  
 9 deem appropriate.

10 12. On Count twelve of the Complaint, For judgment that Defendants, and each  
 11 of them, jointly and severally, have:  
 12

13 (i)

14 a. have violated Subdivision 43(a)(1)(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §  
 15 1125(a); and  
 16

17 b. A Finding this to be an exceptional case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

18 (ii) That an injunction be issued enjoining and restraining Defendants, and each  
 19 of them, jointly and severally, and each of their officers, agents, servants, employees, and  
 20 attorneys, and all those in active concert or participation with it from:  
 21

22 a. Making any statement or representation whatsoever, or using any false  
 23 designation of origin or false description, or performing any act, which can  
 24 or is likely to lead the trade or public, or individual members thereof, to  
 25 believe that any Google, Facebook, or Amazon pay-per-click digital  
 26 advertising products manufactured, distributed, or sold by Defendants  
 27 results in payment of \$0.25 per click;  
 28



b. Destroying, altering, removing, or otherwise, dealing with the Google, Facebook, or Amazon pay-per-click digital advertising products, or any books or records which contain any information relating to the importation, manufacture, production, distribution, circulation, sale, marketing, offer for sale, advertising, promotion, rental or display of all Google AdSense digital advertising products; and

c. Effecting assignments or transfers, forming new entities or associations, or utilizing any other device for the purpose of circumventing or otherwise avoiding the prohibitions set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (c).

(iii) For an assessment of: (a) damages suffered by Plaintiff, trebled, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); or, in the alternative, (b) all illicit profits that Defendants derived while using false advertisements, misrepresentations, or misleading statements, trebled, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); (c) plaintiff be awarded a 10% market profit share of YouTube/YouTube TV; and (d) an award of Plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent provided for by Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117; and

(iv) For costs of suit, and for such other and further relief as the Court shall deem appropriate.

13. On Count thirteen of the Complaint, For judgment that Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, have:

(i)

a. have violated Subdivision 43(a)(1)(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and

1           b. A Finding this to be an exceptional case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

2  
3           (ii) That an injunction be issued enjoining and restraining Defendants, and each  
4 of them, jointly and severally, and each of their officers, agents, servants, employees, and  
5 attorneys, and all those in active concert or participation with it from:

6           a. Making any statement or representation whatsoever, or using any false  
7 designation of origin or false description, or performing any act, which can  
8 or is likely to lead the trade or public, or individual members thereof, to  
9 believe that Alphabet, dba, Google, dba YouTube/YouTube TV is a separate  
10 entity, independent of mainstream media corporations, or box office movie  
11 outlets;  
12

13  
14           b. Destroying, altering, removing, or otherwise, any books or records which  
15 contain any information relating to the importation, manufacture,  
16 production, distribution, circulation, sale, marketing, offer for sale,  
17 advertising, promotion, rental or display of all Alphabet, dba, Google, dba  
18 YouTube/YouTube TV advertising products; and  
19

20           c. Effecting assignments or transfers, forming new entities or associations, or  
21 utilizing any other device for the purpose of circumventing or otherwise  
22 avoiding the prohibitions set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (c).  
23

24           (iii) For an assessment of: (a) damages suffered by Plaintiff, trebled, pursuant to  
25 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); or, in the alternative, (b) all illicit profits that Defendants derived  
26 while using false advertisements, misrepresentations, or misleading statements, trebled,  
27 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); (c) plaintiff be awarded a 10% market profit share of  
28

1 YouTube/YouTube TV; and (d) an award of Plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees to the  
2 full extent provided for by Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117; and  
3

4 (iv) For costs of suit, and for such other and further relief as the Court shall  
5 deem appropriate.

6 14. On Count Fourteen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
7 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;  
8

9 15. On Count Fifteen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
10 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;  
11

12 16. On Count Sixteen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
13 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;

14 17. On Count Seventeen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
15 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;  
16

17 18. On Count Eighteen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
18 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;

19 19. On Count Nineteen of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
20 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;  
21

22 20. On Count Twenty of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
23 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;

24 21. On Count Twenty-one of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
25 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;  
26

27 22. On Count Twenty-two of the Complaint, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  
28 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in amount to be determined at trial;



1           23.    An award to Plaintiff of its costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in  
2 prosecuting this action; and  
3

4           24.    Any other relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a matter of law or  
5 equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.  
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
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1 **XI. Demand For Jury Trial**

2  
3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, Plaintiff hereby demands a jury  
4 trial on all issues so triable.

5  
6 Dated this 25th day of **February, 2021**

7  
8 

9 Harry J. Williby

10 Bar #: In Pro Se

11 Address: P.O. Box 990755

12 City/State/Zip: Redding, CA

13 Phone: 000-000-0000

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